Matteson v. Brown

Decision Date20 June 1911
Citation33 R.I. 339,80 A. 133
PartiesMATTESON et al. v. BROWN et al.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court

Case Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Willard B. Tanner, Presiding Justice.

Suit by Frank W. Matteson, administrator, and others, against John Nicholas Brown and others, for the construction of the will of Harold Brown, deceased. Certified from the Superior Court under Gen. Laws 1909, c. 289, § 35. Decree construing will rendered.

James Tillinghast and Tillinghast & Collins, for complainants. Sheffield, Levy & Harvey, for respondent .

John Nicholas Brown. Edwards & Angell (Eugene A. Kingman, Robert B. Dresser, and Eliot G. Parkhurst, of counsel), for respondents Sophia Augusta Sherman and Georgette Brown.

SWEETLAND, J. This is a bill in equity, brought by the trustees under the will of Harold Brown, the executor of the will of Sophia Augusta Brown, and the administrator de bonis non with the will of said Harold Brown annexed, for instruction, which prayer involves the construction of certain clauses of said will of Harold Brown. Said will was executed October 16, 1899. The testator died on May 10, 1900, and said will was finally proved before the probate court of Newport on June 18, 1900.

By the second clause of said will the testator bequeathed to his wife, Georgette Brown, for her absolute use, $350,000. and, with some slight reservations, all works of art, household furniture, horses, carriages, and like effects by him possessed, together with certain other pieces of personal property. By the third clause of said will the testator devised and bequeathed his Mansion House estate in Newport, his undivided one-half of land situated in Newport called the "Stable estate," another tract of land situated in Newport, his four shares of the stock of the Spouting Rock Beach Association in Newport, and his bathhouses on said beach, to certain trustees in trust, among other matters, to permit the testator's wife, the defendant Georgette Brown, to have the use and occupation of the same, free of rent therefor, during her life, and, in case of lease or sale of the same, or of any part thereof, to pay over, in case of lease the entire rents, and in case of sale the entire income arising from the proceeds of sale, to her, for her absolute use.

The testator further bequeathed a number of pecuniary and specific legacies, and by the nineteenth clause of said will devised and bequeathed his residuary estate, real and personal, to certain trustees in trust, the provisions of which trust materially vary in dependence upon the circumstance of there being or not being a child, children, or more remote issue of the testator living at his death. In the event that there should be issue of the testator living at the time of his death, it is provided, first, that the trustees shall set apart from the rest of what the testator terms his "residuary personal estate" the shares of stock owned by him, at the time of his death, in the capital stock of the Lonsdale, the Hope, the Blackstone Manufacturing, and the Berkley Companies; second that the said trustees shall hold one fourth part of the remaining portion of his residuary personal estate in trust, to pay over the net income therefrom to the testator's wife until her death or marriage; and, third, that, after the death or marriage of said wife as to this one-fourth part of his remaining residuary personal estate, and after the testator's death as to all the remaining residuary estate, real and personal, including shares of stock in the four manufacturing companies aforesaid, the said trustees shall stand seised and possessed of the same to the use of the testator's issue, who shall in the testator's lifetime or after attaining the age of 21 years or marry under that age.

In the event that there be no issue of the testator living at the time of his death, the provisions of the trust, among other things, are: First, that the trustees shall "forthwith transfer and convey" the shares of stock in the four manufacturing companies aforesaid to the testator's brother, John Nicholas Brown, if then living, for his own use, forever. If the said John Nicholas Brown should not be living at the time of the testator's death, then the trustees shall "forthwith transfer and convey" said shares of stock to the issue of the said John Nicholas Brown. Second, that the trustees shall stand seised of the testator's residuary real estate to the use of the testator's brother, John Nicholas Brown, if he be living at the time of the death of the testator, and to the use of his heirs, forever. If the said John Nicholas Brown should not be living at the time of the testator's death, then said trustees to stand seised of said residuary real estate to the use of the child, children, or more remote issue of the said John Nicholas Brown. Third, the trustees shall stand seised of the remaining parts of the testator's residuary personal estate in trust to assign, transfer, and pay over one quarter part to the testator's mother, Sophia Augusta Brown, for her own absolute use, forever. Fourth, to assign, transfer, and pay over one other quarter part to his brother, John Nicholas Brown, if he be living at the time of the testator's death, to his own absolute use, forever. If the said John Nicholas Brown should not be living at the time of the testator's death, then the said trustees to assign, transfer, and pay over said one quarter part to the child, children, or more remote issue of the said John Nicholas Brown. Fifth, to hold one other quarter part in trust to pay over the net income arising therefrom to the testator's wife until her death or marriage, in the same manner as was provided in the event of the testator leaving issue at the time of his death. Sixth, to hold the remaining one quarter part in trust to pay over the net income arising therefrom to the testator's sister, Sophia Augusta Sherman, for and during her natural life, and upon her death the trustees to stand seised and possessed of said one quarter part for the use of the issue of said Sophia Augusta Sherman.

