Mathews v. State
| Decision Date | 07 April 1921 |
| Docket Number | A-3326. |
| Citation | 198 P. 112,19 Okla.Crim. 153 |
| Parties | MATHEWS v. STATE. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Rehearing Denied June 13, 1921.
Syllabus by the Court.
In a criminal case the courts of this state will not inquire as to whether the laws of some other state have been violated in transporting an accused person into the jurisdiction of this state. If the court lawfully acquires jurisdiction of the person after he is within reach of its processes, the means used to bring him there will not be a subject of inquiry.
It is a general rule that upon the trial of one accused of a crime evidence is admissible to prove a conspiracy to commit the crime charged, although the conspiracy is not charged in the indictment. This is not permitted for the purpose of allowing a conviction for a crime not charged, but to lay a foundation for the admission of evidence.
A statement contained in an information, to the effect that the false pretenses charged were made to a banking corporation as distinguished from its officers and agents, is sufficient to give the accused the necessary information as to the scope and character of the crime charged. A corporation is an artificial person, made so by statute, and cannot act or be influenced except through its officers and agents.
It is not necessary for the information to state that by reason of the false pretenses the bank bought the worthless commercial paper of which complaint is made. It makes no difference whether the bank parted with its money through a sale of the commercial paper, or whether it was hypothecated for that purpose. The gist of the offense is the procuring of the money, or something of value, by means of the false pretenses.
The right of the accused in the selection of the jury is one of exclusion of incompetent jurors, and not one of inclusion of particular persons who are competent. No fixed rule can be applied to the numerous reasons why a juror may be excused from the regular panel before examination in the case, and whether a juror should be excused before being examined in any case rests in the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed unless it is shown that such discretion has been abused, to the actual prejudice of the complaining party.
In the examination of jurors, where no attempt is made to state in advance what the instructions would be or what the facts would disclose, it was not prejudicial error to permit the state to ask certain prospective jurors whether, if they were convinced by the instructions of the court and the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant, they would hesitate to find the defendant guilty. The purpose of such questions was doubtless to ascertain whether the jurors would accept the instructions of the court as the law of the case.
The mere fact that a prospective juror is a depositor in the bank interested in the prosecution of the defendant will not disqualify such juror, where it is not shown that his business relations are such as might influence his verdict or cause the bank to oppress him or place him at the mercy of the bank.
Where a juror, from what he had heard or read, believed that a fraud had been committed, but had no recollection or opinion as to who had perpetrated the fraud, and had formed and expressed no opinion as to the guilt of the defendant, he is not disqualified by the mere fact of his belief that some person to him unknown, had committed the fraud.
Where it is claimed that a banking corporation was systematically engaged in issuing fraudulent and worthless commercial paper the fact of the insolvency of such corporation may be shown by statements and records of public officers whose duty it was to inquire into and examine its fiscal affairs, and this may be supplemented by reports of commercial agencies, and by information obtained from bankers and others, in the nature of hearsay evidence.
The fact that conspiracy is formulated in another state, and that the defendant, a coconspirator, was not within this state prior to the commission of the overt act of which complaint is made, will not deprive the courts of this state of jurisdiction to try such defendant when later apprehended within its territorial jurisdiction. Every person participating in an unlawful conspiracy is deemed to be a principal, and is punishable as such, although he may not have been present or within the jurisdiction of the court when the overt act was consummated.
It is immaterial in what order testimony predicated upon a conspiracy is introduced, if the series of facts and circumstances shown in evidence ultimately make a prima facie case of conspiracy. A conspiracy may, and generally must, be proved by a number of independent acts, conditions and circumstances tending to show an unlawful common purpose of the conspirators.
Where it appears that a trust company issues worthless commercial paper, denominated "Time Certificates," and these certificates were ingeniously designed and calculated to mislead and deceive persons of ordinary prudence, and where the circumstances surrounding the sale of one of these certificates were purposely arranged to deceive, the rule of caveat emptor will not apply.
Appeal from District Court, Payne County; John P. Hickam, Judge.
J. Dawson Mathews was convicted of obtaining money by false pretenses, and he appeals. Affirmed.
J. M. Springer and E. G. Wilson, both of Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
S. P. Freeling, Atty. Gen., and W. C. Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
On the 24th day of October, 1917, plaintiff in error, J. Dawson Mathews, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was convicted of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses from the Oklahoma State Bank of Cushing on the 19th day of March, 1917, and was sentenced to confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of three years. From this judgment and sentence he appeals.
It appears from the evidence on the part of the state: That at and before the date of the offense charged one J. Greeley Jones was operating a purported banking institution in Houston, Tex., known as the Commonwealth Trust Company, with a reported capital stock of $250,000; that the defendant, for some time prior to the alleged offense, appeared to be in some way interested in this trust company, and spent much of his time at its offices, and advised and directed some of its business transactions; that the defendant was one of the principal customers of this concern, in buying and disposing of its worthless securities in the form of "time certificates," purchased in the name of J. A. Brown, for defendant's own benefit and profit, between the 15th day of February and the 5th day of March, 1917, of the total amount of $175,000; that the defendant was a man of very limited means and resources, and that he obtained these certificates by exchanging for them oil stocks that were worthless, and known by him at the time to be worthless.
That the place of business of this Commonwealth Trust Company was in two rear rooms on the fourth floor of the Beatty Building in Houston, Tex.; that the office force of the institution consisted of a bookkeeper, who also exercised the functions of cashier, teller, and stenographer; that the concern had no assets of any value, excepting the office furniture and fixtures of the probable value of $300.
That the defendant procured these time certificates--presumably and ostensibly certificates of deposit--to be issued to J. A. Brown, a fictitious person not in being; that the defendant assumed to act for J. A. Brown under a power of attorney, executed in his favor in 1914, and defendant, conspiring together with others, indorsed these time certificates to whoever could be induced to buy, and, among others, sold a certificate in the amount of $5,000, due six months from date, to the State Bank of Cushing, Okl., on March 19, 1917.
That these time certificates were without value, and that the trust company was wholly insolvent, and that the scheme and plan of the defendant and his confederates in selling these time certificates to innocent purchasers amounted to a mere confidence game, by means of which unsuspecting banks and others were fleeced out of large sums of money, in the belief that they were purchasing time certificates of deposit issued by a repatable, solvent banking institution.
That the defendant, at different times before and after the alleged offense, caused a number of these time certificates to be sent by express to G. C. Wisdom and others in Oklahoma City; that on the 15th day of March, 1917, G. C. Wisdom and Charles H. Garnett appeared at the Oklahoma State Bank at Cushing, and represented to the officers of the bank that they were contemplating closing a transaction of the sale and purchase of an oil lease, and that they had a certificate of deposit for the sum of $5,000, issued by the Commonwealth Trust Company of Houston, Tex., to J. A. Brown and indorsed by him to G. C. Wisdom, and that they desired to cash the same, representing to the bank that the certificate of deposit was regular, and that the Commonwealth Trust Company was a solvent, going concern, and that the indorsement and transfer were regular and valid.
The bank at Cushing did not cash this certificate on this day but wrote a letter to the Commonwealth Trust Company, inquiring about its validity. In reply the trust company wrote to the bank that the certificate would be good if it bore the indorsement of J. A. Brown, and that the indorsement of Mr. Wisdom would be the only transfer necessary to convey good title to the bank; that the certificate and the indorsement of J. A. Brown were both genuine; that they did not care to discount their...
To continue reading
Request your trial