Matter of the Marriage of Wilburn

• Decision Date: 20 April 2000
• Citation: 18 S.W.3d 837
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000) IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF TONYA ANN WILBURN AND TED ALLAN WILBURN NO. 12-99-00292-CV
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 837

18 S.W.3d 837 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2000)

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF TONYA ANN WILBURN AND TED ALLAN WILBURN

NO. 12-99-00292-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS

April 20, 2000.

Rehearing Overruled May 31, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Panel consisted of Ramey, Jr., C.J., Hadden, J., and Worthen, J.

JIM WORTHEN, Justice

Appellant Tonya Ann Wilburn ("Tonya") appeals from the trial court's June 22, 1999 order partially setting aside an order granting a motion for new trial in her decree of divorce from Ted Allen Wilburn ("Ted"). The June 22nd order from which Tonya appeals also establishes Ted's father, Tommy D. Wilburn ("Tommy"), as trustee of Ted's life insurance proceeds for the benefit of her two sons. In two issues, Tonya contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the June 22nd order because of Ted's death and that it abused its discretion in appointing Tommy as a trustee of Ted's life insurance proceeds for the benefit of her minor children because there was no evidence to support it. We will reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Tonya and Ted were married in 1991, and had two children during their marriage. In July of 1997, Ted filed for divorce, and two months later, Tonya filed a cross-action for divorce. On November 20, 1998, the trial court conducted a bench trial, and afterwards, the trial judge pronounced its ruling from the bench granting the divorce, dividing the property and establishing conservatorship of the two minor children. Further, it noted the granting of the divorce on its docket sheet.

On December 29, 1998, Ted was killed in an automobile accident. Subsequently, on March 19, 1999, the trial judge signed a divorce decree reducing its oral orders of November 20, 1998 to writing. On that same day, however, Tonya filed a motion for new trial which stated:

1.On March 19, 1999, a judgment was signed by this Court in this case.

2.The parties property rights to the employee retirement benefits and life insurance benefits are significantly affected depending upon whether the marriage was terminated by divorce or death. It is in the best interest of the children for their support and maintenance that the divorce judgment be set aside and a new trial be granted.

3.The granting of a new trial would not injure TED ALLAN WILBURN and would be in the best interest of his children.

4.Justice and the children's best interests will not be properly served unless a[sic] the divorce is set aside and a new trial is granted.

Four days later, on March 23, 1999, the trial court signed the following order on Tonya's motion for new trial:

On March 23, 1999, the Court heard the Motion for New Trial of TONYA ANN WILBURN. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the children that the motion be granted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED and that a new trial is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED that the Temporary Orders shall continue in force until further order of the Court.

On April 23, 1999, Tommy, the father of Ted, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Granting New Trial.¹ Thereafter, on June 22, 1999, without hearing any further evidence, the trial court entered the following order:

On March 23, 1999, this Court granted a partial new trial in the best interest of the children on the sole issue of the life insurance proceeds of Ted Allan Wilburn. The marital status of the parties and other property determinations were not affected by the partial new trial. On the 7th day of June, 1999, the parties appeared with counsel and a hearing was held. After consideration of briefs, argument of counsel, and upon hearing the evidence, the Court finds, in the interest of justice, the life insurance proceeds will remain as designated in the Decree and Tommy D. Wilburn is the proper beneficiary.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the life insurance proceeds will remain as designated in the Decree and Tommy D. Wilburn is the proper beneficiary, and the prior Decree of Divorce entered on March 19, 1999, controls for all other matters. Any order to the contrary is invalid and hereby withdrawn.

IT IS ORDERED that Ted Allan Wilburn's life insurance proceeds and interest on deposit with Maxine Barnett, District Clerk of Anderson County, Texas or the Employees Retirement System of Texas shall be distributed to Substitute Petitioner and beneficiary, Tommy D. Wilburn or a trust or annuity by Tommy D. Wilburn. Any previously ordered past due child support owed by the Estate of Ted Allan Wilburn is to be paid upon receipt of the life insurance funds. The net remainder of the funds are to be held or invested in trust by Tommy D. Wilburn or at his direction or approval for the benefit of NATHAN ALLAN WILBURN and COTA LANE WILBURN and to provide child support payments pursuant to this Court's March 19, 1999, Decree of Divorce.

