Mathews v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-21442 |
| Parties | SCOTT MATHEWS, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
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Pending before the Court is Verizon Communications Inc.'s ("Defendant") motion to dismiss the amended putative class action complaint (the "Complaint") filed by plaintiff Scott Mathews ("Plaintiff"). Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. ("FCRA"). Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims on the basis that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege a willful or negligent violation of the FCRA. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes as true the relevant facts derived from Plaintiff's Complaint and the documents attached thereto. In or around September 2018, Plaintiff discovered while performing a routine review of his credit report, that on September 10, 2018, Defendant performed a credit inquiry on him. Am. Compl. ¶ 10. In doing so, Defendant allegedly obtained access to Plaintiff's credit report. Id. at. ¶ 2 n.2. Plaintiff alleges that he was not, at that time, or any other time, Defendant's actual or prospective customer. Id. at ¶ 9.
Plaintiff subsequently received a letter, dated September 25, 2018, informing him of a Verizon account opened in his name. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that he had not opened an account with Defendant or any of its subsidiaries. Id. Defendant acknowledged by letter dated October 1, 2018, that Plaintiff had not opened or initiated the account in question. Id. at ¶ 12. The letter explained that Verizon had "completed its investigation into [Plaintiff's] claim regarding the Verizon Wireless account . . . and has concluded that [Plaintiff is] not responsible for any of the charges on the account." See Am. Compl. Ex. B, October 1, 2018 Letter. Further, the letter stated that Verizon would submit a request to "each of the three major credit reporting agencies to remove [Plaintiff] from any of the reporting on the account." Id.
On November 14, 2019, Defendant allegedly conducted another credit inquiry on Plaintiff and accessed Plaintiff's credit report. Id. at ¶ 13. Again, Plaintiff asserts that he had not opened or sought to open an account with Defendant or any of its subsidiaries. Id. Following this second credit inquiry, Defendant allegedly sent cellular phone equipment to Plaintiff's home, which Plaintiff had not ordered. Id. at ¶ 16.
When Plaintiff contacted Defendant in or around November 2019, about the unauthorized credit inquiry, Defendant purportedly agreed to remove both the September 2018 and November 2019 inquiries from Plaintiff's credit reports. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to do so, and never explained to Plaintiff why the credit inquiries were conducted without his authorization. However, each time Plaintiff contacted Verizon he was allegedly directed to the company's "Fraud Department." Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff explains that, to his knowledge, he was not a victim of identity theft. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff, relying on publicly posted complaints from various internet websites, further alleges that Defendant routinely obtains credit reports for individuals who are neither current nor prospective customers of Defendant. Id. at ¶¶ 21, 23-25 .
Plaintiff filed a one-count putative class action complaint against Defendant on December 17, 2019, asserting a violation of Section 1681b of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, and in response, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on March 3, 2020. On May 14, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a claim "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must first separate the factual and legal elements of the claims and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010); Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This standard requires the plaintiff to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but does not create as high of a standard as to be a "probability requirement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. The moving party bears the burden of proving that the complaint fails to state a claim. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). "The inquiry is not whether plaintiff[] will ultimately prevail in a trial on themerits, but whether [he] should be afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of [his] claims." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002).
The court separates the factual elements in the complaint from the legal conclusions, then determines whether the facts alleged suffice to establish that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012); Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). The Third Circuit requires a three-step analysis to meet the plausibility standard mandated by Twombly and Iqbal. First, the court should "outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365. Next, the court should "peel away" legal conclusions that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (). It is well-established that a proper complaint "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Finally, the court should assume the veracity of all well-pled factual allegations, and then "determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 365 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A claim is facially plausible when there is sufficient factual content to draw a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The third step of the analysis is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679.
In re Burlington CoatFactory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). "[A] court may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 822 F.3d 125, 133 n.7 (3d Cir. 2016); Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (); Arcand v. Brother Int'l Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 282, 292 (D.N.J. 2009) (); In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). A court may also consider "any 'matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.'" Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant willfully violated the FCRA by knowingly obtaining Plaintiff's consumer report without a permissible purpose and without authorization from Plaintiff, in violation of Section 1681b. Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to allege a FCRA violation and that it had a permissible purpose in accessing the Plaintiff's credit report. ECF No. 13, Def. Br. at 2, 5. Furthermore, Defendant argues that the heightened pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) should apply to the instant motion ratherthan the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Id. at 11-12. The Court first addresses the applicable pleading standard before reviewing the FCRA claim.
To comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to...
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