Mathews v. State

• Decision Date: 20 November 1893
• Citation: 93 Ga. 38,18 S.E. 996
• Parties: MATHEWS. v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

18 S.E. 996

93 Ga. 38

MATHEWS.

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 20, 1893.

Intoxicating Liquors—Licenses—Who Authorized to Issue.

1. The act of 1879 (Acts 1878-79, p. 334) which confers upon the commissioners of roads and revenues of Putnam county exclusive jurisdiction in fixing the amount of the license for the sale of spirituous liquors, and which, after conferring powers touching the road laws, declares that the commissioners "shall exercise such other powers as are granted by the Code of the state" to the justices of the inferior court, or to that court, with the restriction that they shall have no jurisdiction save and except such as pertains to county matters, invests the commissioners with power to grant or refuse licenses to retail spirituous liquors in the county specified; the Code referred to being that which was of force wdien the constitution of 1SGS was ratified, and which, in section 1-132, (Irwin's Rev. Code.) vested this power in the justices of that court. By the general law of 1890. (Acts 1890-01, vol. 1, p. 128,) a license to sell in any quantity is requisite, and power to grant the same is lodged with the same officer or officers having power to grant licenses to retail.

2. The jurisdiction to grant such licenses in Putnam county being exclusively in the commissioners of roads and revenues, and the authorities of no town or city in that county having any power over the subject, an indictment for unlawfully selling spirituous liquors in that county, which negatives the granting of any license by the commissioners, is sufficient, without making any reference to the corporate authorities of any town or city.

3. The evidence warranted the verdict, and there was no error in overruling the certiorari.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from superior court, Putnam county; W. F. Jenkins. Judge.

Pomp Mathews was convicted of selling intoxicating liquors unlawfully, and brings error. Affirmed.

H. A. Jenkins and Harrison & Peoples, for plaintiff in error.

H. G. Lewis, Sol. Gen., Hines, Shubrick & Felder, and J. S. Turner, for the State.

LUMPKIN, J. 1. The act of 1879 creating a board of commissioners of roads and revenues for Putnam county, and defining its powers and duties, which act is cited in the first headnote, confers upon the commissioners exclusive jurisdiction in "fixing the amount of the license for the sale of spirituous liquors." By section 5 of this act it is also declared "that said commissioners shall have the same power of appointing road commissioners, and enforcing the road laws, the justices of the inferior court had by the Code of this state, prior to the ratification of the constitution of eighteen hundred and sixty-eight of this state, and shall exercise such other powers as are granted by the Code of the state to said justices, or said court, or are indispensable to their jurisdiction; and shall have no jurisdiction, save and except such as pertains to county matters." In order, therefore, to determine whether or not the act in question conferred upon the commissioners of Putnam county the power to grant or refuse licenses to retail spirituous liquors in that county, it is necessary to inquire whether or not, under the Code in force prior to the ratification of the constitution of 1868, the justices of the inferior court, or that court, had this power, and, if so, whether or not the exercise of it pertained to a "county matter." The first inquiry admits of no difficulty. Section 1432 of Irwin's Revised Code, which is the Code above referred to, distinctly provides that "persons, before obtaining license to retail spirituous liquors, must apply to the justices of the inferior court of the county in which they' desire to retail, who have the power to grant or refuse such application." The jurisdiction in question, therefore, undoubtedly belonged to the justices of the inferior court. Now, did the subject-matter of that jurisdiction fall within what were termed "county matters?" We think it did. It is true that in section 34G of the Code above mentioned, which conferred upon the inferior court, when sitting for county purposes, jurisdiction over various matters,...