Matthews v. Byrd
Decision Date | 15 May 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 4-3094.,4-3094. |
Citation | 60 S.W.2d 909 |
Parties | MATTHEWS v. BYRD, County Clerk. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
C. E. Love, of El Dorado, for appellant.
C. B. Crumpler, of El Dorado, for appellee.
Hal L. Norwood, Atty. Gen., and Sam T. Poe, Tom Poe, and M. A. Matlock, all of Little Rock, amici curiæ.
This appeal involves the constitutionality of sections 5 and 6 of House Bill No. 559, which, after its final passage, became Act No. 250 of the Acts of 1933. The Secretary of State has certified that this bill, having remained with the Governor twenty days, the General Assembly not being in session, became a law March 30, 1933.
The title to this bill, when introduced in the House, was "A Bill for an Act to be entitled: `An act to fix the compensation of County Officers,'" and this title was not changed.
The legislative journals show that the bill having been passed in the House was amended in the Senate, and that the House concurred in the Senate amendments. The amendments consist in the addition of the two sections of the act which are numbered 5 and 6.
Section 2 of this act fixes the compensation of the county officers of all the counties of the state. It deals with each county separately, and contains various provisions in regard to compensating these officers, and it is insisted that this, in effect, is the consolidation of seventy-five local bills into a single act, all of which are void, because all are local, and that therefore the entire act must fall as being unconstitutional.
Section 3 of the act provides that the compensation allowed by section 2 shall be the maximum compensation, records of which shall be kept, with directions as to the disposition of fees collected in excess of the compensation allowed, etc.
Section 4 provides that nothing contained in the act shall be construed as limiting or restricting the right of the people to initiate such laws as they may, from time to time, deem advisable for the compensation of county officials.
The first amendment to the bill, which appears as section 5 of the act, reads as follows: "That section 10084 of Crawford & Moses' Digest of the statutes of Arkansas, be amended so as to read as follows: `The clerks of the several counties of this State shall cause the list of delinquent lands in their respective counties, as corrected by them, to be entered in a well-bound book, appropriately labeled, which book shall be a permanent public record, and open to the inspection of the public at all times.'"
A comparison of this section 5 of the act with the section of the Digest which it amends discloses that it eliminates the requirement appearing in section 10084, Crawford & Moses' Digest, that the county clerk shall cause the list of the delinquent lands to be published weekly for two weeks, and, in lieu thereof, requires the clerk to enter of record the list of delinquent lands in a well-bound book, to be kept as a public record, open to the inspection of the public at all times.
The other amendment to the bill, which appears as section 6 of the act, amends section 10085, Crawford & Moses' Digest. The amendment is to the effect that, instead of publishing the list of all the delinquent property, as section 10085, Crawford & Moses' Digest requires, there should be published a notice in substance as follows:
Section 6 of the act provides that this notice shall occupy a space of not more than six inches double column in the publication in which it appears, and that the county clerk shall make a certificate, at the foot of the record containing the delinquent list, stating in what newspaper the notice of the delinquent land sale was published, and the dates of publication.
Sections 7 and 8 of the act read as follows:
The court below held that sections 5 and 6, supra, were unconstitutional, and the effect of that holding is to leave sections 10084 and 10085, Crawford & Moses' Digest in force and effect, and these statutes, unamended, require the publication of the delinquent lists in a newspaper for the time and manner there specified.
For the affirmance of this decree it is insisted that the provisions of section 2, relating to the compensation of county officers, are unconstitutional and void, and that the whole act must, therefore, fail, notwithstanding the provisions of section 7, above quoted, as to the separability of the act, for the reason that, if section 2 of the act is void, the whole legislative scheme and purpose is defeated.
We do not consider or decide whether section 2 is valid legislation or not, for the reason that the provisions of sections 5 and 6 may stand and be enforced, whether section 2 be constitutional or unconstitutional. The law of the subject has been many times declared, and in one of the latest of these cases, that of State v. Hurlock, 185 Ark. 807, 49 S.W.(2d) 611, 613, it was said:
The Legislature has manifested and declared its intention in regard to this legislation in a manner too plain to admit of doubt. Section 2 fixes the compensation of county officials. Section 3 makes the provisions of section 2 effective by providing the disposition to be made of fees collected in excess of the compensation allowed by section 2. Sections 5 and 6 dispense with the publication of the delinquent list. These are the provisions of the act, and the Legislature has declared these provisions to be severable, and has declared that if any provision should be declared unconstitutional, that declaration should not affect the remainder of the act.
We, therefore, proceed to consider the constitutionality of sections 5 and 6, without regard to the constitutionality of sections 2 and 3....
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Hopkins v. Jegley
...even though it is a matter to be considered in determining the meaning of a statute which is otherwise ambiguous. Matthews v. Byrd , 187 Ark. 458, 60 S.W.2d 909 (1933). Likewise, the language used in the title of an act is not controlling but may play a part in explaining ambiguities in the......
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