Matthews v. F.M.C. Corp.
| Decision Date | 26 July 1983 |
| Citation | 190 Conn. 700,462 A.2d 376 |
| Parties | Bridget MATTHEWS v. F.M.C. CORPORATION. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
William F. Gallagher, New Haven, with whom, on brief, were Richard A. Jontos, James J. Gentile, Bridgeport, and Elizabeth A. Dorsey, New Haven, for appellant (plaintiff).
Edward J. Holahan, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).
Before PETERS, HEALEY, SHEA, GRILLO and SPONZO, JJ.
In this suit seeking damages for personal injuries received from a product claimed to be defective the jury found the issues for the defendant manufacturer. The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment rendered in accordance with the verdict and contends: (1) that the charge to the jury unwarrantedly confined the basis for imposing liability on the defendant to the malfunctioning of the machine; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient for submission to the jury of the special defense of misuse of the product by the plaintiff. We find the first claim to be without merit. That disposition of the issue makes it unnecessary, because of the general verdict rule, to consider the second claim in reaching our conclusion that there is no error.
The jury could reasonably have found from the evidence that the plaintiff was employed by the city of Bridgeport at the Central High School cafeteria as a sandwich maker. The city had purchased a sandwich wrapping machine from the defendant manufacturer for use at the school. The day before the accident, an employee of the defendant had completed the installation of the machine. He had notified the plaintiff's supervisor that he would begin training the cafeteria employees in the use of the machine at 7:30 a.m. the next morning.
On May 9, 1974, the plaintiff started work at 7 a.m. and took her position near the sandwich wrapping machine. Her job was to pack the wrapped sandwiches into a plastic container as they came out of the machine on a conveyor belt. Before the defendant's employee arrived, the supervisor started the machine. Soon afterward the cellophane became bunched up in front of the opening from which the wrapped sandwiches emerged. The plaintiff reached out with both hands to clear the cellophane from the opening. Her right hand became caught in the machine and she lost two of her fingers as a result.
The complaint set forth three liability theories, strict product liability in the first count, breach of an implied warranty in the second count, and negligence in the third count. 1 The error in the charge raised by the plaintiff pertains only to the first count. She claims that the court limited the jury's consideration of the allegation of a defective and unreasonably dangerous product to whether the malfunctioning of the machine at the time of the accident rendered it defective and unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff had presented evidence of other dangerous features of the machine, including the absence or inadequacy of warning signs, the lack of a guard around the opening where her hand had been caught, the inaccessible location of the emergency shutoff switch, and the failure to equip the machine with a device to stop the machine automatically if a problem occurred.
In charging upon strict tort liability for a defective product, after a general discussion of the applicable legal principles, the court explained that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the machine was defective and unreasonably dangerous, but that she needed to prove only one of the defects alleged. The charge continued: "Now, the plaintiff is limited to the defects which she has alleged in the first count of her complaint and you are entitled to consider no others." The court then summarized briefly the first five paragraphs of the first count, which the defendant had admitted. These paragraphs alleged that the defendant had manufactured, sold and installed the machine for use in the high school cafeteria where the plaintiff was employed. The remaining paragraphs, which were contested, were then read almost verbatim. The sixth paragraph alleged that the defendant's employee who had installed the machine told the plaintiff and other cafeteria workers that it could be placed in operation. The seventh paragraph stated that the defendant was in the business of manufacturing and selling sandwich wrapping machines and that the machine which caused the plaintiff to be injured was in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, as the defendant knew when it was sold. Paragraph eight alleged that the plaintiff, with the assistance of her fellow employees, proceeded to use the machine. Paragraph nine, to which the plaintiff claims the charge limited the jury in determining whether the product was defective and dangerous, was as follows: "While said machine as aforementioned was being used by the Plaintiff and fellow employees, the Plaintiff was injured because of the defective and unnecessarily dangerous condition of said machine in that said machine malfunctioned in not allowing cellophane wrapping paper to flow fluidly from the paper dispensing portion of said machine, causing said cellophane paper to become entangled which the Plaintiff, while attempting to untangle said cellophane wrapping paper was caused to have her hand caught in said machine by a second mechanism located on said machine which caused the aforementioned crushing injury." The tenth and eleventh paragraphs alleged that, after the plaintiff's hand was caught in the machine, it remained there for an extended period of time and that her injuries were caused by the defective and unnecessarily dangerous condition of the machine. The court also read the remaining seven paragraphs of the complaint which described the injuries and damages she had sustained.
A discussion of the special defense of product misuse then followed, during which the court explained that, if a seller had reason to anticipate danger resulting from a particular use of the product, he would be obliged to provide adequate warning and that a product sold without such a warning may be in a defective condition. The charge continued: "Considering whether the product is in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous, you may consider whether the product is (1) either unexpectedly...
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