Mathis v. State

• Decision Date: 11 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. CA CR 08-634.,CA CR 08-634.
• Parties: Christopher Boyd MATHIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

314 S.W.3d 280

2009 Ark. App. 181

Christopher Boyd MATHIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CA CR 08-634.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

March 11, 2009.

Kinslow Law Firm, by: Chris H. Kinslow, Malvern, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Eileen W. Harrison, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge.

After a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Christopher Mathis of two counts of residential burglary and two counts of theft of property. Because of these convictions, the circuit court also revoked Mathis's probation from an earlier, unrelated conviction. Mathis does not challenge the revocation of his probation other than by challenging the convictions. The court sentenced Mathis to 121 months' imprisonment, running all of his sentences concurrently.

Mathis's sole argument for reversal, a sufficiency challenge, lacks merit. Navarro v. State, 371 Ark. 179, 186-87, 264 S.W.3d 530, 535-36 (2007); Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-36-103, 5-39-201 (Supp.2007 & Repl. 2006). In so holding, we view the evidence supporting the convictions in the light most favorable to the State and affirm if substantial evidence supports the convictions. Navarro, 371 Ark. at 186, 264 S.W.3d at 535. "Circumstantial evidence may provide a basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Whether the evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the fact-finder to decide." Ibid. at 186-87, 264 S.W.3d at 536. On appeal, however, we must determine whether the fact-finder resorted to speculation or conjecture in reaching his decision. King v. State, 100 Ark.App. 208, 213-15, 266 S.W.3d 205, 206-07 (2007) (supplemental opinion denying rehearing).

The facts of the case were these. During the first week in May of 2007, Mathis and his friend and housemate, Tyler Blackwell, went to Heath Coit's house trying to sell Coit a gun. A few days later, on May 5, 2007, Coit discovered that two jars of coins were missing from his house. Coit testified that no one else had been to his house between Mathis's and Blackwell's visit and his discovery that the jars of coins were missing. During that same period of time, Coit passed a person that he thought was Mathis one morning on the highway, and Mathis was headed in the direction of Coit's rural home. Coit said that he always kept his doors locked and had found pry marks around one of his windows. One of the stolen jars, according to Coit, was unique.

A few weeks earlier, the police had alerted the Kroger employees to be on the lookout for a tall, white male using the Coinstar machine because someone had broken into the middle school and stolen coins. Carol Sneed, an employee at Kroger, saw Blackwell using Kroger's Coinstar machine on May 3, 2007, to cash in a jar of coins. Sneed saw Blackwell throw the empty jar in the trash can, and she and the Kroger manager recovered the jar and turned it over to the police. Carolyn Bronson, another Kroger employee, corroborated Sneed's story and added that she saw Mathis pull up to Kroger to pick Blackwell up. Coit testified that he was ninety-percent sure that the jar recovered from Kroger was his.

Steven Keistler was the other victim. He testified that a five-gallon water jug filled with coins was stolen from his house. On the night of May 5, 2007, Keistler was working as a D.J. at Club Brittany. Keistler saw Mathis at the club and briefly spoke with Mathis. Keistler noticed that Mathis left for about an hour and a half before reappearing at the club. When Mathis returned to the club, he bought beer with change. When Keistler returned home around 4:00 A.M., his door had been kicked in and his jug of coins was missing. A police officer recovered a five-gallon water jug a few days later in a creek near Club Brittany. Keistler testified that Mathis had admitted to stealing coins from him before, and that is why he thought Mathis stole the coins this time. Keistler said that he did not press charges the first time because he was friends with Mathis's parents.

We address the theft-of-property convictions first. The State had to prove that Mathis knowingly took or exercised unauthorized control over another person's property with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a). In addition to the evidence described above, the State presented a jail-house admission.

While Mathis was in jail shortly after his arrest, his wife and his mother visited him. The police recorded their conversation. Mathis's mother told him that the police had found Coit's coin jar in the garbage can. Mathis said "fingerprints of mine and Tyler's. None of Coit's." Then, after talking about the location of the "big" water jug, Mathis said "the only way that there's . . . fingerprints on those jugs that belonged to them is if . . . the police officer hands it up here and says, `Here, touch this, with your bare . . . hand.' And if he did it's throwed out because there's fingerprints overlapping our fingerprints. . . ." Mathis further admitted that "we turned in change, but it was Tyler's change. And that's our story and we are sticking to it." When pressed by his mother, Mathis stated "I know it was stupid. We're dumb." He then added "if I get out, you know what I'm saying, it would be good. If I don't, you know, I get what I deserve, I guess."

Considered as a whole, the circumstantial evidence of theft was substantial. It satisfied the requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-103, and did not leave the fact-finder to speculation or conjecture. Gamble v. State, 351 Ark. 541, 545-47, 95 S.W.3d 755, 758-59 (2003). We therefore affirm Mathis's theft convictions.

We next consider the burglary convictions. The State had to prove that Mathis entered a residential occupiable structure of another person with the purpose of committing therein any offense punishable by imprisonment. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1). But "possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt of burglary of the party in whose possession the property is found, unless it is satisfactorily accounted for to the fact-finder. This is so even if there is no direct evidence of breaking or entering by the appellant." Stout v. State, 304 Ark. 610, 617-18, 804 S.W.2d 686, 691 (1991). We have already held that substantial evidence exists that Mathis possessed the jars and jugs full of coins that were stolen from Coit's and Keistler's homes. Mathis's possession of the recently stolen property was left unexplained. We therefore affirm Mathis's burglary convictions as well. Stout, 304 Ark. at 617-18, 804 S.W.2d at 691; Ark.Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1).

Affirmed.

ROBBINS, J., agrees.

MARSHALL, J., concurs.

D.P. MARSHALL JR., Judge, concurring.

join the court's judgment because precedent requires me to do so. But I write separately to express my concern over the rule, developed in our cases, that "possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt of burglary, larceny and possession of stolen property. This presumption arises even when there is no direct evidence of breaking or entering by the defendant." Jacobs v. State, 287 Ark. 367, 369, 699 S.W.2d 400, 401 (1985). Due process requires the State to prove every essential element of every crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Entering, or remaining unlawfully in, another person's home is an essential element of residential burglary. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-39-201(a)(1). May entry or presence be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt solely from possession of stolen property? I don't think so. To satisfy the Due Process Clause, other facts and reasonable inferences must fill the evidentiary gap.

In some cases, this rule makes sense because of the defendant's close proximity—both in time and place—to the scene of the crime and the presence of other circumstantial evidence tying the defendant to the crime. See, e.g., Stout v. State, 304 Ark. 610, 804 S.W.2d 686 (1991); Lane v. State, 288 Ark. 175, 702 S.W.2d 806 (1986); Jacobs, supra; Turner v. State, 64 Ark.App. 216, 984 S.W.2d 52 (1998); Alexander v. State, 55 Ark.App. 148, 934 S.W.2d 927 (1996); Brown v. State, 35 Ark.App. 156, 814 S.W.2d 918 (1991). The defendant's proximity and other circumstances—plus possession—make the inference reasonable, logical, and sound.

Consider Brown. The police approached Brown around 9:30 one morning because he matched the description of a suspect. Brown abandoned the shopping cart he was pushing and...