Matter of Grinberg
| Decision Date | 22 November 1994 |
| Docket Number | Interim Decision Number 3235,A-71571961 |
| Citation | 20 I&N Dec. 911 |
| Parties | MATTER OF GRINBERG In Deportation Proceedings |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
In a decision dated October 4, 1994, an immigration judge found the respondent deportable as a nonimmigrant who remained longer than permitted, granted the respondent voluntary departure, and denied his Motion to Request Additional Relief in the form of an adjustment of status based on section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (). The immigration judge found that he lacked jurisdiction to consider such an application for relief, because the version of section 245(i) upon which the respondent sought to rely had been superseded by subsequent legislation. On October 6, 1994, the immigration judge certified his decision to this Board for review pursuant to regulations at 8 C.F.R § 3.1(c) (1994). Upon consideration, the decision of the immigration judge will be vacated, and the record will be remanded for further proceedings.
The sole issue presented for our resolution upon certification is whether an immigration judge has jurisdiction over applications for relief based upon "section 245(i)" of the Act, as enacted on August 16, 1994, through section 506(b) of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Act for 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 1765 ("Appropriations Act"), in light of the unusual fact that a new "section 245(i)" was enacted less than 3 weeks later through section 130003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2024 ("Crime Control Act").1 We conclude that both sections 245(i) are effective, that they create separate adjustment eligibility provisions, and that the immigration judge has jurisdiction over applications based on these subsections.
We begin by observing that the object of statutory construction is to determine congressional intent with respect to the legislation enacted. The paramount index of congressional intent is the plain meaning of the words used in the statute taken as a whole. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987); Phinpathya v. INS, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984). Whenever possible, statutes should be read as consistent with one another. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982). Accordingly, we must not lightly presume that existing law is repealed by subsequent legislation in the absence of clear legislative language expressing an intent to repeal. 1A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 23.09, 23.10 (4th ed. 1985).
An examination of the words Congress used in the Crime Control Act shows no evidence of any intent to repeal the original section 245(i), which Congress had enacted less than 3 weeks earlier in the Appropriations Act, and which had not even gone into effect. Since there was no expressed repeal of the provision in question, a conclusion that the original section 245(i) was repealed could only be reached upon a finding of repeal by implication. In this case, the immigration judge made such a finding, determined that the later enacted statute repealed the prior statute, and concluded that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's application for adjustment of status.
We disagree with the immigration judge's conclusion. As the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly over the course of more than a century and a half, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497 (1936); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342 (1842). Indeed, repeal by implication will not be found unless intent to repeal is "clear and manifest." Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524 (1987) (citations omitted). Thus, "`[i]n the absence of some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only permissible justification for a repeal by implication is when the earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable.'" St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 787 (1981) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974); see also United States v. Fausto, supra (requiring "clear repugnancy"); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra.
Applying these principles to the instant case, we observe that the plain substantive language of the two enactments in question is not irreconcilable, nor even slightly ambiguous as to the intended effect. Rather, the relevant language evinces a clear congressional intent to add two separate, new provisions to existing law. Specifically, section 506(b) of the Appropriations Act created an exception to the usual adjustment of status provisions, so that certain aliens who are out of legal status, such as the respondent here, may nevertheless apply for adjustment under section 245(a) of the Act. Section 130003 of the Crime Control Act, on the other hand, offers the new possibility of adjustment of status to a separate, newly created category of nonimmigrant aliens who have fulfilled a promise to supply the United...
To continue reading
Request your trial