Bryant v. Silverman, 17965-SA

• Decision Date: 04 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 17965-SA,17965-SA
• Citation: 146 Ariz. 41,703 P.2d 1190
• Parties: Barbara BRYANT, as surviving spouse of Paul F. Bryant, deceased, on behalf of herself and the minor children and mother of Paul F. Bryant, deceased; Capital Bank, a national association, Executor of the Estate of Joyce L. Branham, deceased, Petitioners, and Alburquerque National Bank, a national banking corporation, as personal representative of the Estate of Mary T. Peters, deceased, on behalf of Laura Ann Peters and Craig Ashley Peters, the minor children of Mary T. Peters, deceased, Intervenors, v. Honorable Barry G. SILVERMAN, Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona for Maricopa County, Respondent, and SUN WEST AIRLINES, an Arizona corporation, Piper Aircraft Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation; Edo Corporation, a New York corporation; and Century Flight Systems, Inc., a Texas corporation, Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 1190

703 P.2d 1190

146 Ariz. 41

Barbara BRYANT, as surviving spouse of Paul F. Bryant, deceased, on behalf of herself and the minor children and mother of Paul F. Bryant, deceased; Capital Bank, a national association, Executor of the Estate of Joyce L. Branham, deceased, Petitioners, and Alburquerque National Bank, a national banking corporation, as personal representative of the Estate of Mary T. Peters, deceased, on behalf of Laura Ann Peters and Craig Ashley Peters, the minor children of Mary T. Peters, deceased, Intervenors, v. Honorable Barry G. SILVERMAN, Judge of the Superior Court of Arizona for Maricopa County, Respondent and SUN WEST AIRLINES, an Arizona corporation, Piper Aircraft Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation; Edo Corporation, a New York corporation; and Century Flight Systems, Inc., a Texas corporation, Real Parties in Interest.

No. 17965-SA.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

June 4, 1985.

Reconsideration Denied Aug. 20, 1985.

O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears by John H. Westover, Charles J. Muchmore, Phoenix, for petitioners.

Bentley, Brandes & Brandes by Robert M. Brandes, Phoenix, for intervenors.

Beer & Toone by Thomas L. Toone, Rick E. Olson, Phoenix, for respondent.

GORDON, Vice Chief Justice:

Petitioners, Barbara Bryant, beneficiary of Paul E. Bryant deceased, and Capital Bank, executor for Joyce L. Branham, deceased, bring this special action challenging an order of the trial court that Colorado law apply to the issues of compensatory and punitive damages in petitioners' wrongful death action. The Albuquerque National Bank, personal representative of Mary T. Peters, was allowed to intervene in this special action. The primary issue raised in this special action is whether Arizona or Colorado wrongful death damages law should apply. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6 § 5(1).

This case arises out of a tragic airplane crash which took the lives of several victims. On December 31, 1981, Sun West Airlines Flight 104 departed from Alburquerque, New Mexico en route to Durango, Colorado. Upon reaching Durango, the plane crashed while attempting to land at the airport, killing the pilot and passengers Paul Bryant, Mary Peters and Joyce Branham. Joyce Branham's children, Stacy and Jimmy Sadler, Jr. survived the crash. The cause of the crash is disputed by plaintiffs and defendant.

At the time of the crash, Paul Bryant was domiciled in Arizona, Mary Peters in New Mexico, and Joyce Branham in Texas. Sun West Airlines (hereafter Sun West) was an Arizona corporation having its principal place of business in Phoenix and servicing cities in New Mexico, Colorado and Arizona. All three decedents were on their way to Colorado to enjoy ski holidays.

In February 1982, plaintiff Barbara Bryant filed a wrongful death action in Arizona for the death of her husband Paul Bryant against defendant Sun West. Subsequently, similar actions were filed in Arizona for the deaths of Mary Peters, Joyce Branham and for the injuries to Stacy and Jimmy Sadler. All actions were consolidated.