The testator died a young man, within a few months after the execution of this will, without ever having had issue. The testator's brother, John Nicholas Brown, deceased in the testator's lifetime, leaving John Nicholas Brown, Jr., a minor, his only child and issue him surviving. By the twentieth clause of his will, the testator, among other things, provided as follows: "* * * And my said trustees shall collect the income, dividends and profits accruing and arising from the said residuary estate, and said trust properties, estate and premises respectively, and the investments and reinvestments of the same, and shall pay therefrom all taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, repairs and all other expenses incurred in the care and management of said trust estate, and also all upon or in respect of my homestead and other estate hereinbefore by the third clause of this will devised in trust for my wife, and including their own reasonable compensation for services under the several trusts aforesaid."

After the probate of said will, the executors, following what they considered to be the direction to them contained in the will, transferred the shares of stock in the four manufacturing companies aforesaid to said John Nicholas Brown, Jr., and paid over and transferred to him and to Sophia Augusta Brown, the mother of the testator, to each respectively, one-fourth of the testator's residuary personal estate remaining in the hands of the executors after transferring the said shares of stock to John Nicholas Brown, Jr., as aforesaid, and transferred one other one-fourth part of the said remaining residuary personal estate to the trustees under said will in trust for the widow of Harold Brown for her life, with remainder as in said will declared, and transferred the remaining fourth part of said remaining residuary personal estate to the trustees under said will in trust for the said Sophia Augusta Sherman, the sister of the testator, with remainder as in said will declared; and, further, believing that the legal title of the testator's residuary real estate vested at once in said John Nicholas Brown, Jr., by the statute of uses, the said trustees have never collected any of the rents or income from, or otherwise exercised any control over, the said residuary real estate of said Harold Brown, but said trustees have permitted the rents and income of said real estate to be collected by the guardian of the estate of said John Nicholas Brown, Jr. The said trustees under the will of Harold Brown have, therefore, in their hands and under their control only the said two fourth parts of the testator's residuary personal estate remaining after transferring said shares of stock to John Nicholas Brown, Jr., as aforesaid, and, in accordance with what they understand to be the direction of the twentieth clause of said will, they have paid from the income of these two fourth parts of the testator's remaining residuary personal estate in their hands all the taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, repairs, and all other expenses incurred in the care and management of and upon or in respect of the homestead and other estates given by the third clause of said will in trust for the benefit of the testator's wife.

It is contended by the respondents Sophia Augusta Sherman and Georgette Brown that the said executors should not have transferred the said shares of stock in the four manufacturing companies to the said John Nicholas Brown, Jr., and should not have conveyed the said two fourth parts of the testator's remaining residuary personal estate to said Sophia Augusta Brown and the said John Nicholas Brown, Jr., without having first provided that said residuary estate so transferred and conveyed to said Sophia Augusta Brown and John Nicholas Brown, Jr., should contribute its pro rata share of the taxes and other expenditures for the...

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    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1921
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  • R.I. Hosp. Trust Co. v. Thomas
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • August 1, 1947
    ...manner. His intention is to be sought in what he has written and nothing is to be inferred except by necessary implication. Matteson v. Brown, 33 R.I. 339, 80 A. 133. We have held that necessary implication means ‘so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that whic......
  • Indus. Trust Co. v. Wilson
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1938
    ...ascertained is that expressed by the parties by the language they used. What did they mean by the words employed?'" And in Matteson v. Brown, 33 R.I. 339, 80 A. 133, this court said (page 137): "In seeking the intention of the testator, the court must consider what he has written in his wil......
  • Bliven v. Borden
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 6, 1936
    ...an aid in discovering his intent, and when such intent is once determined, the court should, if possible, give it effect. Matteson v. Brown, 33 R.I. 339, 80 A. 133; Metcalf v. Gladding, 35 R.I. 395, 87 A. 195; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Davis, 41 R.I. 386, 103 A. 972; Thurber v. Thu......
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