Mathis v. Carney

• Decision Date: 06 January 2023
• Docket Number: 21-CV-01573-CRE
• Parties: JANIIS MATHIS, LAWRENCE MICHAELS, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE; CLAIRE DEMATTE, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS COMMISSIONER; PERRY PHELPS, FORMER DEPUTY WARDEN; DAVID PIERCE, JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; JOHN D. WETZEL, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SECRETARY; JOHN DOE, DELAWARE STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, MARYLAND STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, CERT DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECDTIONS OFFICER; MICHEAL ZAKEN, FACILITY MANAGER; STEPHEN BUZAS, DEPUTY OF FACILITY MANGEMENT; MARK DELLESANDRO, UNIT MANAGER OF THE IMU; AND COULEHAN, Defendants,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

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JANIIS MATHIS, LAWRENCE MICHAELS, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE; CLAIRE DEMATTE, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS COMMISSIONER; PERRY PHELPS, FORMER DEPUTY WARDEN; DAVID PIERCE, JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; JOHN D. WETZEL, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SECRETARY; JOHN DOE, DELAWARE STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, MARYLAND STATE POLICE OFFICERS; JOHN DOE, CERT DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECDTIONS OFFICER; MICHEAL ZAKEN, FACILITY MANAGER; STEPHEN BUZAS, DEPUTY OF FACILITY MANGEMENT; MARK DELLESANDRO, UNIT MANAGER OF THE IMU; AND COULEHAN, Defendants,

No. 21-CV-01573-CRE

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

January 6, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Cynthia Reed Eddy United States Magistrate Judge

I. RECOMMENDATION

This civil action was initiated in this Court on November 3, 2021 by Plaintiffs Janiis Mathis and Lawrence Michaels (collectively “Plaintiffs”) against various public officials and corrections officials alleging violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs were given leave to file an Amended Complaint on June 2, 2022 which is their operative complaint. (ECF No 65).

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction or alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim by Defendants John Carney (Governor of Delaware), Clair DeMatteis (9^th Commissioner of Delaware Department of Correction), John/Jane Doe (Delaware State Police), John/Jane Doe (Delaware Department of Correction Officer Cert Team), Perry Phelps (8^th Commissioner of Delaware Department of Correction), and David Pierce (former Warden of James T. Vaughn Correctional Center) (collectively “Delaware Defendants”) (ECF No. 66). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 67, 89, 90).

For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Delaware Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 66) be granted and that Plaintiffs' claims against all Delaware Defendants be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.

II. REPORT

a. Background

In 2017, Plaintiffs were inmates in the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“JTVCC”) located in Delaware. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 65) at ¶ 1. On or about February 2, 2017, there was a prison riot at JTVCC and Plaintiffs claim that they were assaulted by Maryland State Police, Delaware State Police and Correctional Staff at the correctional center after they were found on the ground in their cell with their hands up in a non-aggressive manner. Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiffs claim they were beaten, pepper sprayed, not provided with meals or showers for two days, held in an empty cell without any personal property for two days and their personal property from their cell was destroyed. Id. at ¶¶ 33-38. Plaintiffs claim they were held in solitary confinement following the prison riot after being accused of orchestrating the riot and criminally charged in connection with orchestrating the prison riot. Id. at ¶ 5. These charges were nolle prosequi on July 11, 2019. Id.

They further claim that Defendants Carney and DeMatteis entered into a contract with Defendant John D. Wetzel to transfer 300 JTVCC inmates, including Plaintiffs, to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and to specifically place seven prisoners, including Plaintiffs, into restricted housing upon transfer into the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections without a misconduct hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 54-56. Thereafter, Plaintiff Mathis was transferred to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections on April 3, 2019, and Plaintiff Michaels was transferred to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections on June 28, 2019. Id. at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs claim that since their transfer, they remain housed in solitary confinement in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Id. at ¶ 7.

Plaintiffs assert the following claims against the Delaware Defendants:

1. Defendants John/Jane Doe of the Delaware State Police and John/Jane Doe of the Delaware Department of Correction Officer Cert. Team: First, Fourth and Eighth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with the response to the prison riot on February 1, 2017;

2. Defendants Carney and DeMatteis: Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with the transfer of Plaintiffs to Pennsylvania from Delaware; and

3. Defendants Phelps and Pierce: Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in connection with Plaintiffs being placed in solitary confinement following the prison riot and subsequent criminal investigation against Plaintiffs.

Delaware Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them.

b. Standard of Review

i. Pro Se Litigants

A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges,” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

While 28 U.S.C. § 1915 authorizes litigants like Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, such status is a privilege which may be denied when abused. After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must dismiss any claims sua sponte if: “(i) the allegation of poverty is untrue; (ii) the action is frivolous or malicious; (iii) the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iv) the complaint seeks money damages from a defendant who is immune from suit.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

ii. Rule 12(b)(2) - Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Rule 12(b)(2) requires a court to dismiss a case when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). A court must analyze jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 104 (3d Cir. 2004). A defendant bears the initial burden of raising personal jurisdiction as a defense. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1). “When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish ‘jurisdictional facts through sworn affidavits or other competent evidence'.” Regan v. Loewenstein, 292 Fed.Appx. 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Patterson by Patterson by Patterson v. F.B.I., 893 F.2d 595, 604 (3d Cir. 1990)). If there is no evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case by furnishing facts that establish with reasonable particularity that personal jurisdiction exists. Provident Nat. Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff meets this burden, then the burden shifts back to a defendant to present a compelling case that personal jurisdiction is unreasonable. Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)).

iii. Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claim

The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to...