Mattey v. Whittier Mach. Co.
| Decision Date | 28 November 1885 |
| Citation | 4 N.E. 575,140 Mass. 337 |
| Parties | MATTEY v. WHITTIER MACH. CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action of tort for personal injuries, caused by the alleged negligence of defendant's servant. At the trial in the superior court it appeared that the plaintiff was six years and seven months old at the time of the accident. She testified that on the day of the accident she was walking on the righthand sidewalk of Blossom street, in the city of Boston, from the direction of Cambridge street, towards Parkman street; that when she came to the point where Blossom street crosses Parkman street she looked to her right up Parkman street, and saw a wagon of the defendant opposite a stable, and coming down Parkman street on a fast trot; that she had two bundles under her arms; that she then started to go across Parkman street; that when she was about half way across Parkman street she dropped one of her bundles; that she stooped to pick it up, when she heard a woman cry, “Stop, mister! little girl is picking up her parcel;” and that, while she was trying to pick up the bundle, the wagon ran over her, and broke her leg. On cross-examination she testified that, first, she dropped her bundle; then she heard the woman cry out; then she looked, and saw the team coming, still on the trot, and not more than across the court-room,-which it was admitted was 30 feet,-but did not notice how the driver was looking; then she stooped, with her back to the horses, to pick up her bundle, and was run over by the wagon. There was uncontradicted evidence that Parkman street, at this point, was 17.24 feet wide from curb to curb, and was paved with cobble-stones; that the wagon weighed 4,800 pounds; and that said stable was 250 feet off. The driver of the wagon testified, and there was other evidence to the same effect, that he was walking his horses. The defendant asked the judge to rule that there was no evidence on which the jury could find that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care, and that she was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence, and could not recover. The court refused so to rule, but left the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff to the jury as a question of fact. The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendant alleged exceptions.J.C. Ropes, for defendant.
L.M. Child and T.E. Barry, for plaintiff.
We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff, by stopping...
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