Matter of Bernstein, Bankruptcy No. 81-1369
| Decision Date | 04 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | Adv. No. 82-244.,Bankruptcy No. 81-1369 |
| Citation | 20 BR 595 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Harold N. BERNSTEIN, Debtor. Harold N. BERNSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. Stephanie NAGEL a/k/a Stephanie Bernstein, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Middle District of Florida |
David W. Steen, Tampa, Fla., for plaintiff.
Larry M. Segall, Tampa, Fla., for defendant.
ORDER ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
THIS IS an adversary proceeding and the matter under consideration is a complaint filed by Harold N. Bernstein, the Debtor in the above-captioned Chapter 13 proceeding, against his former wife, Stephanie Nagel. The complaint seeks an injunction against Ms. Nagel prohibiting her from taking any further action in the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida in connection with the divorce proceeding.
The facts germane to the resolution of this controversy can be summarized as follows:
On August 13, 1981, the Debtor filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code and on January 20, 1982, his Chapter 13 plan was confirmed. On February 25, 1982, Ms. Nagel caused the Support Enforcement Division of Broward County to issue a Motion for Contempt and Notice of Hearing and sought an order finding the Debtor in contempt of the Circuit Court for failing to make alimony and child support payments in accordance with a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage entered by the Circuit Court on September 9, 1980. This matter was set down to be heard on April 2, 1982. To preserve the status quo this Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order on April 2, 1982, and as a result, the contempt hearing was not held. It is without dispute that the monies in the state proceedings involve enforcement of alimony and child support.
It is well to state at the outset that the area of domestic relations and controversies relating to same have traditionally been left to the states. Santosky v. Kramer, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Thus, it is evident that the commencement and dissolution of marriages are strictly within the competency of the respective states and no federal legislation, regardless of how broad and how remedial, should interfere ordinarily with the divorce proceeding and the federal courts, including bankruptcy courts, should proceed with great caution in this area in order not to upset the delicate balance between the federal and state relationships. In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Popovici v. Alg, 280 U.S. 379, 50 S.Ct. 155, 74 L.Ed.2d 489 (1929).
Thus, the Section of the Code pertinent to the matter under consideration, must be interpreted and construed in light of the foregoing principles and requires that the court strikes a balance between the two seemingly irreconcilable purposes. First, it is evident that Congress never intended to create a sanctuary in which debtors could seek refuge in order to avoid domestic support obligations, Gonzalez Hernandez v. Borgos, 343 F.2d 802 (1st Cir. 1965). On the other hand, Congress clearly did not intend to permit creditors to thwart and frustrate the efforts of a debtor to obtain rehabilitation through the remedial provision of Chapter 13, In re Garrison, 5 B.R. 256 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich.1980).
The difficulty stems from the fact, however, that there is a strong Congressional policy expressed by the Bankruptcy Code which is to assist financially embarrassed debtors to obtain a fresh start in life and achieve rehabilitation under the provisions of Chapter 13.
The relevant Section of the Code provides as follows:
It has been recognized, even under the pre-Code law, that the mere filing of a petition under Chapter 13 of the Code does not automatically stay proceedings designed to enforce alimony and child support obligations. In re Garrison, supra. However, since the underlined phrase, "that is not property of the estate," restricts the sources which are available to satisfy these obligations, it is necessary to consider the meaning of this phrase in the context of a Chapter 13 proceeding.
Section 1306(a)(1), (2) defines "property of the estate" for purposes of a Chapter 13 proceeding. It provides:
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