Matteson v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill.

• Decision Date: 23 March 2022
• Docket Number: CIVIL CASE NO. 3:19-CV-01960 (JCH)
• Parties: Suzanne MATTESON, Plaintiff, v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

593 F.Supp.3d 5

Suzanne MATTESON, Plaintiff,

v.SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant.

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:19-CV-01960 (JCH)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed March 23, 2022

Isabel Virginia Del Vecchio, Law Firm of Stephen M. Reck and Scott D. Camassar, LLC, North Stonington, CT, Stephen M. Reck, Levin, Rojas, Camassar, and Reck, LLC, North Stonington, CT, Kevin Ferry, Law Office of Kevin C. Ferry, New Britain, CT, for Plaintiff.

John Anthony Donovan, III, Sloane & Walsh LLP, Boston, MA, Mara E. Finkelstein, Sloane & Walsh LLP, Glastonbury, CT, for Defendant.

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Janet C. Hall, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Suzanne Matteson brings this action against her insurer, defendant Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois ("Safeco"), alleging four counts stemming from its denial of her underinsured motorist claim. See generally Second Am. Compl. ("Compl.") (Doc. No. 31). Safeco, in turn, has filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, it "has no further liability or obligation" to Matteson for the accident. See Def.’s Answer to Pl.’s Second Am. Compl. at 9 ("Def.’s Answer") (Doc. No. 43).

Following discovery, Safeco has moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim and all four counts of Matteson's Complaint. See Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. on the Counterclaim and Pl.’s Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 58); Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J. on the Counterclaim and Pl.’s Am. Compl. ("Def.’s Mem.") (Doc. No. 58-1); Def.’s Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.’s Reply") (Doc. No. 65). Matteson opposes this Motion. See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.’s Mem.") (Doc. No. 64-1).

For the reasons discussed below, the court grants in part and denies in part Safeco's Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Rule 56(a)2 Statement

As an initial matter, the court begins by noting that plaintiff has manifestly failed to comply with the Local Rules in opposing Safeco's Motion for Summary Judgment. When a party moves for summary judgment, Local Rule 56 requires them to support their Motion with a "document entitled ‘Local Rule 56(a) Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,’ which sets forth, in separately numbered paragraphs ... a concise statement of each material facts." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 1. "Each statement of material fact" in the movant's Rule 56(a) 1 Statement "must be followed by a specific citation" to admissible evidence in the record. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 3. In moving for summary judgment here, Safeco has complied with this requirement. See Def.’s Rule 56(a) 1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt") (Doc. No. 58-2).

Local Rule 56 also requires that the party opposing summary judgment "file and serve with the opposition papers a document entitled ‘Local Rule 56(a)2 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment.’ " D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 2(i). That document "shall include a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement followed by a response to each paragraph admitting or denying the fact and/or objecting to the fact." Id. A Rule 56(a) 2 Statement "must also include a separate section entitled ‘Additional Material Facts’ setting forth in separately numbered paragraphs ... any additional facts." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 2(ii). As with the Rule 56(a) 1 Statement, the non-movant must cite to admissible evidence in the record to support each paragraph. D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 3.

Plaintiff has done none of this here. She has not submitted a Rule 56(a) 2 Statement at all, although the section in her Memorandum entitled "Undisputed Facts" arguably contains similar information to what the "Additional Material Facts" section would include in a properly submitted Rule 56(a) 2 Statement. See Pl.’s Mem. at 7-9. Where a party has failed to comply with Rule 56, the court "may ... deem[ ] admitted certain facts that are supported by the evidence in accordance with Local Rule 56(a)1." D. Conn. L. Civ. R. 56(a) 3. In other words, a district court has "discretion in deeming all facts in [a] defendant[’s] Local Rule [56(a)1] statement admitted" when they are properly supported by evidence in the record and the non-moving plaintiff fails to controvert those facts. See, e.g., Suares v. Cityscape Tours, Inc., 603 F. App'x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding a district court in New York acted within its discretion in admitting defendants’ facts supported by the record where plaintiff failed to comply with a nearly identical local rule).

