MATTER OF MILLER v. Commissioner of Health for the State of New York

• Decision Date: 09 March 2000
• Citation: 703 N.Y.S.2d 830,270 A.D.2d 584
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
• Parties: In the Matter of MATTHEW MILLER, Petitioner,<BR>v.<BR>COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

270 A.D.2d 584

703 N.Y.S.2d 830

In the Matter of MATTHEW MILLER, Petitioner,

v.COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent.

Carpinello, J.

Decided March 9, 2000.

Mercure, J. P., Spain, Graffeo and Mugglin, JJ., concur.

Carpinello, J.

Petitioner, a physician specializing in family practice, was found guilty of conduct evincing moral unfitness to practice medicine (see, Education Law § 6530 [20]) by the Administrative Review Board for Professional Medical Conduct (hereinafter the ARB), which overturned dismissal of this charge by a Hearing Committee of the State Board for Professional Medical Conduct.^[*] The charge is based on petitioner's 16-month consensual sexual relationship with a female patient (hereinafter patient B). The record reveals that patient B began treating with petitioner on November 17, 1994 complaining of nervousness and excess alcohol consumption as a result of personal and financial difficulties in her life. Petitioner diagnosed her with anxiety and prescribed two antianxiety drugs (i.e., BuSpar and Valium). According to petitioner's testimony, he was indeed concerned about patient B's psychological state at the time given the recent events in her life. Notwithstanding his treatment, petitioner had sexual intercourse with patient B less than one month later during a medical house call. The relationship continued until April 11, 1996. During this time period, petitioner continued to treat patient B for, inter alia, anxiety, a treatment regimen which continued the prescriptions for BuSpar and Valium.

In reversing the Hearing Committee, the ARB noted that the first sexual encounter with patient B took place during a medical house call, which it found akin to an office visit, and that their relationship did not constitute an isolated instance of bad judgment—as found by the Hearing Committee—given its long duration. Its ultimate conclusion that petitioner's relationship with patient B evinced moral unfitness was two-fold. First, although petitioner was "only" patient B's primary care physician, his treatment of her obviously entailed a fiduciary relationship, i.e., he held a position of trust and had training to treat all medical conditions, including psychiatric conditions. Second, the relationship compromised his independent medical judgment, a fact petitioner readily admitted during his hearing testimony.

Petitioner claims that this determination should be annulled as arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, he alleges that his status as a nonpsychiatric physician shields him from being found guilty of moral unfitness based on allegations of a consensual sexual relationship with a patient, even during a time period when he provided medical treatment. We strenuously disagree.

Initially, we note that the ARB was empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the Hearing Committee in assessing petitioner's guilt (see, e.g.,...