Tonya timely appealed the June 22nd order contending in two issues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter it and that the trial court abused its discretion in making Tommy the trustee of Ted's life insurance proceeds for the benefit of the two minor children. We will address these two issues together.

DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE

Section 201 of AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2D aptly defines marriage as follows:

Marriage is a personal relationship between a man and a woman arising out of a civil contract to which the consent of the parties is essential. A marriage license, solemnized, and registered as provided, is valid in the State. A marriage may be contracted, maintained, invalidated, or dissolved only as provided by law.

52 AM. JUR.2D Marriage 201 (Supp. 1999). In Texas, marriage may only be terminated by death or court decree. Estate of Claveria v. Claveria, 615 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex. 1981). To determine how the marriage between Tonya and Ted was terminated, we must determine whether the trial court's oral pronouncement of divorce had any legal effect on the parties' marriage. A judgment routinely goes through three stages: (1) rendition; (2) reduction to writing; and (3) entry. Oak Creek Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 758 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex. App. - Waco 1988, no writ). A judgment is "rendered" when the matter submitted to it for adjudication is officially announced either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk. Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982); Oak Creek Homes, Inc., 758 S. W.2d at 290. The principle that an oral judgment is valid is predicated upon the supporting principle that the entry of a trial judgment is only a ministerial act. Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1969). Thus, a written judgment signed by the trial judge is not a prerequisite to the finality of a judgment. Id. at 832-33. Consequently, the marriage between Tonya and Ted ended when the decree of divorce was orally pronounced on November 20, 1998.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL

Having determined that Tonya and Ted were divorced at the time of Ted's death, we must next determine whether the trial court's order granting new trial had any effect on the divorce decree. In the instant case, Ted died in December of 1998, and the trial court signed the divorce decree on March 19, 1999. The trial court then granted a motion for new trial on March 23, 1999.

The facts of this case are strikingly similar to those found in Blain v. Broussard, 99 S.W.2d 993 (Tex. Civ. App. - Beaumont 1936, no writ). In Blain, the trial court orally granted a divorce on September 4th. On September 10th, the husband died. The wife then filed a motion for new trial which was granted by the trial court on September 19th. On appeal, the court held that the trial court's order granting a motion for new trial after the death of the husband was void because the trial court no longer had personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 995-97.

Although Blain is applicable to this case, before proceeding with our jurisdictional analysis under Blain, we will first revisit the supreme court's opinion in Dunn, which criticized Blain. See Dunn, 439 S.W.2d at 833. In Dunn, the trial court had orally decreed a divorce between husband and wife on May 24th. Two days later, on May 26th, the husband died. The wife filed a motion to dismiss the divorce on June 21st stating the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. The trial court denied the wife's motion and entered a written divorce decree pursuant to its oral orders of May 24th. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d at 831. Basing its decision upon the authority of Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 229 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin 1921, no writ), the Tyler court of civil appeals reversed the trial court and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss it.²

The supreme court, however, reversed the Tyler court and affirmed the trial court's entry of the divorce decree. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d at 834. The supreme court based the rationale for this ruling upon the principle that the oral decree of divorce preceded the death of the husband and that the written decree after his death was only a ministerial act. Id. at 832. The supreme court thus determined that the marriage in Dunn had ended by divorce on May 24th rather than two days later on May 26th upon Mr. Dunn's death. Id. at 834. The supreme court then determined that because the divorce decree could be entered, the issue of property rights was still ripe for adjudication on appeal. Id. Thus, the holding in Dunn reversed the Ledbetter decision which had concluded that when the divorce action, which is a personal one, becomes moot, the incidental issues of property become moot as well.

It is clear from Dunn that the trial court maintains jurisdiction over property issues determined in a divorce decree that is pronounced before the death of one of the spouses. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d at 834. Yet the general rule in Texas is that the divorce...