Matson v. Matson

• Decision Date: 01 July 1919
• Docket Number: 31414
• Citation: 173 N.W. 127,186 Iowa 607
• Parties: MARY MATSON, Appellee, v. ED MATSON et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

173 N.W. 127

186 Iowa 607

MARY MATSON, Appellee, v. ED MATSON et al., Appellants

No. 31414

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

July 1, 1919

Appeal from Boone District Court.--R. M. WRIGHT, Judge.

ACTION in equity to set aside a deed executed by defendant Ed Matson to his codefendant, Ida Johnson, and for judgment against said Ed Matson for costs, attorneys' fees, and monthly installments of alimony allowed in plaintiff's favor in a divorce case in the state of Washington. There was a decree for plaintiff, setting aside the deed, and judgment for $ 171.25, being the balance due on the judgment of the Washington court, for costs, attorneys' fees, and balance due on alimony. The defendant Charles Johnson is the husband of Ida Johnson. The defendants appeal. --Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Dyer Jordan & Dyer, for appellants.

Goodykoontz & Mahoney, for appellee.

PRESTON J. LADD, C. J., EVANS and GAYNOR, JJ., concur.

OPINION

PRESTON, J.

No evidence was introduced on the trial in the district court. The decree is based entirely upon the pleadings. The facts alleged in the petition are admitted in the answer, with some denials. The petition set up a decree rendered in the state of Washington, in an action for divorce between plaintiff and defendant Ed Matson, which decree directed appellant to convey certain real estate in Boone, Iowa, to the appellee. It was further averred that, at the commencement of said action for divorce in Washington, defendant Ed Matson was enjoined from disposing of any of the property of the parties until further order of the court, and averred that the property described was the only property in Boone, Iowa, belonging to them or either of them; that, immediately after the announcement of the decision of the court, which announcement was in accordance with the decree afterwards filed, said defendant left the state of Washington and came to Boone, and has remained in the state of Iowa since that time; that, immediately upon arriving in Iowa, he transferred the property to defendant Ida Johnson without consideration; and that said Ida Johnson had knowledge of appellee's rights thereto at the time of such conveyance; that the property was worth $ 1,600 at that time; that the decree of the Washington court provided that defendant Matson should pay monthly installments of alimony, and the costs and attorneys' fees in said divorce action; and that the same were unpaid, to the extent of $ 251.25; that the Washington court was one of general jurisdiction, and had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and that said defendant Matson appeared thereto in person and by attorney; that no appeal was ever taken therefrom; and that said decree has never been modified in any particular. The prayer of the petition in the instant case asked that the deed be set aside, and for judgment, and that the court require said defendant Matson to convey the premises to the plaintiff, or, in default thereof, that a commissioner be appointed for that purpose. The answer admitted certain of the allegations of fact in the petition, except that it averred that defendant Ida Johnson had paid her codefendant, Matson, $ 1.00 as a consideration for the premises, and that he had paid $ 80 on the judgment for the installments of alimony and costs; averred that the decree of the Washington court was of no validity, in so far as it attempted to affect the title to real estate in Iowa; that the injunction referred to did not specifically describe the property. The answer denied that the restraining order applied to the property in controversy in this case; that the Washington court had jurisdiction of that portion of the subject-matter before it which is involved in this case; that the divorce decree was a final adjudication between the parties, so far as it concerned the Iowa property; that the defendant Matson conveyed in violation of any restraining order; that the defendant Ida Johnson knew that defendant Matson was bound by the divorce decree to convey the property to plaintiff; all allegations of fraud; that plaintiff was the beneficial owner of the property in controversy; and that the defendant Matson was bound to convey this property to plaintiff; and that his deed to Ida Johnson constituted a cloud upon plaintiff's title. The answer also alleged that the Washington decree was void, and can have no basis for an action affecting the title to property in Iowa; that plaintiff's remedy, if any, is to be granted by the court which rendered the decree; that the courts of this state have no jurisdiction to require the defendant Matson to comply with an order imposed upon him by the court of another state; that the divorce decree has no effect outside of the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it; that it does not bind the conscience of defendant Matson; that the Washington court had no jurisdiction, in the divorce case, of the property involved herein; that defendant Matson has violated no final judgment or decree to which the courts of this state are required to give full faith and credit. The prayer of the answer was that the plaintiff's petition be dismissed, and that defendant Ida Johnson be decreed to be the owner of the property. These are the general allegations in the petition and answer, but the facts are stated more in detail.

From the detailed statement of the facts in the pleadings, plaintiff states the following facts, in addition to those already stated, which appellants concede to be complete, with one or two exceptions, which will be noted. Plaintiff and defendant Matson were married in May, in 1897, and continued to live together as husband and wife until the summer of 1914. About 1909, they moved to Washington, and thereafter continued to reside in King County, in that state, until the summer of 1914. There were four small children. In June, 1914, plaintiff commenced her divorce action in the superior court of King County, for an absolute divorce; on the date of the commencement of such action, a restraining order and order to show cause was issued, restraining the defendant from incumbering or disposing of any of the property of the parties to said action, and he (the defendant) was required to show cause before that court on July 28, 1914, why the order should not be made permanent. Said restraining order and the summons in the action of divorce were duly served upon appellant in the county of King and state of Washington, on the 22d day of July, 1914. On the 28th day of July, 1914, upon the return of the order to show cause why the restraining order should not be made permanent, appellant Matson appeared, in person and by his attorney, and the court confirmed the restraining order until further order of the court. Said action came on for hearing before said court on the 14th day of August, 1914, the appellee appearing in person and by her attorney, and appellant Matson also appearing in person and by his attorney; and the court, having heard the evidence and proofs, then and upon said day announced its decision granting plaintiff a divorce, the custody of the children, and granting to plaintiff the property in Iowa hereinafter referred to, by the following provision, afterwards incorporated in the decree, "that plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the household furniture and piano and property known as 4628 Meade Street, Seattle, Washington, and the property of the parties hereto, located in the town of Boone in the state of Iowa, and the defendant is hereby directed and required to execute to plaintiff a conveyance of said Iowa property."

On the 8th day of October, 1914, a formal finding of facts was made by the court, in accordance with the oral finding so announced on the 14th day of August, 1914, and on the same day, a decree was filed in accordance with said oral finding and the finding of facts above set out. The law of the state of Washington, at the time of the pendency of said action in the superior court of the state of Washington in and for King County, provided in relation to the property of parties to a divorce action as follows, being Section 4637 of Pierce's Code of that state (1902):

"In granting a divorce the court shall also make such disposition of the property of the parties as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, and to the condition in which they will be left by such divorce, and to the party through whom the property was acquired, and to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children, and shall make provisions for the guardianship, custody, and support and education of the minor children of such marriage."

The Supreme Court of the state of Washington has heretofore construed the provision of the law of that state, above set out, to require the parties to an action for divorce to bring into court all of their property, and a complete showing must be made; and it was decided by said court that said section conferred upon the court the power, in its discretion, to make a division of the separate property of the wife and husband.

Prior to the commencement of the action above referred to, the parties thereto were the owners of the following described real estate, situated in the county of Boone and state of Iowa, the record title standing in the name of Ed Matson, and the plaintiff having her inchoate right of dower therein, said property being described as follows, to wit:

Lot No. Thirty-one (31) in the Southwest Quarter (1/4) of the Northeast Quarter (1/4) of Section Twenty-nine (29), Township Eighty-four (84), Range Twenty-six (26), Boone County, Iowa, also described by metes and bounds.

Said property consisted of a six-room house and seven lots, and the same was of the value of $ 1,600,...