Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Ukiah Rifle and Pistol Club

Decision Date07 July 2021
Docket NumberA159015
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesMATEEL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UKIAH RIFLE AND PISTOL CLUB, Defendant and Respondent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUKCVG18- 70419

BROWN J.

Plaintiff Mateel Environmental Justice Organization (Mateel) filed an action under the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health & Saf. Code[1] § 25249.5 et seq (Proposition 65 or Act)) seeking civil penalties and an injunction to stop Defendant Ukiah Rifle and Pistol Club (Club) from depositing bullets containing lead onto land where it could wash into a nearby creek and to remove existing leaded bullets from the land. The Club moved for summary judgment, arguing it was not subject to Proposition 65 because it had fewer than 10 employees on the alleged discharge dates. The trial court granted the Club's motion, entered judgment for the Club, and dismissed the case.

Because there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Club had 10 or more employees during the relevant time period, and thus whether the Club was subject to Proposition 65's discharge prohibitions, we will reverse the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Founded in 1955, the Club is a non-profit, tax-exempt membership corporation that operates a gun club and shooting range on approximately 98 acres of land in Ukiah. The Club hosts marksmanship competitions, firearm safety training, and junior rifleman programs each year. The Club offers a Junior Trap program to teach children under the age of approximately 14 to shoot trap and develop responsible shooting skills. The Club advertises to and enrolls non-members in that program and several members run it. The revenue the program generates is used to cover the Club's general expenses.

The Club's members elect a board of directors (Board) to supervise and control the Club's activities. Between February 20 and October 30, 2017, the Board was composed of the Club's nine officers.[2] After amendments to the Club's bylaws took effect on October 30, 2017, the Club still had nine Board members, but only five of them were officers.

Board members had discretion to waive the $150 annual dues of members who provided exemplary service to the Club, such as those who spent significant time operating the Junior Trap shooting program or a hunter's education program fundraising, and doing maintenance work on Club property. Between July 1, 2016 and June 30, 2017, the Club waived the dues of at least seven members who performed exemplary service to the Club. Between July 1, 2017 and June 30, 2018, the Club again waived the dues of at least seven such members, six of whom received a dues waiver the prior year. Two of the members who received dues waivers in both years helped run the Junior Trap program. The Club later stopped awarding waivers of dues.

The Club has known that users of its shooting ranges shoot leaded ammunition and that spent ammunition becomes embedded in the land at the Club's property. Mateel, an environmental organization, filed a Proposition 65 challenge on February 20, 2018, alleging that the Club discharged leaded ammunition onto its property and that, during rainstorms, lead from that ammunition washes into Sulphur Creek and subsequently into the Russian River. Mateel further alleged that lead is a listed pollutant under Proposition 65. Mateel therefore sought to enjoin the Club from shooting leaded ammunition onto its property where rain could fall on the projectiles. Mateel also sought civil penalties under section 25249.7, subdivision (b)(1) and an order requiring the Club to remove leaded projectiles from its property to the extent that rain could come in contact with it.

The Club moved for summary judgment, relying on section 25249.11, subdivision (b) to argue that it was not subject to Proposition 65 because it had fewer than 10 employees on the four days on which Mateel alleged lead from the Club's property had entered into a source of drinking water. The Club argued it had no employees because its officers and members who ran its programs were volunteers, not employees. Mateel countered that the relevant days were those on which the Club discharged leaded ammunition onto the land, not just four particular days when lead from the ammunition reached drinking water. Mateel also argued that the Club had more than 10 employees because the Club's officers and members who provided services for the Club received compensation in the form of waivers of their membership fees.

The trial court agreed with the Club, ruling that the Club did not have employees during the relevant time period. The court therefore granted the Club's motion, entered judgment for the Club, and dismissed the case.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant has met “his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Id., subd. (p)(2).) Where, as here, the defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that one or more elements of the plaintiff's claim cannot be established, the defendant must present evidence that either “conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff's cause of action” or “show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, ” evidence needed to establish an element of the claim. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853-854 (Aguilar).) If the defendant meets this burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. (Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 60.) We consider all evidence presented in the moving and opposition papers, excluding evidence to which objections were made and sustained. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.) We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Ibid.)

“The question of whether a person is an employee [under Labor Code section 3200 et seq.] may be one of fact, of mixed law and fact, or of law only. Where the facts are undisputed, the question is one of law, and the Court of Appeal may independently review those facts to determine the correct answer.” (Barragan v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 637, 642 (Barragan); see Land v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 491, 494.) “A trial court's interpretation of an administrative regulation is a legal determination and is reviewed de novo.” (As You Sow v. Conbraco Industries (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 431, 447.)

II. Proposition 65

Proposition 65 “was designed, in pertinent part, to regulate the discharge or release of cancer-causing chemicals (carcinogens) and reproductive toxins (teratogens) into drinking water. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 25249.5-25249.13; People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 298.) Under section 25249.5, the discharge prohibition, ‘No person in the course of doing business shall knowingly discharge or release a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity into water or onto or into land where such chemical passes or probably will pass into any source of drinking water, notwithstanding any other provision or authorization of law except as provided in Section 25249.9.' Section 25249.8 requires the state to publish and update annually a list of these known carcinogens and teratogens.” (Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Edmund A. Gray Co. (2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 8, 17-18, fn. omitted (Mateel).) Section 25249.11, subdivision (b) excludes from the definition of “person in the course of doing business” anyone employing fewer than 10 employees, so businesses with fewer than 10 employees are not subject to the Act. The statute of limitations for a Proposition 65 claim is one year. (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 976 (Shamsian).)

The California Health and Welfare Agency (HWA)[3] promulgated regulations to clarify the meaning of Proposition 65. (Mateel, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 18, fn. 5.) In light of Proposition 65's nature as a remedial statute whose goal is to protect Californians from toxic chemicals in drinking water, we broadly construe the statute and its regulations. (People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 314 (People ex rel. Lungren).)

The premise of the Club's summary judgment motion was that one of Mateel's discovery responses identified only four dates in early 2018 on which Mateel contended the Club discharged lead into drinking water. The Club therefore aimed its arguments at those dates and contended that it had fewer than 10 employees on those dates. As it did in the trial court, Mateel argues both that the Club is mistaken about what dates are relevant and that the trial court erred in concluding the Club had fewer than 10 employees on the relevant dates. We address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Relevant Time Period (When Discharges Occur)

Proposition 65 applies to persons employing 10 or more employees, but it does not explain how to calculate the number of employees a person employs. (§ 25249.11, subd. (b).) The HWA's regulations fill in...

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