Matter of T.L.J.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1980
• Docket Number: No. 13928.,No. 79-979.,13928.,79-979.
• Citation: 413 A.2d 154
• Parties: In the Matter of T. L. J., Appellant.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

413 A.2d 154

In the Matter of T. L. J., Appellant.

No. 13928.

No. 79-979.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 25, 1979.

Decided March 28, 1980.

Michael B. Waitzkin, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., with whom Silas J. Wasserstrom, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., was on the briefs, for appellant.

Margaret L. Hines, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., Louis P. Robbins, Principal Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., when the brief was filed, and Richard W. Barton, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before KERN, HARRIS and PRYOR, Associate Judges.

PRYOR, Associate Judge:

Appellant, convicted in juvenile court and committed to the custody of the District of Columbia Social Rehabilitation Administration, challenges two court orders granting one-year extensions of the commitment.¹ As grounds for reversal, appellant urges that the trial court abused its discretion and misconstrued its statutory authority in granting the extensions.² We find that the Corporation Counsel, representing the custodial institution and the "public interest," may move to extend the period of commitment of a juvenile when the extension is necessary for his or her rehabilitation, or the protection of the public interest. In granting a motion for extension, however, the court must find the existence of one (or both) of the two factors set forth in D.C. Code 1973, § 16-2322(b)(2). The record before us does not reflect the requisite findings. Accordingly, we remand the record to the trial court. On remand the court may either hold a new hearing or state the basis for its previous rulings.³

I

On July 28, 1976, appellant was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder (both felony and premeditated), four counts of armed robbery, and one count of assault with intent to kill.⁴ As a result, appellant was adjudicated delinquent and on September 8, 1976, committed to the custody of the Social Rehabilitation Administration (herein S.R.A.) for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years.⁵ The order of commitment directed that appellant be placed in the maximum security juvenile facility and only released into the community upon order of the court. See D.C.Code 1973, § 16-2322(a)(1).

Shortly before the expiration of appellant's period of commitment, the Corporation Counsel sought a one-year extension of the original order. The S.R.A. recommended the extension. However, it was the opinion of the agency that the restrictions imposed by the first order should be removed. After a hearing, the trial judge granted the motion for extension with restrictions, concluding that this was necessary for the protection of the public interest. Appellant appealed.

While the appeal was still pending, appellant's first one-year commitment extension was scheduled to expire. The Corporation Counsel moved for a one-year extension of the commitment, contending in part that appellant "could not possibly be rehabilitated." S.R.A. filed a separate written request that the commitment be extended for six months. On September 7, 1979, the day on which the first extension order was to expire, a new extension hearing was conducted, resulting in another one-year commitment extension. A second appeal was taken therefrom.

II

Appellant's first challenge to the trial court's rulings is that the court erred in granting the extensions, upon motion of the Corporation Counsel, because under D.C. Code 1973, § 16-2322(b), the Corporation Counsel has no standing to make such a motion.⁶ This position is not supported by reading the relevant statutes as a whole, nor is it supported by the legislative history.

The President of the United States, via Reorganization Order No. 50, L.S. 4240-B, June 26, 1953, as amended, established the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel, vesting it with full authority to act as attorney for and chief law officer of the District of Columbia Government, its officers, employees, agencies, boards and commissioners. Reorg.Ord. No. 50, Part II(A) and (D), June 26, 1953, as amended. The Social Rehabilitation Administration is a subagency of the District of Columbia and, therefore, is represented by the Corporation Counsel. That office is empowered to act as attorney for the S.R.A. in all matters. It may represent the S.R.A. in actions filed against it; initiate actions at the request of the agency; or institute suit sua sponte on behalf of the agency where such action is for the protection and best interest of the municipality and the public. See In re Rice, D.C.App., 217 A.2d 596 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 194, 385 F.2d 976 (1967).

