Matonovich v. State Bd. of Tax Com'rs

• Decision Date: 15 February 1999
• Docket Number: No. 49T10-9809-TA-00111,49T10-9809-TA-00111
• Citation: 705 N.E.2d 1093
• Parties: John S. MATONOVICH, personally and as North Township Assessor, Booker Blumenberg, personally and as Calumet Township Assessor, and Hank Adams, personally and as St. John Township Assessor, Petitioners, v. STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Tax Court

Page 1093

705 N.E.2d 1093

John S. MATONOVICH, personally and as North Township Assessor, Booker Blumenberg, personally and as Calumet Township Assessor, and Hank Adams, personally and as St John Township Assessor, Petitioners, v. STATE BOARD OF TAX COMMISSIONERS, Respondent.

No. 49T10-9809-TA-00111

Tax Court of Indiana.

Feb. 15, 1999.

Kathryn D. Schmidt, Joseph E. Costanza, Kevin E. Steele, Burke Costanza & Cuppy, Merrillville, Indiana, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana, Angela L. Mansfield, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Respondent.

FISHER, J.

John S. Matonovich and other Lake County township assessors (hereinafter referred to collectively as Petitioners) have filed an original tax appeal challenging portions of an order of the State Board of Tax Commissioners

(State Board) requiring a reassessment of all real property in Lake County. ¹

BACKGROUND

A division of the State Board, the Division of Tax Review ² studied the need to reassess real property in Lake County. In its study, the Division of Tax Review concluded that there was a need to conduct a reassessment of all real property in Lake County due to an endemic problem with the uniformity of assessments within classes of property. See IND. CONST. art. X, § 1. On April 1, 1998, in response to the study, the State Board issued a Reassessment Resolution and Order. In the Reassessment Resolution and Order, the State Board found sufficient cause to hold hearings regarding the reassessment of all real property in Lake County. ³ On May 19 and 20, 1998, the State Board conducted those hearings.

On August 14, 1998, after considering the evidence presented at the hearings as well as supplemental evidence, the State Board ordered the reassessment of all real property in Lake County as of March 1, 2000 pursuant to the State Board's authority under section 6-1.1-4-9. In its order, the State Board stated that it would hire a contractor to conduct and oversee the reassessment. (State Bd. Ord. pp 53-54). The contractor would be paid out of the Lake County Reassessment Fund. ⁴ In addition, the State Board ordered Lake County assessing officials to submit a statement detailing what assistance they could make available to the contractor hired by the State Board. (State Bd. Ord. p 53).

On September 11, 1998, the Petitioners filed this original tax appeal. On October 22, 1998, after hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court enjoined the State Board from contracting with any entity for purposes of allowing that entity to conduct the Lake County reassessment. On November 25, 1998, the Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment. In its response, the State Board asked the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor. ⁵ On January 26, 1999, the Court heard the arguments of counsel on the Petitioners' motion, and the Court now issues its decision. Additional information will be supplied as necessary.

ANALYSIS AND OPINION

Jurisdiction

Although neither party raises the issue of this Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will do so sua sponte. See City Securities Corp. v. Department of State Revenue, 704 N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998). Nowhere in the statutory provisions governing reassessment orders is there any mention of judicial review procedures or remedies available to aggrieved parties. However, under IND.CODE § 33-3-5-2 (1998), the Court has jurisdiction over initial appeals of final determinations of the State Board. See Miller v. Gibson County Solid Waste Management Dist., 622 N.E.2d 248, 249 (Ind. Tax Ct.1993). The reassessment order at issue in this case constitutes a State Board final determination for purposes of section 33-3-5-2, thereby making judicial review of the State Board's reassessment order available to the Petitioners. See Bowman v. State Bd. of Nursing, 663 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); see also Mills v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 639 N.E.2d 698, 701 (Ind. Tax Ct.1994); Johnson County Plan Comm'n v. Ramshead Corp., 463 N.E.2d 295, 299-300 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petitioners' claims.

Standard of Review

The State Board is afforded great deference when it acts within the scope of its Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See IND. T.R. 56 (C); Dana Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 694 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998). Cross motions for summary judgment do not alter this standard. See Hyatt Corp. v. Department of State Revenue, 695 N.E.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998), review denied. The summary judgment procedure is designed to terminate cases in which there can be no factual dispute and that may be decided as a matter of law. See Mayfield v. Continental Rehabilitation Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 738, 740 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. Questions of statutory construction are particularly amenable to resolution by summary judgment. See State Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 693 N.E.2d 972, 974 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

authority. Accordingly, the Court reverses State Board final determinations only when those determinations are unsupported by substantial evidence, are arbitrary or capricious, constitute an abuse of discretion, or exceed statutory authority. See Clark v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 694 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (Ind. Tax Ct.1998).

Discussion

In their summary judgment motion, the Petitioners do not challenge the State Board's authority to order a county-wide reassessment under section 6-1.1-4-9. Instead, the Petitioners maintain that portions of the reassessment order are invalid because the reassessment order unlawfully infringes upon the Petitioners' authority to conduct that reassessment. Specifically, the Petitioners contend that the State Board has no authority to conduct the reassessment it has ordered and therefore has no authority to hire a contractor to do so on its behalf. The Petitioners also contend that although the State Board has the authority to oversee the reassessment, it does not have the authority to employ contractors to do so on its behalf. ⁶ Both contentions will be addressed in turn.

It is axiomatic that as a creature of the Legislature the State Board only has those powers granted by statute. See State Bd. of Pub. Welfare v. Tioga Pines Living Ctr., 622 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Ind.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1195, 114 S.Ct. 1302, 127 L.Ed.2d 654 (1994); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Department of State Revenue, 672 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Ind. Tax Ct.1996); Vehslage v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) ( "Administrative boards, agencies, and officers have no common law or inherent powers, but only such authority as is conferred upon them by statutory enactment."). In addition, "[a]ll doubts regarding a claim to power by a governmental agency are resolved against the agency." ANR Pipeline Co., 672 N.E.2d at 94 (citing Adkins v. City of Tell City, 625 N.E.2d 1298, 1302 (Ind.Ct.App.1993)). However, this rule should not be employed by courts to unduly restrict authority granted to an agency by the Legislature. Because the State Board only has that authority granted to it by statute, in resolving the issues raised in the Petitioners' summary judgment motion, the Court must look to the statutory provisions governing the State Board's authority.

One of the duties of the State Board is to "see that all property assessments are made in the manner provided by law." Id. § 6-1.1-35-1(3) (1998); see also Bielski v. Zorn, 627 N.E.2d 880, 886 (Ind. Tax Ct.1994); cf. IND.CODE § 6-1.1-4-31(a) (1998) (State Board required to check conduct of a general reassessment). In carrying out this duty, the State Board has the authority to supervise a county-wide reassessment it has ordered. Under IND.CODE § 6-1.1-30-10 (1998), the State Board has the authority to "delegate to a field representative or supervisor the board's powers with respect to any duty of the board." Under As for the State Board's authority to conduct the Lake County reassessment, the law is not so clear. The Court's research has disclosed no statutory provision explicitly allowing the State Board to conduct the Lake County reassessment. Therefore, the resolution of this dispute turns on whether the State Board's authority to order that reassessment and its authority to supervise that reassessment necessarily imply the authority to conduct that reassessment. From the Court's examination of the specific statutory provisions relied on by the parties and the general tenor of the laws governing the assessment of property, the Court concludes that the State Board does not have the authority to conduct the Lake County reassessment and therefore does not have the authority to hire contractors to do so on its behalf.

IND.CODE § 6-1.1-30-8 (1998), the State Board may employ field representatives and supervisors so that the State Board may perform its duties. This gives the State Board the authority to select whomever it chooses to oversee and supervise the Lake County reassessment.

The State Board argues that section 6-1.1-4-9 itself allows the State Board to conduct the reassessment. However, the plain language of section 6-1.1-4-9 ⁷ speaks in terms of the State Board ordering a reassessment, not conducting a reassessment. This strongly implies that the State Board is not the body charged with actually conducting that reassessment. In general, a person does not order himself to do something. Rather, an order is usually given to others to do something. In addition, the fact that section 6-1.1-4-9 requires the State Board to specify in its order the time in which the reassessment must be completed strongly suggests that the reassessment is conducted by someone other than the State Board.

The State Board strenuously argues that the fact that the State Board may order itself to do something means...