Mathers v. Sewell

• Citation: 186 N.W. 636,193 Iowa 35
• Decision Date: 14 February 1922
• Docket Number: No. 34453.,34453.
• Parties: MATHERS ET AL. v. SEWELL ET AL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

193 Iowa 35

186 N.W. 636

MATHERS ET AL.

v.SEWELL ET AL.

No. 34453.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 14, 1922.

Appeal from District Court, Clinton County; F. D. Letts, Judge.

Action in equity to set aside a deed. The petition alleged mental incapacity, undue influence, and nondelivery. Plaintiffs' petition was dismissed, and they appeal. The facts appear in the opinion. Affirmed.Lee R. Harding and Geo. F. Skinner, both of Clinton, for appellants.

Wolfe, Wolfe & Claussen, of Clinton, for appellees.

FAVILLE, J.

One Luella Sewell was the owner of lots 1 and 2 in block 8 in Ringwood No. 2 to the city of Clinton. On the 12th day of January, 1915, she had executed her last will and testament, by the terms of which she devised said described lots to her sister, Frances H. Mathers, reserving, however, in said real estate, a life estate for her husband, James W. Sewell. The devisee named in said will predeceased the said testatrix, and the appellants are her sole heirs at law, and claim a right to the property in controversy in this action as such heirs of the said predeceased devisee, under the provisions of section 3281 of the Code.

On February 2, 1920, the said Luella Sewell signed and executed two warranty deeds; by one of said deeds she conveyed said lot 1 to her husband, James W. Sewell, and by the other deed she conveyed said lot 2 to the appellants herein. It is conceded that the last-named deed was never delivered to appellants.

The grantor died on the 22d day of February, 1920. Her husband died on the 27th day of the following August. This action is brought to vacate and set aside the deed to lot 1. Said deed was filed of record on the day following the death of the grantor.

I. There is no sufficient evidence of either mental incapacity or of undue influence to have justified a decree in appellants' favor.

II. The case turns upon the question of the delivery of the deed in controversy. The said Luella Sewell and her husband, James W. Sewell, had been married about 18 years. Mrs. Sewell was 65 years of age, and her husband 94. From the fall of 1919 until her death in February, 1920, the grantor was in poor health. On the same day in which the deed in question was executed, the grantor was taken from her home to the hospital, where she remained until the time of her death. The circumstances surrounding the execution and acknowledgment of the deed in controversy are not fully disclosed in the record. It appears from the evidence that after the execution of the deeds they were placed with other papers of the grantor in a bookcase or desk. On the day that the grantor left her home to go to the hospital, she told her husband to “get those deeds and take care of them.” Thereupon Mr. Sewell went to the bookcase, and took the deeds therefrom, and placed the same in his pocket. On the Sunday following, it appears that the grantee had the deed in question in his possession, and after the death of his wife he still had it in his possession, and gave it to his son at that time, who placed the same of record. The question for our determination at this point is whether or not, on this state of facts, there was such a delivery as was sufficient to pass title to the grantee named in said deed. The deed is an ordinary form of warranty deed, without any limitations or conditions.

The question of delivery of a deed has been so frequently before this court that it is impossible and unnecessary for us to review the authorities at length. A few general rules applicable to the instant case may, however, be of service in arriving at a conclusion. There is no question, under the evidence, of the fact that the grantor in the deed personally directed the grantee to take the said deed in his possession and to “take care of it.” The deed was unconditional upon its face, and the grantor caused the same to be placed in the hands of the grantee by her specific direction. There was no expression on the part of the grantor that the delivery was conditional, or that the grantor intended to retain any control whatever over the said deed. There was no expression of any purpose to have the deed restored to the grantor at any time, nor was there any condition or reservation expressed. There is no dispute in the evidence that the grantor specifically directed the grantee to “get those deeds and take care of them,” and that to the knowledge of the grantor the grantee did so take the deed and take possession of it, and there is nowhere any claim that thereafter the grantor at any time in any way expressed to the grantee any desire that the deed be returned, or expressed any claim thereto, or in any way sought to disavow the delivery of the deed.

[1] The appellants offered the testimony of a Mrs. Burham, who testified in regard to a conversation which she had with the grantor, Mrs. Sewell, after the deed in question had been executed and turned over to the grantee, under the direction of the grantor, in the manner heretofore described. The witness testified that in said conversation the grantor said, referring to the deeds:

“She wouldn't have them recorded then, because if she lived she didn't want it that way, but if she died she wanted them recorded.”

Even if this evidence was competent, it would not be sufficient to impeach the deed, which is unconditional on its face, and was placed in the possession of the grantee by specific direction of the grantor. Furthermore, the rule is well recognized that declarations and admissions of a grantor, after the execution and delivery of a conveyance, cannot be received in evidence to render ineffectual a solemn deed, found after the death of the grantor in the possession of the grantee. McGee v. Allison, 94 Iowa, 527, 63 N. W. 322;Burch v. Nicholson, 157 Iowa, 502, 137 N. W. 1066;Cedar Rapids Natl. Bank v. Lavery, 110...