Matlock v Ar Blue Cross Blue Shield

• Decision Date: 27 June 2001
• Docket Number: 00-1153
• Citation: 49 S.W.3d 126
• Parties: ERIKA MATLOCK, APPELLANT, V. ARKANSAS BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, APPELLEE. CA00-1153 Arkansas Court of Appeals DIVISIONS I, II, and III 27 June 2001 AN APPEAL FROM ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION REVERSED AND REMANDED. Wendell L. Griffen, Judge. Erika Matlock appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that denied benefits for injuries suffered when she fell while returning to her work station at Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield after a trip to the restroom. Appellant argues that the Commission erroneously interpreted Act 796 of 1993 when it determined that she was not performing employment services when she was injured and, therefore, that her injury was not compensable. She also contends that the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We hold that the Commission's finding thatappellant was not performing employment services when she sustained injuries from the fall is not supported by substantial evidence, nor does the Commission's opinion display a substantial basis for denial of the relief sought. We specifically hold that the Commission erred in construing Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 1999) to require a denial of benefits under the facts of this case. Thus, we reverse the Commission's decision and remand for a determination of appellant's benefits. In reaching this decision, we serve notice that our statement in Beaver v. Benton County, 66 Ark. App. 153, 156, 991 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1999), that "the personal-comfort doctrine is no longer the law," was obiter dictum. Finally, we take this opportunity to list some factors that should be instructive to the Commission, employers, workers, and their legal counsel in determining whether an employee's activity falls within the course of employment. Background Facts The parties strongly disagree on whether the Commission correctly found that appellant was not performing employment services when she fell on stairs while returning from the tenth-flo
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

ERIKA MATLOCK, APPELLANT,

V.

ARKANSAS BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD, APPELLEE

CA00-1153

Arkansas Court of Appeals DIVISIONS I, II, and III

27 June 2001

AN APPEAL FROM ARKANSAS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION [E904817]REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge.

Erika Matlock appeals a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that denied benefits for injuries suffered when she fell while returning to her work station at Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield after a trip to the restroom. Appellant argues that the Commission erroneously interpreted Act 796 of 1993 when it determined that she was not performing employment services when she was injured and, therefore, that her injury was not compensable. She also contends that the Commission's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We hold that the Commission's finding thatappellant was not performing employment services when she sustained injuries from the fall is not supported by substantial evidence, nor does the Commission's opinion display a substantial basis for denial of the relief sought. We specifically hold that the Commission erred in construing Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 1999) to require a denial of benefits under the facts of this case. Thus, we reverse the Commission's decision and remand for a determination of appellant's benefits. In reaching this decision, we serve notice that our statement in Beaver v. Benton County, 66 Ark. App. 153, 156, 991 S.W.2d 618, 620 (1999), that "the personal-comfort doctrine is no longer the law," was obiter dictum. Finally, we take this opportunity to list some factors that should be instructive to the Commission, employers, workers, and their legal counsel in determining whether an employee's activity falls within the course of employment.

Background Facts

The parties strongly disagree on whether the Commission correctly found that appellant was not performing employment services when she fell on stairs while returning from the tenth-floor restroom to her ninth-floor workstation. However, appellant's account regarding the underlying facts is not controverted. Appellant testified that she began working for Blue Cross Blue Shield in January 1999 as an overpayment clerk. At around 9 o'clock a.m. on January 29, 1999, appellant left her desk on the ninth floor to use the restroom. The ninth-floor restroom was occupied, so she went to the restroom on the tenth floor. While returning to resume work on the ninth floor, appellant fell on the stairs and sustained a contusion to her left knee, strained her right ankle, and injured her back. The back injury was eventually diagnosed by Dr. David L. Reding, a Little Rock neurosurgeon, as a small disc rupture at L5-S1 on the right, for which Dr. Reding recommended conservative treatment. Appellant testified that she was off work for almost three months (from April 5 until July 6, 1999) for her back problem.

Appellant filed a workers' compensation claim. Her employer controverted the claim, contending that appellant was not performing employment services when the accident occurred. The record of the hearing before the Commission's Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consists of appellant's testimony and medical exhibits. The ALJ denied the claim, and appellant appealed to the Commission. The Commission affirmed, relying on our statement in Beaver v. Benton County, supra, that "the personal-comfort doctrine is no longer the law." The Commission also found that "an alleged injury sustained while an employee is going to or from the bathroom, while no employment duties are being carried out, is not compensable under Act 796 of 1993." This appeal followed.

I. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Authority

When a workers' compensation claim is denied, the substantial evidence standard of review requires us to affirm the Commission if its opinion displays a substantial basis for denial of the relief sought by the worker. See McMillian v. United States Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 953 S.W.2d 907 (1997); see also Shaw v. Commercial Refrigeration, 36 Ark. App. 76, 818 S.W.2d 589 (1991). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and affirm if they are supported by substantial evidence. See Weldon v. Pierce Bros. Constr., 54 Ark. App. 344, 925 S.W.2d 179 (1996). The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to the ones made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988).

II. "Employment Services"

and the "Personal Comfort" Doctrine

Our analysis begins with Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) which defines a "compensable injury" as follows:

[a]n accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body . . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. An injury is "accidental" only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence; . . . .

The parties apparently agree that appellant suffered an accident involving harm to her body. Their dispute centers on whether appellant's injury was one "arising out of and in the course of employment" in view of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(B), which prescribes what is not a "compensable injury." Specifically, the statute reads:

(B) "Compensable injury" does not include:

(iii) Injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed . . . .

Thus, the critical inquiry is whether appellant was performing"employment services" within the meaning of the statute when she fell while returning to her work station after using the restroom.

The "employment services" requirement was added to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law by Act 796 of 1993. The general rule precluding worker's compensation benefits for acts performed by employees solely for their own benefit does not apply to acts of personal convenience or comfort; in this regard, the "personal comfort" doctrine -- also sometimes referred to as the "personal convenience" exception -- was developed to provide coverage when an employee is injured while taking a brief pause from labors to minister to the various life necessities such as satisfying thirst, eating, discharging bodily wastes, protecting oneself from excessive heat or cold, or cleansing oneself. Although technically the employee's actions do not contribute directly to the employer's profits, compensation is justified under the "personal comfort" exception on the rationale that the employer indirectly benefits in the form of better work from a happy and rested worker, and on the theory that such a minor deviation does not take the employee out of the employment. Under the doctrine, acts that do not conflict with specific instructions and that are normally expected for an employee to indulge in under the conditions of the work, are considered incidental to employment duties within the course of employment. See 1A Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 21.10 (1990). See also 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, § 283.

In Lytle v. Arkansas Trucking Services, 54 Ark. App. 73, 923 S.W.2d 292 (1996), our court quoted Professor Larson's treatise concerning the "personal comfort" doctrine or exception as follows:

Employees who, within the time and space limits of their employment, engage in acts which minister to personal comfort do not thereby leave the course of employment, unless the extent of the departure is so great that an intent to abandon the job temporarily may be inferred, or unless, in some jurisdictions, the method chosen is so unusual and unreasonable that the conduct cannot be considered an incident of the employment.

Id. at 54 Ark. App. at 79, 923 S.W.2d at 295.

The boundaries of the personal-comfort exception in Arkansas were blurred when Act 796 became effective on July 1, 1993. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 1996). Act 796 also contains the following declaration of legislative intent at Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-1001:

It is the specific intent of the Seventy-Ninth General Assembly to repeal, annul, and hold for naught all prior opinions or decisions of any administrative law judge, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any provision of this act. In the future, if such things as the statute of limitations, the standard of review by the Workers' Compensation Commission or courts, the extent to which any physical condition, injury, or disease should be excluded from or added to coverage by the law, or the scope of the workers' compensation statutes need to be liberalized, broadened, or narrowed, those things shall be addressed by the General Assembly and should not be done by administrative law judges, the Workers' Compensation Commission, or the courts.

While our opinion in Lytle mentioned the "personal comfort" doctrine, it did so in the context of a claim that predated Act 796 (the Lytle worker was a truck driver who alleged an injury sustained on July 3, 1992). However, unlike pre-Act cases, post-Act cases require a determination that the worker was injured while performing "employment services," a requirement that is unique to Arkansas.(FN1)

We first addressed the meaning of "employment services" in, Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996), a post-Act case involving a nurse's assistant whose job required her to care for patients in their homes. Pettey was injured in an automobile accident while en route from her employer's offices to the home of a patient. The...