Matos v. Nextran, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2008–65.
• Citation: 52 V.I. 676
• Parties: Eduardo MATOS and Santa Matos, Plaintiffs, v. NEXTRAN, INC. and Mack Truck Sales of South Florida, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

52 V.I. 676

Eduardo MATOS and Santa Matos, Plaintiffs,

v.NEXTRAN, INC. and Mack Truck Sales of South Florida, Defendants.

Civil No. 2008–65.

District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John.

Aug. 10, 2009.

Desmond L. Maynard, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the plaintiffs.

William E. Crabill, Esq., Miami, FL, for defendant, Nextran, Inc.

Daryl Barnes, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., for defendants Nextran, Inc. and Mack Truck Sales of South Florida.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GÓMEZ, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is the motion of defendant Nextran, Inc. (“Nextran”) to dismiss this matter, to strike certain allegations, and for a more definite statement.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2006, Eduardo Matos was driving a truck carrying concrete in an area known as Mahogany Run on St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands.¹ He suffered injuries when the truck rolled over. The truck was allegedly manufactured and sold by Nextran and defendant Mack Truck Sales of South Florida (“Mack Truck”).

Mr. Matos and his wife, Santa Matos (together, the “Plaintiffs”), subsequently commenced this action against Nextran and Mack Truck (together, the “Defendants”), asserting six causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose; (3) strict liability; (4) breach of the warranty of merchantability; (5) loss of consortium; and (6) punitive damages.

Nextran thereafter made a limited appearance for the sole purpose of moving to dismiss this matter for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). That motion was denied. Matos v. Nextran, Inc., No.2008–65, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22898, 2009 WL 763791 (D.V.I. Mar. 19, 2009).

Nextran now moves to dismiss the complaint ² pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In the alternative, Nextran moves to strike certain allegations in the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) or for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir.2004). A court must ask whether the complaint “contain[s] either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 562 (emphasis in original) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do.” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a ... plaintiff must allege facts that ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).’ “ Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555).

B. Rule 12(f)

Rule 12(f) provides that a district court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “[I]t is settled that [a Rule 12(f) ] motion will be denied, unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible.” Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir.1976) (citations omitted). Allegations that are “repugnant” or that contain “superfluous descriptions and not substantive elements of the cause of action” also may be stricken. See, e.g., Alvarado–Morales v. Digital Equipment Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 618 (1st Cir.1988). Indeed, a court has “considerable discretion” in striking an allegation. Delta Consulting Group, Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir.2009); see also BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 908, 917 (8th Cir.2007) (“Judges enjoy liberal discretion to strike pleadings under Rule 12(f).” (citation omitted)). “Striking a party's pleading, however, is an extreme and disfavored measure.” BJC Health Sys., 478 F.3d at 917;see also Waste Mgmt. Holdings v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir.2001) (“Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic .” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893 (“[T]he courts should not tamper with the pleadings unless there is a strong reason for so doing.” (citations omitted)).

C. Rule 12(e)

Rule 12(e) allows a party to “move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Such a motion “must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. Such a motion may be granted, for instance, where “a shotgun complaint fails to adequately link a cause of action to its factual predicates .” Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir.2006); see also Beanal v. Freeport–McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir.1999) (“[A] complaint, which contains a bare bones allegation that a wrong occurred and which does not plead any of the facts giving rise to the injury, does not provide adequate notice.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

1. Counts Two and Four

Nextran first argues that the breach of warranty claims asserted in Counts Two and Four should be dismissed. Counts Two and Four assert claims for breach of the warranty of merchantability and breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, respectively. Both counts assert breaches of express and implied warranties.

Beginning with the express warranty claims, Virgin Islands law ³ does not appear to differentiate between an express warranty of merchantability and an express warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. SeeV.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 2–313.⁴ To state a claim for breach of an express warranty generally, a plaintiff must allege the following: “(1) plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract; (2) containing an express warranty by the defendant with respect to a material fact; (3) which warranty was part of the basis of the bargain; and (4) the express warranty was breached by defendant.” Beachside Assocs., LLC v. Okemo, LLC, No.2006–233, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105019, at *5, 2008 WL 5455402 (D.V.I. Dec. 31, 2008) (citations omitted); see alsoV.I. Code Ann. tit. 11A, § 2–313 (defining express warranties).

Furthermore, although “a person must be in privity to a contract to sue for damages for breach of such contract[,] ... under certain conditions a person may sue as a third party beneficiary to a contract.” Sanchez v. Innovative Tel. Corp., No.2005–45, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93255, at *4, 2007 WL 4800351 (D.V.I. Nov. 30, 2007) (citation omitted). Virgin Islands law specifically extends express and implied warranties to third-party beneficiaries. Title 11A, Section 2–318 of the Virgin Islands Code provides that “[a] seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.” V.I. Code Ann. tit. 11A, § 2–318.

In Count Two, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants, pursuant to a contract they consummated with Mr. Matos's employer, knew that the truck the Defendants manufactured and sold to Mr. Matos's employer “was to be used as a concrete truck ... for the purpose of transporting, mixing and pouring concrete.” (Am.Compl.¶¶ 18–19.) They further allege that the Defendants “knew and/or should have known that [Mr. Matos] would rely on [the] Defendants ['] skill and judgment to furnish a truck suitable for the intended purpose [.]” ( Id. ¶ 19.) Count Two also alleges that the Plaintiffs and Mr. Matos's employer “relied on [the] Defendants' expertise as a designer/manufacturer of said trucks to design and manufacturer the truck for them that was suitable for the intended purpose[.]” ( Id. ¶ 20.) According to that count, Mr. Matos “was a beneficiary to the express and/or implied warranties under the contract for the truck[.]” ( Id. ¶ 21.) Specifically, the complaint alleges that the “truck was defectively designed, manufactured and/or assembled, including, but not limited to, defective design of the chassis or frames and/or installation of the barrel/drum,” and that “the brakes on the truck were defective and/or did not operate properly and effectively to permit Plaintiff Eduardo Matos to control and stop the truck in a timely fashion.” ( Id. ¶¶ 22–23.) Finally, the Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Defendants breached their warranty of fitness that the truck ... was fit for the particular and general purpose for the use [for] which said truck was intended.” ( Id. ¶ 24.)

In Count Four, the Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants “expressly and impliedly warranted that the truck and its chassis and frame and brakes and other parts ... were fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used” and that Mr. Matos “made use of the truck ... in reliance on said express and implied warranties.” ( Id. ¶ 31.) They also allege that the Defendants breached that express and/or implied warranty of merchantability by selling a “truck...