Mathias v. Billet-Barclay
| Decision Date | 12 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:16-CV-01338 |
| Parties | SHAHNAWAZ M. MATHIAS, Plaintiff v. APRIL BILLET-BARCLAY, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Chief Magistrate Judge Schwab)
The plaintiff Shahnawaz M. Mathias claims that the defendants violated his rights in connection with his probation supervision and probation-revocation proceedings. Currently pending are cross-motions for summary judgment as to some of Mathias's claims. For the reasons discussed below, we will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts I, II, III, and IX of Mathias's amended complaint, and we will deny Mathias's motion for partial summary judgment.
In June of 2016, Mathias began this action by filing a complaint naming the following six defendants: (1) York County; (2) York County Adult Probation Department ("Department"); (3) April Billet-Barclay, Chief Probation Officer; (4) Albert Sabol, former Chief of Adult Probation; (5) Amy Alu, Adult Probation/Parole Supervisor; and (6) Crystal Perry, Adult Probation/Parole Officer. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. After those motions were briefed, the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the case was referred to the undersigned. Although we granted the motions to dismiss the complaint, we granted Mathias leave to file an amend complaint.
Mathias then filed an amended complaint naming Billet-Barclay, Sabol, Alu, and Perry in their individual capacities. Mathias alleges that Perry was his primary probation officer and the other defendants were her supervisors. He alleges that he was required to meet with Perry once a week, whereas others under Perry's supervision were not required to meet with her weekly. He further alleges that Perry made discriminatory and derogatory comments to him including telling him that he should marry within his own race, and she refused to allow him to getmarried or have children. He also alleges that Perry restricted his travel beyond the restrictions imposed by the court.
Mathias further alleges that the defendants penalized him every time he exercised his legal rights and filed an appeal by telling him that because he appealed, they were extending his probation. He alleges that even though his term of probation had already expired, the defendants filed a petition to revoke his probation, which resulted in the court revoking his probation, after which he was arrested and incarcerated. Mathias claims that the defendants falsely arrested him, falsely imprisoned him, and maliciously prosecuted him.
The amended complaint contains eight counts. Counts I through III are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Count IV is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Counts V through VII are state-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Count VIII is a state-law claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. And Count IX is a claim for civil conspiracy.1
The defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint, and the parties had time to conduct discovery.
Currently pending is Mathias's motion for partial summary judgment. Mathias's motion is a partial motion for summary judgment because his motion and his brief in support address only his claims that the defendants violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments in supervising and revoking his probation and arresting and detaining him. He limits his argument to the claims that the defendants extended his probation beyond his five-year sentence imposed by the court and arrested him for a probation violation after his five-year sentence had expired. Mathias does not mention his racial-discrimination claims or his state-law claims. Thus, we construe him as seeking summary judgment as to only Counts I, II, III, & IX of the amended complaint.
Also currently pending is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Although the defendants do not title their motion as a partial motion for summary judgment, like we construe Mathias's motion, we construe the defendants' motion as a motion for partial summary judgment as to only Counts I, II, III, & IX of theamended complaint. The defendants contend that they are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and qualified immunity, doctrines which apply to only federal claims. See Miller v. New Jersey, 144 F. App'x 926, 929 (3d Cir. 2005) (); Tara M. by Kantner v. City of Philadelphia, 145 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir. 1998) (). The defendants do not mention Mathias's state-law claims.2 And in their brief, they limit their arguments to Mathias's claims that they extended and moved to revoke his probation beyond the five years imposed by the court and arrested him for a parole violation after his five-year sentence had expired. They do not mention Mathias's racial-discrimination claims in their brief in support of their motion for summary judgment.3 Thus, we construe the defendants as seekingsummary judgment as to only Counts I, II, III, & IX of Mathias's amended complaint.
The parties move for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a 'genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality." Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by "'showing'—thatis, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial," summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49. When "faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts 'in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court "is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Id. at 250.
Further, a party that moves for summary judgment on an issue for which he bears the ultimate burden of proof faces a difficult road. United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). "[I]t is inappropriate to grant summary judgmentin favor of a moving party who bears the burden of proof at trial unless a reasonable juror would be compelled to find its way on the facts needed to rule in its favor on the law." El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted). A party who has the burden of proof must persuade the factfinder that his propositions of fact are true, and "if there is...
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