Matter of Colorado Springs Air Crash

• Decision Date: 21 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-C-5959.,93-C-5959.
• Citation: 867 F. Supp. 630
• Parties: In the Matter of COLORADO SPRINGS AIR CRASH, Consolidated Pretrial Proceeding.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

867 F. Supp. 630

In the Matter of COLORADO SPRINGS AIR CRASH, Consolidated Pretrial Proceeding.

No. 93-C-5959.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

July 21, 1994.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James Michael Kuhn, U.S. Attorney's Office, Chicago, IL.

Charles A. Hornewer, Hinshaw & Culbertson, Chicago, IL.

Michael Rowe Feagley, Lucia Nale, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, IL.

Mary Jo Smerz, Lowrey & Smerz, Ltd., Chicago, IL.

Kevin P. Durkin, Corboy, Demetrio & Clifford, P.C., Chicago, IL.

Stephen P. Kenney, Lord, Bissell & Brook, Chicago, IL.

John W. Adler, Adler, Kaplan & Begy, Chicago, IL.

Donald J. Nolan, Law Offices of Donald J. Nolan, Chicago, IL.

Keith Gerrard, Thomas J. McLaughlin, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA.

Richard F. Schaden, Schaden, Lampert & Lampert, Broomfield, CO.

Andrew Dilk, F.A.A., Washington, DC.

Colleen L. Conlin, U.S. Dept. of Justice; Torts Branch, Civ. Div., Washington, DC.

Brian Murphy, Hofeld & Schaffner, Chicago, IL.

Gregory D. Hanley, Brooks, Cahill & Hanley, Chicago, IL.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BRIAN BARNETT DUFF, District Judge.

Before this court are briefs discussing the choice-of-law issues implicated by the United States' Motion for a Determination of Good Faith Settlement. The government's deceptively innocuous motion raises the complex issue of whether the government's settlement with the plaintiffs is subject to good faith review under Illinois law, Colorado law, or the law of some other state. Choice of law determinations in mass tort cases are always tedious. Our burden is increased unnecessarily when — as in this case — the parties fail to address directly the conflict fueling the controversy and fail to candidly discuss the substantive law of the relevant states.

The parties focused their briefs on the law of contribution, ie. which state's law should apply the defendants' contribution claims against the government. A review of Washington, Illinois and Colorado's contribution statutes shows that there is no real conflict pertaining to contribution; all three states' statutes protect settling defendants from contribution actions, if the settlement was made in good faith.¹ 740 ILCS 100/2; RCWA 4.22.060; C.R.S. 13-50.5-105. If contribution were the real matter at issue, there would be no true conflict, and we could proceed with our determination of whether the government's settlements with the plaintiffs were in good faith.

However, the settlement agreements also raise the issue of whether the remaining defendants' share of liability will be reduced by the government's proportionate share of liability, or by the actual amount paid in settlement. On this issue, there is a true conflict between the substantive law of the three states with an interest in this litigation.

Colorado limits the damages paid by a defendant to the defendant's proportionate share of the total liability. C.R.S. XX-XX-XXX.5(1). Any award received by a plaintiff must be reduced by the proportionate share of that award attributable to settling defendants. C.R.S. 13-50.5-105(1)(a).

Illinois holds joint tortfeasors jointly and severally liable, unless a tortfeasor is less than 25% responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. 735 ILCS 5/2-1117. Illinois law reduces a co-defendant's liability by the actual amount of any settlement the plaintiff has reached with another defendant. 740 ILCS 100/2; Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 431 (7th Cir.1992); Henry by Henry v. St. John's Hosp., 138 Ill.2d 533, 541, 150 Ill.Dec. 523, 563 N.E.2d 410 (1990), cert. den. 499 U.S. 976, 111 S.Ct. 1623, 113 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).

Contrary to Boeing's representation, Washington's law is similar to that of Illinois. In Washington, a defendant is generally only severally liable for its joint torts. When, as here, the claimant is in no way responsible for his own injuries, Washington holds tortfeasors jointly and severally liable. RCWA 4.22.070(1)(b); Washburn v. Beatt Equipment Co., 120 Wash.2d 246, 840 P.2d 860, 886 (1992). Boeing shamefully failed to include in its discussion this exception to Washington's general rule, despite the exception's direct applicability to the facts in this case.² Rather than discuss Washington's statute, the plaintiff's gave an accurate litigant the defendants' procedural misdeeds. While we understand and share the plaintiffs' frustrations, we cannot excuse their failure to notice a significant statute.

