Mathews v. Sniggs
| Decision Date | 01 July 1919 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 8237 |
| Citation | 1919 OK 196,182 P. 703,75 Okla. 108 |
| Parties | MATHEWS et al. v. SNIGGS et al. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
¶0 1. Pleading -- Counterclaim or Cross-Petition--Requisites.
A counterclaim or cross-petition must be pleaded as fully and distinctly, and with the same substantial requisites, as an original cause of action; it must be sufficient within itself without recourse to other parts of the pleading, or other pleadings, unless by express reference. It should be separately stated, and must show with certainty the character of the claim, how it accrued, and the facts making it a proper subject of counterclaim or cross-petition.
2. Set-Off and Counterclaim--Extent of Remedy--Counterclaim.
A counterclaim secures to the defendant full relief, which a separate action at law or a bill in chancery or a cross-bill would have secured to him on an allegation and proof of the facts; but it relates to only such causes of action as exist against the plaintiff, and might, in their nature, be the basis of an action against him at the suit of the defendant.
3. Action--Distinction Between Law and Equity--Abolishment--Scope of Statute.
While section 4650, Rev. Laws 1910, abolishes the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, the essential and inherent principles of legal and equitable rights and legal and equitable remedies remain as before; the Code provision not being intended to produce any alteration of, nor direct effect upon, the primary rights, duties, and liabilities of persons created or recognized either in law or equity.
4. Jury--Right to Jury Trial--Constitutional Guaranty.
The right of trial by jury, declared inviolate by section 19, art. 2, Const., except as modified in the Constitution itself, means the right as it existed in the territory at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
5. Same--Equity Cases.
The constitutional guaranty that "the right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate" has no reference to the trial of issues of fact in equity cases.
6. Action--Determination of Nature.
The character of an action is to be determined by the nature of the issues made by the pleadings and the rights and remedies of the parties, and not alone by the form in which the action is brought or by the prayer for relief, which, in this respect, forms no material part of the pleading.
7. Jury--Jury Trial--Refusal in Equity Case.
Plaintiffs brought an action based in part upon a claim of equitable title to lands, the effect of which, if sustained, would have been to restore to one of them the title which she had theretofore conveyed to one of the defendants. The defendants answered setting up legal title acquired by such deed, which they asked to have quieted both against the claim of equitable title of the plaintiff and against a lease made by her, as well as against a further claim of right to temporary occupancy of the premises under an order of the county court in an administration proceeding, made after the execution and delivery of the deed, but without notice to them. Upon call of the case for trial, plaintiffs amended the prayer of their first cause of action, and demanded a jury trial upon all of the issues. This the court denied and proceeded to hear the case upon defendants'' cross-petition and upon plaintiffs'' first cause of action, reserving, for the time, plaintiffs'' right to a jury trial upon such issues of fact, if any, as should remain after the equitable issues were disposed of. Held, that as the issues tried were equitable, and the relief granted such as only a court of equity could render, the court did not err in refusing a jury trial upon such issues, even though the trial before the court effectually disposed of the entire case.
8. Same--Counterclaim.
The defendants being in possession of the land in controversy, and having the right to bring a suit in equity against plaintiffs to quiet their title, could, when sued, by counterclaim, under sections 4745, 4746, Rev. Laws 1910, avail themselves of such right, to all intents and purposes and subject to the same rights respecting trial by the court as if their action had first been brought and they were plaintiffs instead of defendants.
9. Same.
The rule announced in the foregoing paragraph is otherwise where the answer sets up an equitable defense for the sole purpose of defeating plaintiffs'' recovery, and in which no affirmative relief by cross-petition is asked.
10. Quieting Title--Right of Action to Remove Cloud.
Where the surviving wife and minor children, lay removal from the state, abandon the homestead of the family, which upon the death of the husband and father they would have had the right to "continue to possess and occupy," under section 6328, Rev. Laws 1910, an order of the county court, made on hearing of the final report of the administratrix (the surviving wife), without notice to a prior purchaser of the surviving wife''s portion of the lands, is ineffectual to defeat either the title or right of occupancy of such purchaser or his trustee or grantee, and constitutes a cloud on the title such as a court of equity has power to remove.
