MATTER OF ST. LUCIA v. Novello

• Decision Date: 07 June 2001
• Parties: In the Matter of STEVEN ST. LUCIA, Petitioner,<BR>v.<BR>ANTONIA NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

284 A.D.2d 591

726 N.Y.S.2d 488

In the Matter of STEVEN ST. LUCIA, Petitioner,

v.ANTONIA NOVELLO, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, et al., Respondents.

Decided June 7, 2001.

Peters, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur.

Crew III, J. P.

In February 1999, petitioner, a licensed general surgeon, was charged with 11 specifications of professional misconduct stemming from his care and treatment of patients A, B, C, D and E. Specifically, petitioner was charged with three specifications of moral unfitness to practice medicine based upon his consensual sexual relationships with patients A, B and C, together with two specifications each of gross negligence, gross incompetence and failure to maintain accurate patient records, and one specification each of negligence on more than one occasion and incompetence on more than one occasion, all of which related to his medical treatment of patients D and E. Following a lengthy hearing before a Hearing Committee of respondent State Board for Professional Medical Conduct (hereinafter the Committee), the Committee sustained most of the 11 specifications charged^[*] and, as to the penalty, revoked petitioner's license to practice medicine. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding to challenge the Committee's determination contending, inter alia, that the underlying determination is not supported by substantial evidence.

Despite the voluminous record and the serious nature of this proceeding, the various arguments raised by petitioner on review do not warrant extended discussion. Initially, we reject petitioner's assertion that Education Law § 6530 (20) and 8 NYCRR 29.1 (b) (5), both of which define "professional misconduct" as conduct that evidences moral unfitness to practice medicine, are unconstitutionally vague. This very argument was considered and rejected by this Court in Matter of Addei v State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct (278 AD2d 551), wherein we held that although the cited statutory provision "does not describe the behavior which constitutes a violation in minute detail, it does provide sufficient warning concerning the manner in which the profession must be practiced" (id., at 552; see, Matter of Dolin v State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, 274 AD2d 862, 864-865, lv denied 95 NY2d 770). More to the point, we concluded that the term "moral unfitness" encompasses misconduct of a sexual nature and "gives fair notice to a person of ordinary intellect of the nature of the proscribed conduct, such that [Education Law § 6530 (20)] is not unconstitutionally vague" (Matter of Addei v State Bd. for Professional Med. Conduct, supra, at 552).

Equally unpersuasive is petitioner's claim that he was denied due process with respect to his cross-examination of patient A due to his inability to obtain patient A's counseling records. The mere fact that patient A testified as a witness in the underlying disciplinary proceeding did not place her psychological status in issue, nor did it constitute a waiver of the privilege existing between her and her treating...