Finally, as in Illinois, the plaintiff's award will be reduced by the actual amount paid by a settling defendant, not the settling defendant's proportionate share of fault. RCWA 4.22.060(2).

The Washington statute also differs from the Illinois statute in that Washington law applies joint and several liability only to tortfeasors against whom judgment has been entered; Illinois has no such restriction. Thus, there appears to be a conflict between the laws of these two states. A rational plaintiff in Washington, however, will agree not to enforce a judgment against a settling joint tortfeasor. This puts a rational plaintiff in Washington in the same position as a plaintiff in Illinois who releases a settling defendant from liability. In the end, the effect of settlement on the remaining defendants is the same under either state's regime: the non-settling defendant's liability to the plaintiff will be reduced by the actual amount paid in settlement. Washburn, 840 P.2d at 887; Berard v. Eagle Air Helicopter Inc., 257 Ill.App.3d 778, 780, 195 Ill.Dec. 913, 915, 629 N.E.2d 221, 223 (1994). There is no true conflict between the law of Illinois and the law of Washington, as they apply in this case.

Which State's Law Applies

Since the issue of joint and several liability is not related to the claims arising from the Federal Tort Claims Act, that statute's choice of law provision is of no interest here.³ The effect of the government's settlement on the remaining defendants is based on plaintiffs claims against those defendants. See Boeing's Brief at p. 11. Since this court has supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, we will apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, Illinois. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Ashmore v. Northeast Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 843 F.Supp. 759, 772 (D.Me. 1994). As a practical matter, we found no significant difference in the choice-of-law rules of Colorado and Illinois. Both employ the Restatement (Second) approach. Indeed, Colorado choice-of-law cases cite to Illinois authority. See e.g. In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapelton Intern. Airport Denver Colo. on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F.Supp. 1445 (D.Colo. 1988).

Illinois' Choice of Law

Illinois has adopted the Restatement (Second) Choice of Law as its method of resolving conflicts of law issues. Ingersoll v. Klein, 46 Ill.2d 42, 262 N.E.2d 593 (1970). Under the Restatement approach, we must apply the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the particular matter at issue. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594, 611 (7th Cir.1981), cert. den., 454 U.S. 878, 102 S.Ct. 358, 70 L.Ed.2d 187 (1981).

The "most significant relationship" is measured by two sets of criteria. The first consists of the following general factors, listed in order of importance:

(a) the needs of the interstate system;

(b) relevant policies of the forum;

(c) relevant policies of other interested states;

(d) the protection of justified expectations;

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity in result; and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6; In re Air Crash, 644 F.2d at 611-612. We must consider these principles in light of the following relevant contacts: (1) the place of the injury; (2) the place of the misconduct; (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; (4) the place where the relationship between the parties is centered. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145; In re Air Crash, 644 F.2d at 612.

The Seventh Circuit has also adopted the principle of depeçage for choice-of-law questions. Depeçage is the "process of applying the rules of different states on the basis of the precise issue involved." Id. See also, International Administrators, Inc. v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 753 F.2d 1373, 1376, f.n. 4 (7th Cir.1985) ("The choice of law is not made for all issues; the trend is to decide the applicable law for each issue separately.") This principal is particularly useful in personal injury cases, like the instant one, where there are many theories of liability and where there are multiple parties from different states. The "precise issue involved" here is how the government's settlement effects the liability of the non-settling defendants and the sole question we must address, then, is which state's law concerning joint and several liability applies in this case.

Relevant Contacts

The majority of the decedents lived in Colorado. Most of the plaintiffs are residents of Colorado. Colorado is also the place of injury. See Boeing's Brief at p. 1. Defendant Boeing has its principal place of business in Washington and Washington is the place of Boeing's misconduct. See Boeing's Brief at p. 12. Defendant United has its principal place of business in Illinois. See Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Brief. United's misconduct occurred either in Illinois (where the flight began and where United has its principal maintenance facility) or Colorado (where the plane was negligently operated). Id., Boeing's Brief at p. 1. The relationship between United and the decedents is focused in Colorado, since the decedents boarded and were scheduled to deplane in Colorado. See Boeing's Brief at p. 6, f.n. 1; Stapleton, 720 F.Supp. at 1451, citing, Bryant v. Silverman, 146 Ariz. 41, 703 P.2d...