Matson v. Field

• Decision Date: 31 March 1846
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: MATSON v. FIELD & CATHCART.

10 Mo. 100

MATSON

v.FIELD & CATHCART.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1846.

APPEAL FROM ST. LOUIS CIRCUIT COURT.

HOLT & BEATTY, for Appellant. 1. Equity will not relieve against the inattention of parties in a court of law, as by neglecting a proper defense, or to move for a new trial in proper time. 1 Mad. Ch. 77; Wheat. 14; Vesey, 28, and 1 Ch. Cas. 43, are referred to. See also Barker v. Elkins, 1 Johns Ch. R. 466. 2. No distinction can be made between the negligence of a party, and that of his attorney. Field & Cathcart v. Matson, 8 Mo. R. 687. 3. On motion for a new trial, due diligence must be shown. Wimer v. Morris, 7 Mo. R. 6; Green v. Goodloe, 7 Mo. R. 27. The rule is the same at law and in equity. Woodsworth v. Van Buskirk, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 432. 4. Eliza P. Grimes and her children, ought to have been made parties to this suit, the rule in equity being that all interested in the subject-matter must be parties. Story's Eq. Pl. 74; Mitford's Eq. Pl. 163-4. 5. Even if the complainants have made out a case for the interference of chancery, yet the decree of the Circuit Court goes too far. The court ought, at most, to have ordered a new trial at law, and not have made a perpetual injunction.

LESLIE & LORD, for Defendants. 1. Equity will relieve against a judgment obtained by accident, where there is no negligence or default of the party against whom it is rendered. Andrews v. Fenter, 1 Ark. R. 186; Kincaid v. Cunningham, 2 Munford, 1. In Forshea & Sea, 4 Call, 279, it is said “a court of equity will relieve when the common law gives no remedy, or judgment has been obtained by surprise or inadvertence.” In Click v. Gillespie, 4 Haywood, 7, it is said, “in Tennessee the courts of chancery will grant relief to a defendant when he has a good defense at law, but by some mistake of his counsel was prevented from availing himself of it.” See also 2 Tucker's Commentaries, pp. 472, 475-6-7, and the cases there cited; 4 Munf. 469; 6 Munf. 291; 2 Wash. 41. 2. The Circuit Court did not err in refusing to let Eliza P. Grimes in to answer. 3. The decree is regular under the rules and practice of the courts of chancery of this State. See Practice in Chancery, Rev. St. It is said in the English books of practice, “if the defendant makes default by not appearing, &c., &c., plaintiff is entitled to a decree nisi, to become absolute at the next term,” &c. Now this is precisely the decree meant by our statute; the giving it a new name will not affect it--it is a decree nisi in its nature and effect. 1 Smith's Ch. Pr. 416. “An interlocutory decree is properly a decree pronounced for ascertaining matter of fact, or law, preparatory to a final decrec,” &c. Seaton's Decrees, 2; 1 Hoffman Ch. Pr. 501; 1 Barbour's Pr. 326; Kane v. Whittick, 8 Wend. 224. Section 12, of article 2, of the act concerning Practice in Chancery, Rev. St. p. 841, provides, “““if they (demurrers) are overruled the defendant shall pay costs, and shall file his answer instanter, or in default thereof so much of the bill as remains unanswered shall be taken as confessed.” 4. The plaintiff in the judgment in the Common Pleas, James S. Matson, was the only proper party to the bill as defendant.

SCOTT, J.

This is the case reported in 8 Mo. R. 686, of Field & Cathcart v. Matson. After the judgment against Field and Cathcart had been affirmed in this court, they on the very same grounds which are reported in the said case, and on which they in the first instance applied to the Court of Common Pleas to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial, by a bill in equity, applied to the Circuit Court of St. Louis county, for a perpetual injunction restraining all proceedings by Matson under his judgment against Field and Cathcart. The bill was demurred to for the want of equity, and the demurrer was overruled. The defendant, Matson, failing to answer, a decree was entered against him perpetually restraining him from enforcing his judgment against Field and Cathcart.

If the Circuit Court had barely granted a new trial, there would have been some semblance of justice, if not of law, in its proceedings. But by perpetually restraining Matson from the use of his judgment, he was sent away without redress, totally unheard. A plaintiff brings an action at law against a defendant, he takes a judgment by default, which is matured into a final judgment. An application is made to set aside the default, and grant a new trial. The motion is overruled, and a judgment overruling that motion is affirmed in the Supreme Court. Afterwards the defendant, on no other grounds than those on which he applied for relief to the courts of law, goes into equity and obtains a perpetual injunction to the judgment. The bare statement of this case, is sufficient to show how irreconcilable it is to all principle. As there had been no trial at law on the merits, it is obvious that if acourt of equity interfered at all, it should have again permitted a litigation of the rights of the parties in a court of law.

In what a situation is this court placed by this proceeding. This...