Stec v. Raymark Indus., Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18412.,18412.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Richard STEC et al. v. RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.

10 A.3d 1

299 Conn. 346

Richard STEC et al.

v.RAYMARK INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.

No. 18412.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 21, 2010.

Decided Dec. 28, 2010.

Lucas D. Strunk, Glastonbury, for the appellant (defendant The Hartford Insurance Group).

Lawrence G. Widem, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, wereRichard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant second injury fund).

Christopher Meisenkothen, New Haven, for the appellee (plaintiff June Stec).

ROGERS, C.J., and KATZ, PALMER, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

EVELEIGH, J.

The sole issue in this certified appeal ¹ is whether the failure to file an appeal from the decision of a workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) within the twenty day limit set forth in General Statutes § 31-301(a) ² deprives the compensation reviewboard (board) of subject matter jurisdiction over that appeal.³ Specifically, we must determine whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the board improperly had dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the appeal of the second injury fund (fund) ⁴from a decision of the commissioner concluding that the plaintiff JuneStec (plaintiff), ⁵ the surviving spouse of the named plaintiff, Richard Stec (decedent), was entitled to dependent widow benefits from the decedent's employer, the named defendant, Raymark Industries, Inc. (Raymark).⁶ The defendant The Hartford Insurance Group (The Hartford),⁷ an insurance carrier that the fund claimed was potentially responsible for any benefits owed, claims that filing an appeal outside the twenty day limit set forth in § 31-301(a) deprives the board of subject matter jurisdiction over such an appeal. Conversely, the fund claims that § 31-301(a)and precedent dictate that an appeal filed outside the twenty day limit is voidable, but not void. We conclude that the time limitation set forth in § 31-301(a) for filing an appeal is jurisdictional and that filing an appeal outside of that time period deprives the board of subject matter jurisdiction over that appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.⁸

The following relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court. "In 1986, the [plaintiff, and the decedent, who was then living], filed a workers' compensation claim alleging that the decedent contracted lung canceras a result of exposure to asbestos during the course of his employment with [Raymark]. Raymark [had] been in bankruptcy proceedings since 1986, and the [fund] was cited in as a party to the workers' compensation claim because of its potential liability pursuant to General Statutes § 31-355.

"Hearings were held before the ... commissioner between 2002 and 2005, and on October 3, 2005, the commissioner issued a finding and award. In that finding and award, the commissioner found, inter alia, that [the decedent] 'sustained a compensable work-related lung injury as a result of being exposed to asbestos while working for [Raymark],' and that such injury led to his disability and ultimate death. The commissioner also found that he was 'precluded from issuing an award against the [fund] ... because an order must first issue against [Raymark] as the employer of record. An order cannot issue against [Raymark] because of its bankruptcy status.' The finding and award went on to indicate that if relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay were to be issued by the Bankruptcy Court, thecommissioner would entertain requests for orders against both Raymark and the fund.⁹

"Subsequent to that October 3, 2005 finding and award, the Bankruptcy Court issued relief from the automatic stay in the Raymark bankruptcy case. Thereafter, on September 29, 2006, the commissioner issued a new finding and award ordering Raymark to pay 'all the chapter 568 [workers' compensation] benefits noted in the October 3, 2005 finding and award.' On October 25, 2006, the commissioner issued an order to the fund for payment of the benefits under the October 3, 2005 finding and award.

"The fund appealed to the board on November 13, 2006. [The Hartford filed a brief in opposition on April 25, 2007], claiming that the fund was required to appeal to the board within twenty days of the October 3, 2005 finding and award.¹⁰In response, the fund argued thatthe appeal was timely, as it was filed within twenty days of the issuance of the October 25, 2006 order. It also argued that the motion to dismiss the appeal was filed outside of the ten day period in which such motions must be filed pursuant to Practice Book § 66-8, thereby waiving the issue of timeliness. The board dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the appeal was filed late and that a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be filed at any time." Stec v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 114 Conn.App. 81, 84-86, 968 A.2d 960 (2009).