After considering cross motions for summary judgment relating to the issues of compensatory and punitive damages, the trial judge found that Colorado had the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties on all compensatory and punitive damage issues, and therefore, held that Colorado law governed all damage issues. Under Colorado law, compensatory damages in wrongful death actions are limited to the net pecuniary loss suffered by the survivor (beneficiary). Lewis v. Great Western Distributing Co. of Borger, 168 Colo. 424, 451 P.2d 754 (1969). Additionally, Colorado prohibits recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions. Moffatt v. Tenney, 17 Colo. 189, 30 P. 348 (1892). All plaintiffs would prefer that Arizona law be applied to this case since Arizona places no limitation on compensatory or punitive damages. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that Arizona law should govern the damage issues because plaintiff-Bryant, decedent-Paul Bryant, and defendant-Sun West were domiciled in Arizona at the time of the crash and because the misconduct occurred in Arizona. Sun West, on the other hand, argues that since Colorado was the place of injury and conduct and the place where the relationship between the parties arose, Colorado law should apply.

In determining which state's law to apply, this Court has adopted the rules embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (1971) to analyze and solve conflicts problems arising in Arizona. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968) (discarding the doctrine of lex loci delicti). Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (1971) §§ 175 and 178 deal specifically with the choice of law principles in an action for wrongful death and to the damage issues in such an action. Restatement § 178 sets out the choice of law principles for wrongful death damages, and states:

" § 178 Damages

"The law selected by application of the rule of § 175 [wrongful death] determines the measure of damages in an action for wrongful death."

Comment b of this section notes that merely because the conduct and injury occur in one state does not ipso facto require application of that state's law to the issue of damages, but instead, the law of the state with the "dominant interest" or "greater interest" should govern:

"b. Rationale. The choice-of-law principles stated in § 6 should be applied in determining the state whose local law will be applied to determine the measure of damages in a wrongful death action. In general, this should be the state which has the dominant interest in the determination of this issue. The state of conduct and injury will not, by reason of these contacts alone, be the state which is primarily concerned with the measure of damages in a wrongful death action. The local law of this state will, however, be applied unless some other state has a greater interest in the determination of this issue. In a situation where one state is the state of domicile of the defendant, the decedent and the beneficiaries, it would seem that, ordinarily at least, the wrongful death statute of this state should be applied to determine the measure of damages." (emphasis added)

Restatement § 178 points to § 175 for the principles in determining conflict issues in wrongful death cases:

" § 175. Right of Action for Death

"In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied." (emphasis added)

As in Restatement § 178, this section emphasizes that the state with the "most significant relationship" or "greater interest" should govern rather than the place of injury:

"d. Rationale. The rule of this Section calls for application of the local law of the state where the injury occurred unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Whether there is such another state should be determined in the light of the choice-of-law principles stated in § 6. In large part, the answer to this question will depend upon whether some other state has a greater interest in the determination of the particular issue than the state where the injury occurred. The extent of the interest of each of the potentially interested states should be determined on the basis, among other things, of the purpose sought to be achieved by their relevant local law rules and of the particular issue involved (see § 145, Comments c-d)." (emphasis added)

Restatement § 175, comment d. According to Restatement §§ 175 and 178, determination of which state has the greater interest in damages is influenced largely by the factors set forth in Restatement §§ 6 and 145.

Restatement § 145 sets forth the general principles by which tort choice of law questions are to be decided:

" § 145. The General Principle

"(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

"(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

"(a) the place where the injury occurred,

"(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

"(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

"(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

"These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue."

Restatement § 6 sets out the various policy considerations and other factors for making a choice of law selection:

" § 6. Choice of Law Principles

"(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

"(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include

"(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

"(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

"(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

"(d) the protection of justified expectations,

"(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

"(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

"(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied."

Our analysis starts with the four contacts specified in § 145(2), which will be taken into account in applying the...