Because Matteson has failed to comply with Rule 56, the court deems admitted the material facts in defendant's Rule 56(a) 1 Statement to the extent they are adequately supported by specific citations to admissible evidence in the record. See, e.g., Vaden v. Connecticut, 557 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285 (D. Conn. 2008) (deeming facts in defendant's Rule 56(a) 1 Statement admitted where plaintiff failed to comply with Rule 56 ). The court will, however, in its discretion, still look to the statements of material fact plaintiff makes in her Memorandum and the citations to the record therein.¹ The method in which Matteson lays out her fact section in separately numbered paragraphs with citations to the record at the very least demonstrates an attempt to present the evidence to the court in an organized manner. Pl.’s Mem. at 7-9. In addition, the court is obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Matteson, the non-movant, at this stage. Doing so, in this court's view, requires treating the "Undisputed Facts" section in her Memorandum similar to an "Additional Material Facts" section of a properly submitted Rule 56(a) 2 Statement.

B. Facts

In 2013, defendant Safeco issued plaintiff Matteson a personal automobile insurance policy. See Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt at ¶ 1; Def.’s Ex. B (Doc. No. 58-4). The policy had effective dates of June 4, 2013 through December 4, 2013. Id. In relevant part, the policy provides:

LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US

...

C. All claims or suits under Part C of this policy must be brought within three years of the date of the accident. However, in the case of a claim involving an underinsured motor vehicle, the insured may toll any applicable limitation period by:

1. Notifying us prior to expiration of the three year period, in writing, of any claim the insured may have for Underinsured Motorists Coverage; and

2. Commencing suit or arbitration proceedings not more than 180 days from the date of exhaustion of the limits of liability under all automobile bodily injury bonds or policies applicable at the time of the accident by settlements or final judgments after any appeals.

Def.’s Ex. B at 20.

On August 18, 2013, while she was covered by the policy, Matteson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt at ¶ 3. At the time of the accident, "Matteson was slowing down with traffic" when she "was rear ended." Def.’s Reply Ex. A (Doc. No. 65-1). Matteson had several medical issues as a result of the accident and, as of May 2021 was "still see[ing] [a doctor] ... who prescribe[d] [her] the meloxicam that [she] ha[d] been on since the accident." See Def.’s Ex. A, Dep. of Suzanne Matteson, at 17. She continued to be prescribed that medication due to lingering back pain stemming from the accident. Id.

Shortly after the accident, on September 16, 2013, Matteson reached out to Safeco through counsel via a faxed letter. See Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt at ¶ 4; Def.’s Ex. C (Doc. No. 58-5). In that letter, Safeco was advised that Matteson was represented by counsel "for bodily injuries sustained" in the accident. Def.’s Ex. C. In addition, the letter stated that Matteson had "$5,000.00 medical payments coverage" under her policy; that she "ha[d] made co-payments"; and that she "would like to be reimbursed by the medical payments coverage" for those expenses. Id. The letter did not specifically mention an underinsured motorist claim.² Id. According to Matteson's attorney, however, following the letter she "had numerous telephone conversations with the Defendant's adjuster within" the three years after the accident regarding "the fact that there would be an underinsured claim as the tortfeasor policy was not sufficient" to fully cover Matteson's damages from the accident. Pl.’s Ex. A, Aff. of Isabel V. Del Vecchio, at ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 64-2).

In August 2014, approximately a year after the accident, Matteson brought suit against the tortfeasor who had rear ended her in Rhode Island Superior Court. Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt at ¶ 5; Pl.’s Mem. at 7. While that case remained pending, Matteson's attorney sent an email to Safeco on July 28, 2017. Def.’s Ex. E (Doc. No. 58-7). In that email, her attorney stated that "this email [is] notice of potential underinsured motorist claims" for Matteson. Id. The email also noted that a date for arbitration had been set with the tortfeasor, who only "carried 25/50 BI limits." Id. This was the first written correspondence specifically mentioning an underinsured motorist claim. Def.’s Ex. F, Dep. of Christina Morante, at 78 (Doc. No. 58-8).

Eventually, the Rhode Island case against the tortfeasor settled on May 14, 2018. Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt at ¶ 9; Pl.’s Mem. at 8. The settlement was for $25,000, the full policy limit under his insurance. Def.’s R. 56(a) 1 Stmt at ¶ 9; Pl.’s Mem. at 8; Aff. of Isabel V. Del Vecchio at ¶ 5. Following settlement, Matteson's attorney averred that she "requested consent to settle from the underinsured motorist adjuster [at Safeco] via email and numerous phone calls from both [her]self and [her] paralegal." Aff. of Isabel V. Del Vecchio at ¶ 6. She "also indicated that an underinsured claim would follow" and "was shuffled between at least three underinsured motorist adjusters." Id. An email in the record provides further support for at least some Attorney Del Vecchio's statements. On June...