Matey v. Estate of Dember
| Decision Date | 26 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16390) |
| Citation | 774 A.2d 113,256 Conn. 456 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | MARY LOU MATEY v. ESTATE OF SARAH DEMBER ET AL. |
Borden, Katz, Palmer, Sullivan and Vertefeuille, Js.1 Michael J. Belzer, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and William J. McCullough, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (defendant second injury fund).
Alexander H. Schwartz, with whom was Laurence V. Parnoff for the appellee (plaintiff).
This case involves a claim under the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes §31-275 et seq. (act). The defendant2 second injury fund (fund) raises the following issues on appeal from a ruling of the compensation review board (board):3 (1) whether the board improperly concluded that the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) had jurisdiction to order the fund to make payments to an injured employee (plaintiff) pursuant to General Statutes §31-355 (b),4 when the plaintiffs employer had died after receiving notice of the injury, and the plaintiff did not present her claim to the executors of her employer's estate within the time ordered by the Probate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-395;5 (2) whether the board improperly denied the fund's claim that the award must be reduced by the amount of the plaintiff's third party recovery pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 31-293;6 and (3) whether the board improperly ruled that the fund was not entitled to a hearing on its notice of intention to contest liability pursuant to § 31-355 (b), when the fund had participated in all of the proceedings before the commissioner.
This case is marked by a truly Byzantine, sixteen year procedural history. A thorough review of that history is, unfortunately, necessary for the resolution of the parties' claims.
On August 9, 1984, the plaintiff, Mary Lou Matey, was allegedly injured in an automobile accident during the course of her employment by Sarah Dember. Dember, an ailing elderly woman, had employed the plaintiff as a live-in home care aide. The plaintiff notified Dember of the accident on the day that it occurred, and Dember acknowledged that notice in a letter dated August 14, 1984, to the plaintiffs attorney.
Dember died on October 13, 1984. The plaintiff was informed of Dember's death at that time. The Probate Court for the district of Waterbury subsequently ordered that all claims against Dember's estate be presented to the executors of the estate on or before February 14, 1985, or be barred. The order was published in the Waterbury Republican on November 22, 1984. The probate record for the estate was ultimately closed on March 20, 1986.
On July 8, 1985, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 31-294,7 the plaintiff filed a notice of claim and request for a hearing with both the commissioner and the attorney representing the executors of Dember's estate. The plaintiff testified in a hearing before the commissioner that she had had a good rapport with Dember and her family, that Dember had died while the plaintiff was hospitalized as a result of the accident, and that, after leaving the hospital several weeks after Dember had died, "she was not thinking about suing." The plaintiff also testified that she had notified her counsel about the accident while she was in the hospital. She stated that she had been "hesitant about [filing the claim] then," but, at some point close to one year after the date of the accident, her attorney had indicated to her that, if she were going to make a claim, she would have to make it before the statute of limitations expired. In a letter dated July 16, 1985, counsel for the executors of Dember's estate notified the commissioner that the executors denied that the plaintiff had been an employee of Dember, and that the claim was barred by the order of the Probate Court.
The record is unclear on the matter, but we assume that the commissioner, based on the executors' denial of the estate's liability under the act, made a preliminary determination that there was some probability that the estate would not pay an award entered against it. Therefore, the commissioner notified the fund of the plaintiffs claim. The fund had an interest in the case because, pursuant to § 31-355, if Dember's estate failed to pay an award, the commissioner could direct the fund to pay the award. The date of the fund's first notification of the claim is not clear from the record, but notice of an informal hearing on the claim was mailed to the fund on August 28, 1985. While the workers' compensation claim was pending, the plaintiff also brought an action in the Superior Court against the city of Waterbury in connection with the accident. See Matey v. Waterbury, 24 Conn. App. 93, 585 A.2d 1260, cert. denied, 218 Conn. 908, 588 A.2d 1383 (1991).
