Matheis v. CSL Plasma, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 September 2018
• Docket Number: Civil No. 1:17-cv-00785
• Citation: 346 F.Supp.3d 723
• Parties: George F. MATHEIS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CSL PLASMA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

346 F.Supp.3d 723

George F. MATHEIS, Jr., Plaintiff,

v.CSL PLASMA, INC., Defendant.

Civil No. 1:17-cv-00785

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed September 27, 2018

Zachary E. Nahass, CGA Law Firm, York, PA, for Plaintiff.

Louis Evan Van Gorder, Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, Harrisburg, PA, Bruce J. Douglas, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC, Minneapolis, MN, Donald D. Gamburg, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

SYLVIA H. RAMBO, United States District Judge

This case under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , presents an issue of first impression within the Third Circuit: whether a blood plasma donation center meets the definition of a "public accommodation" under the ADA. Plaintiff George Matheis, Jr. brings this action, alleging that Defendant CSL Plasma Inc.¹ ("CSL") unlawfully discriminated against him due to his disability. Presently before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 26.) For the reasons that follow, the court will grant Defendant's motion.

I. Background

The relevant facts are not in dispute. CSL is the owner and operator of a plasma donation center located in York, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 26-1, ¶ 2.) At its heart, CSL's business model consists of screening potential blood plasma donors, accepting or rejecting those potential donors, taking blood plasma from approved donors, paying those donors for their plasma, and selling the plasma to pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-9.) CSL is regulated by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and is licensed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-16.) FDA regulations guide CSL in determining whether to accept or reject potential donors and require prospective donors to undergo a physical examination and complete a medical history questionnaire. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.) Members of the public are allowed in CSL's reception area, but must be screened and approved before being allowed into the plasma donation portion of the facility. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) CSL staff members² obtain a blood sample and a "brief" medical history consisting of current health, surgeries, medications, diagnoses, tattoos, needle marks, and other related questions. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.) Staff members also perform a visual examination and may reject donors if they appear to have an undisclosed illness or if a disclosed illness appears particularly severe. (Id. at ¶¶ 28-30.) Staff use a medical reference document that lists common conditions and gives guidance on whether those conditions could cause a potential donor to be rejected. (Id. at ¶¶ 31-32.) If the staff member is unsure whether a potential donor should be rejected, the staff member can call a licensed physician and consult about whether to accept or reject the potential donor. (Id. at ¶ 33.)

Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania citizen who has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder

("PTSD") stemming from a medical screening that occurred after a police-involved shooting. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Due to his disability, Plaintiff sometimes suffers from panic attacks when exposed to crowded or confined spaces, verbal altercations, or helicopter noise. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.) The symptoms associated with Plaintiff's PTSD range from physical paralysis to violent outbursts such as breaking a door off of its hinges if Plaintiff feels trapped in a confined space. (Id. at 48-49.) Despite his PTSD, Plaintiff successfully made approximately 90 plasma donations at the CSL facility between January and December 2016 and earned approximately $250-$300 per month from plasma donations. (Id. at ¶¶ 58-60.) Plaintiff never had a panic attack during the donation process. Since October 2016, Plaintiff has used a service dog, "Odin," to help him cope with his PTSD. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-51.) Odin was originally purchased as a pet and was not specifically "prescribed" by a medical professional. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-52.) Odin's training included "pressure therapy," which consisted of leaning on or lying against Plaintiff when a panic attack was imminent and "willful disobey," meaning that Odin would leave his sitting position and lead Plaintiff out of the triggering environment. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-57.)

During Odin's initial training, Plaintiff brought him to the CSL facility to allow Odin to become comfortable with places that Plaintiff frequents. (Id. at ¶ 63.) A staff member initially told Plaintiff that dogs were not allowed in the facility. (Id. at ¶ 64.) Plaintiff was instructed to confer with a staff member and informed the staff member that Odin was a service dog used to help him deal with his anxiety. (Id. at ¶¶ 65-66.) Plaintiff was informed that CSL had a policy prohibiting service animals for anxiety, but allows service animals for vision-disabled and hearing-disabled patients. (Id. at ¶¶ 40, 67-70.) According to CSL policy, this limitation is not due to health concerns related to the dog's presence. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Instead, the need for a service dog for anxiety is an indicator that the potential donor's anxiety is too severe to safely undergo the donation process. (Id. ) CSL essentially equates the use of a service dog with the need for "more than two medications daily" to treat anxiety-related issues, which is a standard reason to reject a potential donor. (Id. at ¶ 41.) This rejection criteria is based on 21 C.F.R. § 630.10(e)(2), which provides that a "donor is ineligible to donate when donating could adversely affect the health of the donor ..." (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 41.) Apparently, CSL fears that a patient with severe anxiety could harm himself or herself if the donation process induces an anxiety or panic attack. (Id. )

After Plaintiff had been rejected as a donor and informed of the CSL policy, a CSL nurse told Plaintiff that he would be able to donate if he brought a note from his physician stating that he could donate safely. (Id. at ¶¶ 70-71.) While having this conversation with the CSL nurse, Plaintiff began to have a panic attack and left the facility aided by the nurse and a general manager. (Id. at ¶¶ 74-76.) Plaintiff has not returned to CSL or any other plasma donation center since that incident. (Id. at ¶ 77.)

On May 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging discrimination under the ADA, as well as either negligent infliction of emotional distress or intentional infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.³ (Doc. 1.) CSL filed an answer to the complaint on June 5, 2017. (Doc. 10.) After the conclusion of discovery, CSL filed the instant motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2018. (Doc. 26.) Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on March 24, 2018, (Doc. 30,) and CLS filed a reply brief on April 15, 2018 (Doc. 32). The matter has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp. , 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations, but must consider all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Andreoli v. Gates , 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).

To prevail on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party can discharge the burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman , 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," but must show sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. Cty. of Allegheny , 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). However, if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the non-movant's case, and on which the non-movant will bear the burden of proof at trial," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment because such a failure "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Jakimas v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. , 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation and alterations omitted).

III. Discussion

Title III of the ADA provides that individuals with disabilities must be given full and equal access to places of public accommodation and the benefits, goods, and services associated with those accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). In order to state a claim for discrimination under Title III, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is disabled; (2) that the defendant qualifies as a place of public accommodation as defined by the ADA; and (3) that the defendant discriminated against him based on one or more of his disabilities.

Sharrow v. Bailey , 910 F.Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Pa. 1995). The parties do not contest that Plaintiff's PTSD qualifies as a disability under the ADA. Thus, the court will turn first to a novel issue in this Circuit: whether a plasma donation center, such as CSL,...