11. Equity--Jurisdiction--Scope of Relief.
For the purpose of avoiding more than one suit, and in order that a full, effectual, and final decree adjusting the right and equities of all parties in interest may be entered and enforced, a court of equity, once having rightfully assumed jurisdiction of a cause on any equitable ground, will retain such jurisdiction for the purpose of administering complete relief in the determination of the entire subject-matter of the action.
12. Pleading -- Amendment at Trial -- Statute.
Amendment of pleadings in furtherance of justice may be allowed during the trial, when such amendments do not substantially change the "claim or defense." Section 4790, Rev. Laws 1910.
Error from District Court, Payne County: R. W. Higgins, Assigned Judge.
Action by Lorena Mathews and James L. Mathews, a minor, by his guardian, M. F. Edwards, against Anna M. Sniggs and others, Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Affirmed.
Robert A. Lowry, Chester H. Lowry, Giddings & Lillard, and T. Emmett Buckley, for plaintiffs in error.
Lydick & Lydick, J. M. Springer, Stuart, Cruce & Cruce, Shartel, Dudley & Shartel, and John E. Luttrell, for defendants in error.
¶1 This case presents error from the district court of Payne county, and involves the title to a one-third interest in, and the right of Lorena Mathews and James L. Mathews to the possession of 100 acres of land. During his lifetime the land was owned and occupied by Lawrence E. Mathews, husband of Lorena Mathews and father of Fannie and James L. Mathews. Mathews died in Payne county in December, 1908, leaving as heirs his wife and the children named. Some time after the death of Mathews, his wife and a negro were arrested. charged with his murder. Lorena Mathews employed Moman Pruiett to defend her of the criminal charge, and executed and delivered to him one promissory note for $ 3,100 and another for $ 1,000, which second note was delivered to Pruiett for Robert A. Lowry, theretofore employed by Lorena Mathews as her attorney. To secure the payment of the note first mentioned, Lorena Mathews gave to Pruiett a real estate mortgage on her one-third interest in the land. Afterward, and on the 12th day of April, 1913, Lorena executed and delivered to Anna M. Sniggs a warranty deed to her undivided one-third interest in the land.
¶2 It is the circumstances connected with the making of this deed that furnish principally the subject-matter of the suit. Plaintiffs contend that the deed was given to enable defendant Sniggs to qualify as a surety on the bond of Lorena Mathews. On the other hand, the defendants contend that after entering into the original contract of employment arrangements were made whereby Ben F. Williams was to succeed Lowry, and that he and Pruiett were to have charge of the defense, and that thereupon a new fee contract was entered into whereby the attorneys named were to accept for their services the one-third interest of Lorena Mathews in the land, and that it was in fulfillment of this agreement that the warranty deed was made. Furthermore, that the original contract of employment having been, by mutual agreement of the parties, changed in the respect named, Pruiett afterward released of record the mortgage given him and returned the notes to the maker. The deed was made to Anna M. Sniggs, sister-in-law of Pruiett, and intended for the use and benefit of Pruiett and Williams. On the same date of the Lorena Mathews deed, her daughter, Fannie, at the time a minor, by agreement with her mother, executed to Anna M. Sniggs a warranty deed to her undivided one-third interest in the land. Anna M. Sniggs subsequently signed the appearance bond of Lorena Mathews, and the case coming on for trial some time thereafter, she was acquitted of the charge of murder. On May 1st following, Anna M. Sniggs conveyed the two-thirds interest in the land by warranty deed to Pruiett and Williams, who, on the 1st day of July following, conveyed the same by warranty deed to W. I. Ritchey, husband of Fannie (Mathews) Ritchey, who contemporaneously therewith executed a mortgage in favor of Pruiett and Williams in the sum of $ 6,500. On the same day W. I. Ritchey conveyed the land by warranty deed to J. A. Ritchey, who was at the time of the trial the holder of the legal title. At the time of the institution of the suit, and for some time prior thereto, J. A. Ritchey, through his tenant, Geo. Mitchell, was in possession of the premises. In the suit brought by Lorena Mathews and James L. Mathews it was charged that at the time of the death of Lawrence E. Mathews the land in question constituted the homestead of himself and family; and at the time of making the deed to Anna M. Sniggs it was...
To continue reading
Request your trial