During 1985 and 1986, the commissioner held hearings on the plaintiffs claim, at which counsel for the fund argued that the commissioner had no subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the plaintiff had failed to file a claim with the executors of Dember's estate within the period ordered by the Probate Court and, therefore, any cause of action against the executors was barred. On September 26, 1986, the commissioner issued its finding and award in which it found that "[n]o claim was made by the [the plaintiff] against the estate within the time set by the Probate Court for the presentation of claims." The commissioner rejected the fund's jurisdictional argument, however, and ordered the estate to pay benefits to the plaintiff at the weekly rate of $240. The fund then filed a petition for review of the finding and award with the board, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 31-301 (a).8 In its reasons of appeal, the fund again argued, inter alia, that the commissioner had no jurisdiction to order the estate to pay the plaintiff when the claim was barred by the order of the Probate Court.
On June 14, 1988, the board issued its opinion, holding that neither the commissioner nor the board had jurisdiction to construe probate statutes, but that the board had jurisdiction to determine whether the claim complied with the act. Accordingly, the board affirmed the commissioner's ruling on the fund's jurisdictional argument. The board also found, however, that there was insufficient evidence in the record on which to base a finding of equivalent monetary value for room and board that Dember had furnished to the plaintiff and, accordingly, remanded the claim to the commissioner for a hearing on that matter. On July 5, 1988, the fund appealed from the board's ruling to the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301b.9 This court then transferred the appeal to itself. Ultimately, this court dismissed the appeal, concluding that it was premature because the board's remand order had directed further evidentiary proceedings necessary for the determination of the amount of the award. See Matey v. Estate of Dember, 210 Conn. 626, 631, 556 A.2d 599 (1989).
On October 2, 1990, the commissioner, in compliance with the board's remand order, issued a finding and award in which it found that the plaintiffs weekly compensation rate was $276.66. The finding and award did not direct any person or entity to make payment to the plaintiff. We presume, however, that it was intended simply to clarify the September 26, 1986 finding and award, which ordered payment by Dember's estate.
During 1990, the plaintiff settled her third party claim against the city of Waterbury for $386,791.78, and on December 4, 1990, withdrew that action. Prior to the settlement and withdrawal, the fund had filed a motion to intervene in the action, which the trial court had denied. After the trial court also had denied the fund's motion to open and set aside the denial of its motion to intervene, the fund appealed to the Appellate Court, which, on February 12, 1991, reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with direction to grant the motion, subject to the trial court's discretion in restoring the case to the active docket. See Matey v. Waterbury, supra, 24 Conn. App. 99. On February 25, 1991, the commissioner issued an order to the fund to pay the plaintiff temporary total benefits in the amount of $115,970.38, for the period from August 9, 1984, through March 1, 1991. The fund then filed with the board a petition for review of that order. Two days after filing the petition for review, the fund filed a motion to open the order, claiming that there had been no hearing prior to the order to determine the amount of temporary total benefits due to the plaintiff. The fund also noted that the order had been prepared by the plaintiffs attorney on his firm's letterhead, but that it had not been sent to the fund prior to being sent to the commissioner. Additionally, the fund claimed that there had been an informal hearing on December 23, 1990, at which the fund had requested a formal hearing on the plaintiffs request for an order for payment from the fund pursuant to § 31-355, and at which the fund had renewed its jurisdictional claims. At the informal hearing, the fund had also raised the issue of the plaintiffs recovery from the settlement of her third party claim against the city of Waterbury.
On March 8, 1991, the commissioner granted the fund's motion to open. The board subsequently dismissed the fund's petition for review as moot in light of the commissioner's granting of the motion to open.
Over the next several years, the commissioner held a number of hearings on the claim, at which the fund continued to raise its jurisdictional and third party recovery claims. Meanwhile, on January 6, 1992, on remand from the Appellate Court, the trial court restored to the docket the plaintiffs action against the city of Waterbury, and on May 4, 1992, the court granted the fund's motion to...
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