Matthews v. ALABAMA AGR. AND MECHANICAL UNIV.

• Decision Date: 26 May 2000
• Citation: 787 So.2d 691
• Parties: Kevin D. MATTHEWS v. ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

787 So.2d 691

Kevin D. MATTHEWS v. ALABAMA AGRICULTURAL AND MECHANICAL UNIVERSITY et al.

1981259.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 26, 2000.

Rehearing Denied December 29, 2000.

Sherryl Snodgrass Caffey, Huntsville, for appellant.

Melissa W. Larsen of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Huntsville, for appellee.

SEE, Justice.

The plaintiff Kevin D. Matthews appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical University ("A & M"); Dr. Virginia Caples, interim president of A & M; Amy Herring, university counsel for A & M; and Edwin Hayes, chief of A & M's Department of Public Safety (collectively, the "university employees"). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We view the facts in a light most favorable to Matthews. Matthews is a former student and former employee of A & M.¹ On August 18, 1994, Matthews sued A & M, stating claims allegedly arising out of his employment contract with A & M.² Matthews alleges in this present case that after he had sued A & M, its officials began to harass him. On November 3, 1995, Matthews sent a letter to Chief Hayes complaining of, among other things, the alleged harassment. In response to Matthews's letter, A & M's director of human resources on November 7 sent a letter to Matthews advising him that, because of Matthews's then pending action against A & M, she was turning his letter over to A & M's counsel, Ms. Herring. Matthews alleges:

"Attorney Herring responded to [his] complaints of harassment, and to instructions regarding the same from ... Dr. Caples, A & M Interim President, by designing a special criminal trespass form, ... and by instructing Chief Hayes to deliver the same to [Matthews], and to arrest him upon his return to [the] A & M campus."

On November 21, Matthews visited the A & M library. As he was leaving the library, he was stopped by Chief Hayes and other A & M police officers. One of the officers, Lt. Raymond Johnson, told Matthews that he was trespassing and that if he returned to the A & M campus that day he would be arrested. Johnson also placed a "criminal-trespass-warning" form on Matthews's car. The form provides for an acknowledgment by the person being warned. If the trespasser refuses to complete the acknowledgment, the form instructs the issuing officer to complete the following provision:

"On this ___ day of _____, 199_, I warned __________ that he/she was trespassing on the campus of Alabama A & M University. I further requested that he/she leave the premises immediately and refrain from returning to the campus of Alabama A & M University. He/she refused to sign the foregoing Acknowledgement and a copy of the Acknowledgement as signed below by me was given to him/her."

Lt. Johnson completed that part of the form, but he incorrectly wrote in his own name as the name of the person being warned. Matthews drove away. Lt. Johnson then discovered his error in completing the form and filled out another one, but this time he incorrectly wrote the name "Calvin Matthew" as the name of the person warned.

Kevin Matthews did not leave the A & M campus, but instead drove to another building on the campus. There, he went to the office of Barbara Davis, the Alabama Education Association representative, who was assisting him in his action against A & M. Matthews complained to Davis about the incident involving the officers and the trespass warning. While Matthews was meeting with Davis, he was arrested by A & M police officers for criminal trespass; he was transported to the Huntsville city jail. On January 19, 1996, Matthews was tried in the Huntsville Municipal Court on the charge of criminal trespass, but was found not guilty. Matthews alleges that at the trial the A & M police officers who arrested him testified that they did so because Herring had instructed them to (and presumably not because he had violated any law).

In January 1996, Matthews, through his attorney (presumably the same counsel who had represented him in the employment dispute with A & M), asked A & M whether he could attend a collegiate basketball tournament being held at the A & M gymnasium. Matthews alleges that Herring told him he would be arrested if he returned to A & M for any reason. On March 27, 1996, Matthews attended a meeting on the A & M campus, a meeting that Matthews alleges was open to the public. At the event, Chief Hayes issued Matthews a trespass warning and told him that if he returned to the A & M campus he would be arrested.

On May 30, Matthews sued A & M and Caples, Herring, and Hayes, alleging state-law tort claims of false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel and slander, negligence, and the tort of outrage, and violations of federal and state constitutional rights.³ Matthews asserted claims under the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 of "denial of due process," "illegal search and seizure," "denial of freedom of association," and "denial of equal protection." Matthews petitioned in the alternative for a writ of mandamus, a writ of certiorari, or an injunction, ordering the defendants "to withdraw [the] trespass warning" and "enjoin[ing] [them] from denying him the right to have public access to [the university]." Matthews further sought relief pursuant to Alabama's Declaratory Judgments Act, specifically under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-223. Matthews seeks compensatory and punitive damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.

On July 1, the defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. After removal, the defendants moved for a summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for a summary judgment as to all of Matthews's federal-law claims and remanded Matthews's state-law claims to the state circuit court. In the circuit court, the defendants moved for a summary judgment as to all of Matthews's remaining claims, arguing that they are entitled to sovereign immunity, pursuant to Ala. Const. of 1901, art. I, § 14, and that Matthews's state constitutional claims are not cognizable under Alabama law. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion. In its order, the circuit court held that "Alabama law does not recognize a direct cause of action for monetary damage under the [Alabama] [C]onstitution," that A & M was "absolutely immune from [Matthews's] tort claims" under § 14, and that Matthews's tort "claims against the University officials in their official capacities are merely another method of asserting claims against Alabama A & M University." Implicit in the trial court's order is a finding that Matthews sued the University employees in their official capacities. Matthews appeals the circuit court's summary judgment.

I.

The defendants moved for a summary judgment on the grounds that they are immune to Matthews's claims and that Alabama law does not recognize a direct cause of action for violations of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. Immunity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead and prove. See Lightfoot v. Floyd, 667 So.2d 56, 64 (Ala.1995); Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 86 (Ala.1989); Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P. Our standard for reviewing a defendant's summary judgment based on an affirmative defense is well established:

"This Court reviews de novo a trial court's denial of a summary judgment. Where, as in this case, the defendant moves for a summary judgment based on an affirmative defense, this Court applies the following standard of review:

"`When there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of an affirmative defense, ... and it is shown that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. If there is a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the affirmative defense, summary judgment is inappropriate. In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to each element of an affirmative defense, this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the plaintiff (the nonmoving party) and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the defendant (the movant).'"

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So.2d 442, 444-45 (Ala.1999) (citations omitted; omission in Wal-Mart); see also Carroll ex rel. Slaught v. Hammett, 744 So.2d 906, 908 (Ala.1999) (affirmative defense of discretionary-function immunity).

II.

Matthews argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion for a summary judgment because, he argues, they failed to make a prima facie showing that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.⁴ Matthews contends that the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing because they did not support their motion with affidavits or produce any other evidence, but instead relied solely on the pleadings. We agree that the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing. Under Rule 56(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the defendants were not required to produce affidavits in support of their motion; however, as the moving parties, they were required to produce evidence in support of their motion showing (1) that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the affirmative defense and (2) that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on that affirmative defense. See Smitherman, 743 So.2d at 444-45. If the defendants did not make that prima facie showing, then the burden did not shift to Matthews. See Chilton v. City of Huntsville, 584 So.2d 822, 824 (Ala.1991).

In support of their motion for a summary judgment, A & M and the university employees argued that they are agents of the State of Alabama and, therefore, are immune from suit by § 14 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901. The defendants produced no admissible evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment. Their motion was supported entirely a memorandum of law and the allegations in Matthews's amended complaint. At the...