Matter of Welfare of CDL, 51791.
| Decision Date | 19 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 51791.,51791. |
| Citation | 306 NW 2d 819 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the WELFARE OF C.D.L. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
William R. Kennedy, Hennepin County Public Defender, and E. George Widseth, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Thomas L. Johnson, County Atty., Gail S. Baez, Asst. County Attys., and Thomas Weist, Law Clerk, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.
This is an appeal by a juvenile from an order of the Juvenile Division, Hennepin County District Court, finding that he committed a delinquent act, namely, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.55, subd. 2 (1980). The court placed appellant on probation, ordered restitution, and granted appellant's request for permission to move to his father's residence in another state once restitution was made. On his appeal appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence supporting the finding and also that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to impeach the credibility of a defense witness with a prior juvenile adjudication. We affirm.
The vehicle in question was a Moped taken from its owner's garage on or about May 20, 1980, 1 week before appellant, with a companion as passenger, was stopped while he was driving it.
Appellant claimed at the adjudicatory hearing that he had gotten the Moped from a "dude" whose first name was "Benny," whom he did not know personally, a few days before he was stopped, and that he was planning to pay Benny $85 for it. Testifying as a corroborating witness was a friend of appellant whose credibility was impeached by a prior juvenile adjudication.
Appellant's first contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he used the vehicle knowing that he did not have permission from its true owner to do so.
We agree with the appellant and with the trial court that unauthorized use is a crime requiring more than a mere general intent; the intent is the intent to use a vehicle knowing that one does not have permission from the true owner to do so. This is clear from a reading of the Advisory Committee Comments to the statute, and this is the approach taken in 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass'n, Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 16.27 (1977). This approach is also consistent with the approach which we took in interpreting Minn.Stat. § 609.53 as it read before it was amended in 1973 to spell out the knowledge requirement. It is also consistent with basic rules of fairness and common sense. Any other approach would theoretically permit the conviction of people who in good faith used cars loaned to them by people who did not have permission to use them.
Although we agree with appellant's analysis of the elements, we disagree with his contention that the evidence in this case should be deemed insufficient to justify a finding that he committed an act of unauthorized use. We believe generally that when the state is able to show use and lack of permission to use, that should be enough to establish a prima facie case.
Appellant's contention that the trial court's explanation of his finding suggests that the trial court improperly believed appellant had some burden of proof is meritless. The trial court did not say that appellant had a burden of proving himself innocent, but that there were holes in appellant's defensive explanation for the devastatingly incriminating evidence that he was caught in the act of using the vehicle in question without permission from the true owner and for that reason, among others, the trial court disbelieved the explanation.
2. Appellant's other contention is that the trial court committed prejudicial error in permitting the prosecutor to impeach appellant's...
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