Matter of Ige
| Decision Date | 16 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | A-27178229.,A-27594794.,Interim Decision Number 3230 |
| Citation | 20 I&N Dec. 880 |
| Parties | MATTER OF IGE In Deportation Proceedings |
| Court | U.S. DOJ Board of Immigration Appeals |
In a decision dated July 13, 1987, an immigration judge found the respondents deportable on their own admissions under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1982), as nonimmigrants who remained longer than permitted. The immigration judge further denied the male respondent's applications for asylum and withholding of deportation to Nigeria under sections 208(a) and 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1253(h) (1982). On October 5, 1992, the respondents' appeal was dismissed and the male respondent's motion to remand to apply for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988), was denied.
In an order dated May 21, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of asylum and withholding of deportation to the male respondent but remanded the case to the Board for consideration of the issue of hardship to the United States citizen child, should he remain in the United States without his parents. Ige v. INS, 993 F.2d 1543 (5th Cir. 1993). On September 21, 1993, the female respondent filed a motion to reopen to apply for suspension of deportation with supporting documents. Her motion is consolidated with that of the male respondent. Both motions will be denied.
The respondents are a 44-year-old male native and citizen of Nigeria and his 34-year-old wife, also a native and citizen of Nigeria, who entered the United States as nonimmigrant visitors on November 3, 1983, and August 18, 1985, respectively. They were married in Nigeria in August 1979. The male respondent has lived in the United States for 10 years. His mother was a school teacher and his father was a bank manager. His mother and seven brothers and five sisters reside in Nigeria. He graduated from a 2-year college there and taught school and worked in the Nigerian Department of Urban Planning. The female respondent has now lived here for 9 years. Her mother, a brother, and a sister live in Nigeria. The respondents both work for Tellabs Texas, Inc. They have three children, the two youngest of whom are United States citizens. Their daughter, Abayome, lives with her grandmother in Nigeria and is now 12 years old. Their older son is now 7 years old. The third child, a 1-year-old boy, was born since our 1992 order and is apparently in good health. We will take any potential hardship to either or both United States citizen children into account.
In order to establish eligibility for section 244(a)(1) relief, an alien must prove that he has been physically present in the United States for the 7 years immediately preceding his application, that he has been a person of good moral character for the same period, and that his deportation will result in extreme hardship to himself or to his United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, child, or parent. The alien carries the burden of demonstrating both that he is statutorily eligible for relief and that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(e) (1994); Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1984); Israel v. INS, 710 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); Marcello v. INS, 694 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 426-27 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
The phrase "extreme hardship" is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible content or meaning. The elements required to establish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. See Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 I&N Dec. 629 (BIA 1978); Matter of Kim, 15 I&N Dec. 88 (BIA 1974); Matter of Sangster, 11 I&N Dec. 309 (BIA 1965); see also, e.g., Jara-Navarrete v. INS, 813 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1987); Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1984); Ramos v. INS, 695 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Supreme Court has held that a narrow interpretation of extreme hardship is consistent with the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy. INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981); see also Hernandez-Cordero v. United States INS, 819 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987). Factors relevant to the issue of extreme hardship include the alien's age; the length of his residence in the United States; his family ties in the United States and abroad; his health; the economic and political conditions in the country to which he may be returned; his financial status, business, or occupation; the possibility of other means of adjustment of status; his immigration history; and his position in the community. See Hernandez-Patino v. INS, 831 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1987); Jara-Navarrete v. INS, supra; Matter of Gibson, 16 I&N Dec. 58 (BIA 1976); Matter of Uy, 11 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA 1965). Relevant factors, though not extreme in themselves, must be considered in the aggregate in determining whether extreme hardship exists. See, e.g., Hernandez-Patino v. INS, supra; Hernandez-Cordero v. United States INS, supra; Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986); Ravancho v. INS, 658 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1981).
While political and economic conditions in an alien's homeland are relevant, they do not justify a grant of relief unless other factors such as advanced age or severe illness combine with economic detriment to make deportation extremely hard on the alien or his qualifying relatives. Matter of Anderson, 16 I&N Dec. 596 (BIA 1978); see also, e.g., Hernandez-Patino v. INS, supra; Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983); Ramos v. INS, supra. Economic detriment in the absence of other substantial equities is not extreme hardship. Matter of Sangster, supra; see also, e.g., Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra; Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, 682 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1982); Carnalla-Munoz v. United States INS, 627 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1980). Even a significant reduction in the standard of living is not by itself a ground for relief. Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra; Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). The loss of a job and the concomitant financial loss incurred does not rise to the level of extreme hardship. Marquez-Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1985); Moore v. INS, 715 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1983); Matter of Chumpitazi, supra. Similarly, the readjustment of an alien to life in his native country after having spent a number of years in the United States is not the type of hardship that is characterized as extreme, since similar hardship is suffered by most aliens who have spent time abroad. See Matter of Chumpitazi, supra; see also Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra; Moore v. INS, supra; Carnalla-Munoz v. United States INS, supra; Pelaez v. INS, 513 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975).
The fact that an alien has a United States citizen child does not of itself justify suspension of deportation. See Israel v. INS, supra; Diaz-Salazar v. INS, supra; see also Bueno-Carrillo v. Landon, supra; Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1982); Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1981); Banks v. INS, 594 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1979); Davidson v. INS, 558 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977); Matter of Kim, supra. An alien illegally in the United States does not gain a favored status by the birth of a child in this country. Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra; Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra; Bueno-Carillo v. Landon, supra. Even though the child may face difficulties adjusting to life in his parent's homeland, these problems do not materially differ from those encountered by other children who relocate with their parents, especially at a young age. Marquez-Medina v. INS, supra. The fact that economic and educational opportunities for the child are better in the United States than in the alien's homeland does not establish extreme hardship. Matter of Kim, supra; see also Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, supra (). Finally, the fact that medical facilities in the alien's homeland may not be as good as they are in this country does not establish extreme hardship to the child. Matter of Correa, 19 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1984).
A motion to reopen must, among other things, state the new facts to be considered at the reopened hearing and must be supported by affidavits or other evidence. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.8(a), 103.5, 242.22 (1994). Such a motion may not be granted unless the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at...
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