Matsumoto v. Labrador

Docket Number1:23-cv-00323-DKG
Decision Date08 November 2023
PartiesLOURDES MATSUMOTO, NORTHWEST ABORTION ACCESS FUND, and INDIGENOUS IDAHO ALLIANCE, Plaintiffs, v. RAUL LABRADOR, in his capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Idaho, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Idaho
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Honorable Debora K. Grasham United States Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 35.) The motion is fully briefed. (Dkt. 37, 39.) Having carefully reviewed the submissions and the entire record, the Court finds the facts and legal arguments relevant to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss are adequately presented in the record. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding delay and because the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument Defendant's Motion will be decided based on the record. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant's Motion.[1]

BACKGROUND

In this lawsuit, Plaintiffs contest the constitutionality of Idaho's criminal abortion trafficking statute, Idaho Code Section 18-623. (Dkt. 1.)[2] The statute provides that: [a]n adult who, with the intent to conceal an abortion from the parents or guardian of a pregnant, unemancipated minor either procures an abortion, as described in Section 18604, Idaho Code, or obtains an abortion-inducing drug for the pregnant minor to use for an abortion by recruiting, harboring, or transporting the pregnant minor within this state commits the crime of abortion trafficking.” Idaho Code § 18-623(1). The offense is punishable by imprisonment for no less than two years and no more than five years. Idaho Code § 18-623(5). The statute allows for an affirmative defense where a parent or guardian of the pregnant minor consented. Idaho Code § 18-623(2). It is not an affirmative defense “that the abortion provider or the abortion-inducing drug provider is located in another state.” Idaho Code § 18-623(3). The statute was signed into law by Idaho Governor Brad Little on April 5, 2023, and went into effect May 5, 2023 due to its emergency clause.[3]

On July 11, 2023, Plaintiffs Lourdes Matsumoto, Northwest Abortion Access Fund, and Indigenous Idaho Alliance (collectively Plaintiffs) filed this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Defendant Raul Labrador, in his official capacity as the Attorney General for the State of Idaho. (Dkt. 1.) Plaintiffs are an individual and two organizations who provide assistance to pregnant people, including minors, who are located within and outside of Idaho, with accessing legal abortion care.

The Complaint raises four claims challenging Idaho Code Section 18-623. (Dkt. 1.) Claim one asserts the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness in violation of Plaintiffs' due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Claim two asserts the statute infringes on the Plaintiffs' fundamental right to interstate travel. Claim three asserts the statute infringes on the Plaintiffs' fundamental right to intrastate travel. Claim four asserts the statute infringes on the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, assembly, association, and petition. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment concluding that, among other things, Idaho Code Section 18-623 is unconstitutional, and to enjoin Defendant Labrador from enforcing the statute.

On July 24, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or, in the alternative, a Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. 12.) Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion. (Dkt. 32.) The Attorney General for the State of Washington, on behalf of nineteen states and the District of Columbia (collectively Amici States), submitted an amici curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs' Motion. (Dkt. 20, 31.) Following a hearing, the Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion and preliminarily enjoined Defendant from enforcing Idaho Code Section 18-623. (Dkt. 40.) On September 12, 2023, Defendant filed the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), that is presently before the Court. (Dkt. 35.)

LEGAL STANDARDS
1. Motion to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), an action may be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Challenges to Article III standing are properly raised in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Standing is a threshold matter central to our subject matter jurisdiction.”); Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Brnovich, 172 F.Supp.3d 1075, 1086-87 n. 9 (D. Ariz. 2016).

Motions made under Rule 12(b)(1) may be factual or facial. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A factual attack presents extrinsic evidence disputing the truth of the allegations of the complaint that would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction, whereas a facial attack challenges that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004); Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Defendant's motion to dismiss presents both factual and facial challenges. See (Dkt. 35, 39) (relying on Attorney General Opinion 23-1, dated April 27, 2023, and challenging the pleadings).

For factual challenges, the Court may consider factual information presented outside of the pleading, including affidavits or other evidence, without converting the motion to a motion for summary judgment and need not presume the truthfulness of the allegations in the complaint. Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039; White, 227 F.3d at 1242.[4]

For facial challenges, the allegations in the Complaint are accepted as true and inferences are drawn in favor of Plaintiffs when determining whether the allegations are sufficient to invoke the Court's jurisdiction. Jones v. L.A. Central Plaza LLC, 74 F.4th 1053, 1056, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2023); Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013). To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenge at the pleading stage, the Complaint must “clearly allege facts demonstrating each element” of standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).

Additionally, [i]n determining constitutional standing, ‘it is within the trial court's power to allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, by amendment to the complaint or by affidavits, further particularized allegations of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's standing.' Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (in assessing standing, the court may consider “the complaint and any other particularized allegations of fact in affidavits or in amendments to the complaint”)); see also Reeves v. Nago, 535 F.Supp.3d 943, 950. In doing so, the court ‘must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party' when ‘ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing.' Reeves, 535 F.Supp.3d at 950 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 and citing Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakama Nation v. Yakima Cnty., 963 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)).

2. Motion to Dismiss Rule 12(b)(6)

Motions made under Rule 12(b)(6) test the legal sufficiency of the allegations underlying the claims made in a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018), and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party as well. Caltex Plastics, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 824 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 2016). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss all claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and because Plaintiffs' have failed to state plausible claims for relief. (Dkt. 35, 39.) Defendant's subject matter jurisdiction arguments are substantively the same as those raised in response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. 32, 35, 39.) The Court considered and denied Defendant's subject matter jurisdiction assertions in its Order granting a preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 40.) For the reasons stated in the prior Order, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) will be denied.[5] The Court will discuss below Defendant's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs' claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. (Dkt. 1.) To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiffs must plead sufficient facts to establish that (1) the defendant[ ] acting under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Williams v. California, 764 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986)).

1. Claims One and Four - Vagueness and First Amendment

Defendant moves to dismiss claims one and four alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. These claims were the subject of the Court's Order granting the preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 40.) Defendant's arguments for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) contest the merits of the claims and are substantively the same as the arguments raised in...

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