Mindful of the broad role of the Corporation Counsel as the Congress promulgated § 16-2305(f) of D.C.Code 1973, which provides that "The District of Columbia shall be a party to all proceedings under this subchapter [Family Division proceedings]." In enacting this section of the Code, Congress amended an earlier existing law providing that the District of Columbia could only be involved in juvenile cases upon request of a Juvenile Court Judge.⁷

Under its predecessor provision, this court held in an opinion later reversed on other grounds:

That the District of Columbia, for the protection and best interests of the municipality and of the public, has an inherent role in the proceedings of the Juvenile Court is reflected in our statute and established by decisions of this court. The office of the Corporation Counsel, as duly constituted attorney and chief law officer for the District of Columbia, [and its agencies] is empowered to institute suit on behalf of the municipality, "including all cases within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court." In re Rice, supra, at 598.

The above interpretation of the earlier provision was adopted by the legislature when proposing the enactment of the present § 16-2305. The Committee on the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 reported that:

Subsection (f) [of D.C.Code § 16-2305] for the first time makes the District of Columbia a party to all proceedings under this subchapter. Under existing law the principal legal officer for the District of Columbia is not permitted to be involved in behalf of the interest of the public in juvenile cases except in the invitation of a Juvenile Court judge. The intent of this subsection is to make the Corporation Counsel an active participant in all Family Division proceedings involving delinquency, need of supervision and neglect.⁸

Aside from the above statement, there is a paucity of legislative history on the Act. Such being the case, in construing the statute, we must rely heavily on the language of the statute itself. United States v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 455 F.Supp. 1072 (D.D.C.1978). Section 16-2305(f) empowers the District of Columbia, through its chief law officer, the Corporation Counsel, to be a party to all Family Division proceedings covered by D.C.Code 1973, Chapter 23, Subchapter I, to represent the S.R.A. in actions brought against it, in actions instituted by it, or to initiate actions on behalf of the agency in matters of "public interest."

A dispositional hearing involving one who has been adjudicated delinquent based upon violations of law is certainly a matter of "public interest." Thus, where we read in § 16-2322(b) of the same subchapter that:

A dispositional order vesting legal custody of a child in an agency or institution may be extended for additional periods of one year, upon motion of the department, agency, or institution to which the child is committed . . .

we cannot conclude that by giving the agency authority to move for extensions, the Corporation Counsel was thereby intended to be excluded. Such a construction would be contrary to the well-accepted tenet of statutory construction that, "whenever possible, a statute should be interpreted as a harmonious whole." United States v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., supra, at 1079. See Southern Garment Manufacturer's Association v. Fleming, 74 App.D.C. 228, 237, 122 F.2d 622, 631 (1941). See generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 345 (1953). Similarly, one part of a statute must not be construed so as to render another part meaningless. Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126-127, 55 S.Ct. 60, 79 L.Ed. 232 (1934).

We cannot construe § 16-2322(b) as excluding the Corporation Counsel. Such a construction would make § 16-2322(b) discordant with § 16-2305(f), which provides that the Corporation Counsel shall be a party to all Family Division proceedings, and thereby render that section meaningless. We are persuaded by earlier decisions of this jurisdiction that we must construe §§ 16-2305(f) and 2322(b) together, Dunning v. Randall H. Hagner & Co., D.C.Mun. App., 63 A.2d 770, 771 (1949); United Mine Workers of America v. Andrus, 189 U.S. App.D.C. 110, 581 F.2d 888 (1978), and interpret the statute "with an eye to surrounding landscape and an ear for harmonizing potentially discordant provisions . . ." Zaimi v. United States, 155 U.S. App.D.C. 66, 476 F.2d 511 (1973).

Consonant with this analysis, we find the Corporation Counsel was a proper party to request extension of appellant's period of commitment. The trial court could entertain the Corporation Counsel's motion just as it could that of any department, agency, or institution to which the child was committed. See also D.C.Code 1973, § 16-2303.

III

Concluding that the trial court properly heard the Corporation Counsel's motion, we turn now to appellant's second contention: that the trial court abused its...