Vaden v. Connecticut
Citation | 557 F.Supp.2d 279 |
Decision Date | 30 May 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 06-cv-71 (JBA).,06-cv-71 (JBA). |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Redinno L.S. VADEN, Plaintiff, v. State of CONNECTICUT, Connecticut Dep't of Corrections, Theresa Lantz, Brian Murphy, Walter Ford, Lori Ricks, Robert Gillis, Robin Bourne, James Foley, and John Alves, Defendants. |
Cynthia Renee Jennings, Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiff.
Margaret Q. Chappie, Maria A. Santos, Jane B. Emons, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Redinno Vaden filed this suit against his former employer, the Connecticut Department of Corrections, to seek redress for what he alleges to be racial discrimination and a hostile work environment culminating in his termination. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on all counts, and for the reasons below, their motion will be granted.
I. Facts and Background
In his fourth amended complaint, Mr. Vaden advances three claims: a Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (Count 2); a Title VII claim (Count 3); and a claim under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (Count 4). In Count 1, Mr. Vaden purports to bring a claim for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. However, In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 731 (2d Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted). Since plaintiff seeks declaratory relief on all counts in the "Relief Demanded" section of his fourth amended complaint, and because his Count One is not predicated on any underlying cause of action, summary judgment on Count One is appropriate and will be granted.
In his complaint and opposition to summary judgment, Mr. Vaden recites a litany of events stretching back to 2002, but the relevant statutes of limitations controlling his § 1983 equal protection and due process and Title VII discrimination and hostile work environment claims restrict the summary judgment analysis of actionable conduct to more recent events.
Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains no express time limit for bringing claims, the Supreme Court directs courts to apply the statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims in the state in which the tort is alleged to have occurred. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In Connecticut, the appropriate statute of limitation is found in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577, which sets a three-year limit for tort claims, Lounsbury v. Jeffries, 25 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1994).
With respect to a Title VII claim, an administrative charge must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), but the filing deadline is extended to 300 days in states, such as Connecticut, which have agencies "with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice." Id. Following the release of jurisdiction from the agency (also known as a "right to sue" letter), an individual alleging a Title VII grievance may file a civil action "within ninety days." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Mr. Vaden filed this action on January 13, 2006, and dual filed his Title VII complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) on July 13, 2006, receiving a release of jurisdiction on July 3, 2007.1 Therefore, any conduct or actions by defendants alleged to give rise to § 1983 liability occurring before January 13, 2003 are time-barred, as are any actions on which his Title VII claim is premised occurring before September 16, 2005, 300 days prior to his administrative filing. Mr. Vaden contests this conclusion, arguing very briefly that "[t]he Second Circuit has permitted continuing civil rights violations to be remedied under the continuing violation doctrine," Pl.'s Opp. to Summ. J. at 14. He does not specify whether his continuing violation theory applies to his § 1983 claim, his Title VII claim, or both.
A continuing course of conduct may toll the statute of limitations on a plaintiffs Title VII and § 1983 claims, where the alleged violation is "`composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.'" Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310 (2d Cir.2004) at 318 (quoting N'tl Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). A string of incidents which are each a "discrete act" or "a single completed action" does not constitute a continuing violation which tolls the statute of limitations. Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted). Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill, of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797 (7th Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted).
Mr. Vaden does not address how the occurrences catalogued in his complaint collectively constitute one cumulative violation of his rights, but instead simply asserts that the series of events in the complaint "establish specific repeated instances where discriminatory acts by Defendants were permitted over a span of years during Plaintiff[']s employment." Pl.'s Opp. to Summ. J. at 15. The only pre-January 13, 2003 event mentioned in the complaint—the July 2002 altercation between plaintiff and a number of other corrections officers in front of inmates—is a self-contained event, unconnected to Vaden's later travails. Although the plaintiff alleges that the Department's response to this incident "subjected [plaintiff] to disparate and more severe treatment in the discipline accorded him based upon his race and color," Pl.'s Opp. to Summ. J. at 12, the July 2002 incident is unconnected to Mr. Vaden's other § 1983 allegations. Thus, it is time-barred as a basis for liability in Count 2. A similar result is required for the allegations which predate September 16, 2006 advanced as a basis for Mr. Vaden's Title VII claim.2
In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants have submitted a statement of material facts as to which they contend there is no genuine issue remaining for trial resolution. In his opposition, however, Mr. Vaden has not countered the defendants' contentions by specifically admitting or denying them as required by Local Rule 56(a)(2), but has countered with a different list of facts which he asserts to be in dispute. Because the plaintiff has not admitted or denied the defendant's asserted uncontroverted facts, the defendants urge the Court to take the plaintiffs failure to rebut their statement of material facts as admissions based on which summary judgment should be granted in their favor.
Local Rule 56(a)(1) requires that a party moving for summary, judgment annex to its motion a document which "sets forth in separately numbered paragraphs ... a concise statement of material fact as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." The party opposing summary judgment is in turn obliged under Local Rule 56(a)(2) to include in its opposition a document which "states in separately numbered paragraphs ... and corresponding to the paragraphs contained in the moving party's Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement whether each of the facts asserted by the moving party is admitted or denied." The nonmoving party is further obliged to submit a separate list "of each issue of material fact as to which it is contended there is a genuine issue to be tried," id. All statements of fact submitted under Local Rule 56 are subject to the requirement that each fact "must be followed by a specific citation to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at trial and/or (2) evidence that would be admissible at trial," Local R. 56(a)(3).
The requirement that Local R. 56(a)(1) statements cite the record, and be responded to as either admitted or denied, is grounded in the expectation that "[a] party responding to a motion for summary judgment presumably has conducted discovery and should have a reasonable, factually supported basis to admit or deny any factual assertions made in the case," Hogan v. Conn. Judicial Branch, 220 F.Supp.2d 111, 115 (D.Conn.2002). The penalty for failing to properly and completely respond to the moving party's Local R. 56(a)(1) statement may include the moving party's facts being "deemed admitted," Local R. 56(a)(2). See, e.g., Roberts v. Dominion Resources, Inc., No. 06-cv-1598, 2008 WL 1777377, *1, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31183 at *1-2 (D.Conn. Apr. 16, 2008) () ; Eider v. McCarthy, 531 F.Supp.2d 333, 338 (D.Conn.2008) ( ). However, even where a non-moving party's failure to comply with Local Rule 56 would result in the admission of facts, this Court must be guided by the substance of the record submitted in support and "may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the moving party's Rule 56[] statement," Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d...
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