The fund appealed from the board's dismissal to the Appellate Court, "the dispositive issue on appeal [being] whether the failure to file an appeal to the [board] within the twenty day period set forth in § 31-301(a) deprives the board of its subject matter jurisdiction or whether timely filing may be waived by the parties." Id., at 86, 968 A.2d 960. In determining that such a failure did not deprive the board of subject matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court "conclude[d] that § 31-301(a) does not limit the board's subject matter jurisdiction to hear a late appeal but, rather, provides the board with discretion to hear a late appeal when no timely motion to dismiss has been filed." ¹¹ Id., at 99, 968 A.2d 960. The Appellate Court accordingly reversed the decision of the board dismissing the fund'sappeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. This certified appeal followed.

The Hartford claims on appeal that the board has a time-tested interpretation of § 31-301(a), that the board lacks subject matter jurisdiction over untimely appeals and that this interpretation is entitled to deference. In support of its claim, The Hartford asserts that: (1) the plain language of the twenty day appeal period set forth in § 31-301(a), in concert with General Statutes § 31-300 ¹² and a regulation promulgated pursuant to § 31-301(e),¹³demonstrates that the board must dismiss anuntimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction; (2) the time limitation for filing an appeal should be narrowly and strictly construed because workers' compensation statutes are in derogation of the common law; (3) the Appellate Court recognized, but failed to apply, the public policies of expediency and finality that underlie the workers' compensation statutes; (4) the judgment of the Appellate Court conflicts with established precedent of that court and the board; and (5) Murphy v. Elms Hotel, 104 Conn. 351, 133 A. 106 (1926), wherein this court determined that an untimely workers' compensation appeal was voidable, but not void, is not binding precedent.

The fund responds by claiming that: (1) the language of § 31-301 fails to provide sufficiently clear and unambiguous evidence that the legislature intended for an appeal outside the twenty day limit to deprive the board of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) this court should abide by the legislature's policy of a voidable, nonsubject matter jurisdictional appeal period; (3) the Appellate Court did not disregard established precedent when it reversed the board's dismissal of the fund's appeal; and (4) Murphy v. Elms Hotel, supra, 104 Conn. at 351, 133 A. 106, is applicable and binding precedent. We agree with The Hartford.

"As a threshold matter, we set forth the standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals. The principles that govern our standard of review in workers' compensation appeals are well established. The conclusions drawn by [the commissioner] from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them.... It is well established that [a]lthough not dispositive, we accord great weight to the construction given to the workers' compensation statutes by the commissioner and [the] board.... [W]e do not afforddeference to an agency's interpretation of a statute when ... the construction of a statute previously has not been subjected to judicial scrutiny or to a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Redding, 296 Conn. 352, 362-63, 995 A.2d 51 (2010). In addition to being time-tested, an agency's interpretation must also be reasonable. Derrane v. Hartford, 295 Conn. 35, 42, 988 A.2d 297 (2010).

This court has never addressed whether the twenty day appeal limitation set forth in § 31-301(a) deprives the board of subject matter jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. The Hartford claims that the board's interpretation of § 31-301(a) is time-tested and, therefore, entitled to deference. Specifically, The Hartford cites twenty years of board decisions concluding that the failure to file an appeal within the time limit set forth in § 31-301(a) deprives the board of subject matter jurisdictionover such untimely appeals.¹⁴ The fund disagrees, relying on Murphy v. Elms Hotel, supra, 104 Conn. at 351, 133 A. 106, as applicable and binding precedent rendering the board's interpretation immaterial.

Our research reveals that the board repeatedly has interpreted the appeal period set forth in § 31-301(a) as limiting its jurisdiction over untimely appeals, and that the board has espoused this interpretation since its earliest published decisions. See Golob v. State, 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 3, (1980); Ilewicz v. State, 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 5, (1980); Merto v. Mason-Dixon Transportation Co., 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 7 (1980); see also Karas v. Hamilton, 1 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 26, (1981) ...