Matter of B.E.W., 86-1720.

Decision Date17 February 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-1720.,86-1720.
Citation537 A.2d 206
PartiesIn the Matter of B.E.W., Appellant.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Lee H. Karlin, Washington, D.C., appointed by the court, for appellant.

Charlotte Brookins—Pruitt, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom Frederick D. Cooke, Jr., Acting Corp. Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and Lutz Alexander Prager, Asst. Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FERREN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges, and REILLY, Senior Judge.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

The trial court, in an adjudication of delinquency, found B.E.W. guilty of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, D.C.Code § 22-3815 (1987 Supp.). B.E.W. appeals alleging that the testimony of only one eyewitness was insufficient to support an adjudication of guilt. We affirm.

Evidence presented by the government shows that on February 17, 1986, Winifred C. Lewis' car disappeared after she left it in the parking lot of the Waterside Mall. She had not given anyone permission to use it and did not know B.E.W. The next day Sergeant David Daniel of the Metropolitan Police Department, while driving in a marked patrol car, spotted the lost vehicle near the intersection of 50th and Hayes Streets, N.E. He first noticed the driver when the car was moving "very slowly" into the intersection. Daniel was in the process of stopping at a stop sign as he watched the car drive by with one person in it in addition to the driver. Although it was misty, it was still daylight, and Daniel was able "to see [the driver's] face clearly" as the car drove by. Through the partially rolled-down window of the patrol car and the fully open window on the driver's side of the stolen car, Daniel could see that the driver had on a white T-shirt. He saw the car again two to four minutes later on the 5100 block of Sheriff Road, where the car was parked. Daniel drove slowly past it, scrutinizing the driver as both car windows were down. Daniel then turned his car around to pull up behind the parked car. Before he could do so, however, he saw the other driver leave the car, look in Daniel's direction, and flee down the street. Daniel first tried to follow him in his patrol car. While in his car, Daniel could see the driver and a passenger about 25 to 40 feet away through his closed window. Daniel testified that this was probably the worst opportunity he had to view the suspects. Believing the car was stolen, Daniel broadcast a lookout for "a young black male in a T-shirt." In the broadcast, he described the passenger of the vehicle as wearing a black jacket. Further examination of the car tended to confirm his belief that the car had been stolen.

Officer Larry Hamlet responded to Daniel's broadcast. He noticed 16-year-old B.E.W. wearing a light colored T-shirt, which was unusually light clothing for the middle of February. This abberation prompted Hamlet to conclude that B.E.W. was the driver Daniel had described. Hamlet stopped B.E.W. at 5:00 p.m. on the 5100 block of Just Street, one block from Sheriff Road, and took him to the stolen car where Daniel positively identified him as the driver he had last seen five to ten minutes earlier. Daniel was not certain enough to identify as the passenger another person brought to him.

The trial court denied a defense motion for acquittal at the close of the government's evidence. B.E.W. testified. He denied he was in a car on the day in question and also denied wearing a light colored T-shirt at the time the police stopped him. He testified instead that he had been wearing a light colored blue T-shirt, and he gave an alternative account of his whereabouts. He asserted that he had been at Woodson High School gym at about 4:30 p.m. He then had left to walk to Roper High School, arriving at 5:00 p.m. Finding the school closed, he turned to go back to Woodson and ran into Officer Hamlet on his way. Carl Rice, a coach at Woodson, testified that he had seen B.E.W. at the Woodson gym between 4:00 p.m. and 4:30 or 4:40 p.m. but had not seen him at 5:00 p.m. On cross-examination, Rice testified that it took about two or three minutes to drive from Woodson to the 5100 block of Sheriff Road and no more than a minute from Sheriff Road to 50th and Hayes.

Finding B.E.W.'s testimony unbelievable, the court found him guilty of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. It credited, instead, Sergeant Daniel's testimony because of the certainty of his identification. On appeal, B.E.W. alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and in adjudicating him guilty. He contends that the adjudication lacked sufficient evidence because it was based on the testimony of a single eyewitness who had had an inadequate opportunity to observe the criminal, had given only a vague description of him, and whose sole pretrial identification was at a show-up.

Denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is not reversible error unless "`there is no evidence upon which a reasonable person might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Reid v. United States, 466 A.2d 433, 434-35 (D.C. 1983) (quoting Morrison v. United States, 417 A.2d 409, 412 (D.C. 1980)). This test applies with equal weight to identification evidence as to other evidence. McClain v. United States, 460 A.2d 562, 567 (D.C. 1983); Blango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885, 887 (D.C. 1977). Relying on a single eyewitness does not by itself render the evidence insufficient. Daniel's testimony amply supports the court's conclusion that he had adequate opportunity to observe the driver of the stolen vehicle. We must give deference to the credibility assessments of the trier of fact. Franey v. United...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • U.S. v. BELLAMY, 92-CO-833
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 26 Enero 1993
    ...judge applied in evaluating the officer's credibility. See (Marvin)Brown, supra, 590 A.2d at 1020 (citation omitted); Matter of B.E.W., 537 A.2d 206, 207 (D.C. 1988) (citation The trial judge's findings regarding the nature of the gesture make clear that appellee Murray's gesture was insuff......
  • In re MAC
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 27 Octubre 2000
    ...245 (1969)). Thus, "show-up identifications, while inherently suggestive, do not presumptively violate due process." In re B.E.W., 537 A.2d 206, 207 (D.C.1988). In this case there was a prompt show-up following the shooting close to the scene of the crime. The validity of such a procedure h......
  • Nelson v. US
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 30 Diciembre 1991
    ...omitted). This test applies specifically to identification evidence, just as it does to any other kind of evidence. In re B.E.W., 537 A.2d 206, 207 (D.C.1988) (citing The evidence in this case showed, first of all, that when Nelson moved out of Kelly's house, he took with him a set of house......
  • Clark v. US
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 10 Noviembre 1993
    ...criminal cases, it is well-nigh axiomatic that identification by one eyewitness is sufficient to support a conviction. See In re B.E.W., 537 A.2d 206, 207 (D.C.1988). Yet in numerous seminars and training sessions for lawyers and judges alike, experts have demonstrated, time and time again,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT