Matter of Interception of Tel. Communications
Decision Date | 10 January 1955 |
Citation | 207 Misc. 69 |
Parties | In the Matter of The Interception of Telephone Communications of Anonymous. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
No appearances of counsel.
Application is made to me for an order permitting the interception of telephone communications over a line specified in the proposed order submitted for my signature. The purpose of the requested interception as stated in the papers in support of the application is to secure evidence of the commission of the crime of book-making. The application now made follows the general pattern of like applications heretofore made to me, which also, in the main, had as their objective the detection of gambling in some form. Though I have in the past signed such orders, I have done so with much misgiving. Prompted by this misgiving, I devised certain expedients as a curb on excessive or unwarranted resort to such orders.
Some years ago I instituted the requirement that every application to me for an interception order be supported by the indorsement of an officer of rank in the police department and that written reports of the results obtained from any interception order be thereafter submitted to me. Even with these restrictions, I have granted the orders with reluctance. The reports received by me instead of allaying my anxiety, merely deepened it. These showed some arrests and fewer convictions and then rarely, if ever, for a heinous offense. The sense of uneasiness born of this situation as well as the current discussions of wire tapping has led me to give the problem further study.
The application is made under a provision of the Constitution of this State and a statute implementing it. After intense and prolonged debate the constitutional convention of 1938 adopted the following provision, now part of section 12 of article I of the Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular means of communication, and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof."
The statute is section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, effective in 1942. So far as here material it reads: I am not confronted with the use as evidence of the fruits of wire tapping; the sole question I am concerned with is whether the wire tapping itself should be allowed.
A review of the pertinent decisions shows that in New York there is no limitation on the use of wire-tap evidence. In accordance with the weight of authority in this country, the New York rule has consistently been that evidence is admissible, however tainted its source, and though obtained through violation of law. (People v. De Fore, 242 N.Y. 13.) Nor has the prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure introduced into the State Constitution in 1938 (art. I, § 12) — before 1938 the prohibition was to be found only in the Civil Rights Law (§ 8) — altered this rule. An article seized in defiance of the constitutional provision may still be received in evidence. (People v. Richter's Jewelers, 291 N.Y. 161.)
Unauthorized telephone interception is a crime in this State. (Penal Law, §§ 552, 1423, subd. 6.) Yet, unlawful wire taps may be received in evidence. (Matter of Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 598; People v. McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 809-810.) Even since the adoption of the 1938 Constitution, it has been held that wire-tap evidence is admissible, though the order authorizing the interception is void or irregular. (People v. Katz, 201 Misc. 414.)
The decisions of the Federal courts in no way impair the authoritative effect of the foregoing rulings. Not alone do the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which proscribe unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination, not operate on the States (Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 92-93), but the Supreme Court has held that the tapping of telephone wires and the use of the resultant wire-tap evidence do not violate either of these amendments. (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438.) The later cases in the Supreme Court, in some of which intercepted telephone conversations and evidence derived from them have been excluded in the Federal courts, deal mainly with the interpretation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act. (U. S. Code, tit. 47; Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379; Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338; Weiss v. United States, 308 U. S. 321; Goldstein v. United States, 316 U. S. 114; Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129.)
Despite the ruling in Weiss v. United States (308 U. S. 321, supra), that section 605 of the Communications Act extends to intrastate communications, our courts have uniformly held that the section does not forbid the reception in evidence by them of the fruits of wire taps obtained in compliance with section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Matter of Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15; People v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 728, affd. sub nom. Stemmer v. New York, without opinion by evenly divided court, 336 U. S. 963, rehearing denied, 337 U. S. 921; People v. Feld, 305 N.Y. 322, 329-330; see, also, Black v. Impellitteri, 201 Misc. 371, affd. 281 App. Div. 671, appeal dismissed 305 N.Y. 724.) Any inconclusive effect which might perhaps be attributed to the Supreme Court affirmance of the Stemmer decision by an evenly divided court, seems to have become academic. For, in Schwartz v. Texas (344 U. S. 199, 203), the court held that interceptions obtained in violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act may nevertheless be received in evidence in a State court. In the court's opinion, the Federal act was not intended to impose a rule of evidence on the State courts.
It thus becomes obvious that the fruits of telephone interceptions made pursuant to an order under section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure can successfully withstand legal attack and may be received in evidence in the courts of this State without let or hindrance.
The very immunity so given to the wire taps is alarming. The question before me now, however, is not the use which may be made of the fruits of an accomplished interception, but whether the interception itself should be authorized in the first place. Whatever the purpose of the interception, the stark fact remains that it is an intrusion on the right of privacy. Justice HOLMES in his dissent in the Olmstead case referred to wire tapping as "dirty business" (277 U. S. 438, 470). Justice ROBERTS in the first Nardone case called it "inconsistent with ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty" (302 U. S. 379, 383).
Nor can we forget the words of Justice BRANDEIS in his memorable dissent in the Olmstead case: the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." (277 U. S. 438, 478.) This expression is an accurate appraisal of human values and of the things men hold dear in life. These are concepts not to be brushed aside when judicial action is invoked by which a realm, ordinarily inviolable, is exposed to official invasion and surveillance.
Though I may deplore the fact that the views of Justices HOLMES and BRANDEIS in the Olmstead case did not prevail in the...
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