Mather v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.

• Decision Date: 13 March 1914
• Citation: 125 Minn. 186,145 N.W. 963
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: MATHER et al. v. LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited.

125 Minn. 186

145 N.W. 963

MATHER et al.

v.LONDON GUARANTEE & ACCIDENT CO., Limited.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 13, 1914.

Appeal from District Court, St. Louis County; Bert Fesler, Judge.

Action by Samuel Mather and others against the London Guarrantee & Accident Company, Limited. Verdict for plaintiffs, and, from denial of motion for judgment, or for new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Action upon an accident policy insuring the employés of Pickands, Mather & Co. against bodily injuries suffered through external, violent, and accidental means. The policy as printed contained a provision that it did not cover casualties resulting from certain specific causes, among which sunstroke was included. The assured wanted a policy which covered sunstroke, and, for this reason, the word ‘sunstroke’ was stricken from this provision. Deceased died from sunstroke. Under the facts of this case the court cannot hold, as a matter of law, that sunstroke is a disease, and not such a casualty as was covered by the policy.

Where the proper construction of a contract is not free from doubt, recourse may be had to the preliminary negotiations between the parties fot the purpose of determining the correct constructions to be given it. Alexander Marshall, of Duluth, for appellant.

Washburn, Bailey & Mitchell, of Duluth, for respondents.

TAYLOR, C.

Defendant issued to Pickands, Mather & Co., as trustees for their employés, an accident policy insuring such employés against accidental injuries. John Mozina, one of the employés so insured, while at work in a boiler room, suffered a ‘sunstroke’ or ‘heatstroke’ from which death ensued. Plaintiffs brought suit upon the policy and recovered a verdict. Defendant made the usual motion for judgment or for a new trial, and appealed from the order denying it.

[1][2][3] It is conceded at the outset that sunstroke and heatstroke are synonymous, and mean a sudden prostration resulting from exposure to excessive heat, regardless of the source from which the heat emanates. The controversy is whether the policy covers injury and death from sunstroke. Defendant contends that sunstroke is not an accident but a disease; that medical authorities class it as a disease; and that the courts have held that it is not an accident. Sinclair v. Maratime Pass. Assur. Co., 3 El. & El. 478; Dozier v. Fidelity, etc., Co. (C. C.) 46 Fed. 446, 13 L. R. A. 114. On the other hand plaintiffs contend that the ordinary person regards sunstroke as an accident; that it is within the definition of an accident (Kerr on Insurance, 380; May on Insurance, §§ 518-520); that it is held to be an accident within the meaning of the English Workingmen's Compensation Act (Ismay, Imrie & Co. v. Williamson, 24 Times L. Rep. 882; Morgan v. Owners of Steamship Zenaida, 25 Times L. Rep. 446); and that giving the terms ‘accidental and sunstroke’ their ordinary and popular meaning, instead of a technical one, brings sunstroke within the casualties covered by the policy. It is not necessary to determine these contentions as abstract propositions. The policy...