Matthews v. Greer
| Decision Date | 07 March 1924 |
| Docket Number | 22526 |
| Citation | 260 S.W. 53 |
| Parties | MATTHEWS v. GREER |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
J. M Haw, of Charleston, R. E. Bailey, of Sikeston, and Oliver & Oliver, of Cape Girardeau, for appellant.
John T McKay, of Kennett, for respondent.
This is a suit under section 1970, R. S. 1919, to quiet title to land in Dunklin county, and to cancel a deed alleged to constitute a cloud. The answer sets up a claim to ownership in respondent, avers the deed assailed in the petition is valid, and further avers that the patent under which appellant claims is void in that the patentee was dead when the patent was issued. The trial court submitted this last issue to a jury, and the verdict was in accordance with the answer and was adopted by the court, and a decree for respondent thereupon rendered.
The land was swamp land and duly passed to Dunklin county. Appellant put in evidence a register's receipt in which it was certified by the register of Dunklin county that on December 27, 1860, William Pruett purchased the land in suit (and other lands) from Dunklin county and had made payment therefor 'in full as required by law.' This receipt or certificate was recorded in the office of the clerk of the county court in Patent Register No. 2. August 20, 1867, a patent in proper form was issued for the same lands. This patent was recorded in September, 1867, in the office of the county clerk and in that of the recorder of deeds for Dunklin county. It recites that William Pruett 'has deposited in the clerk's office of the county court of Dunklin county * * * a certificate of register of swamp lands for said county, whereby it appears that full payment has been made to * * * Dunklin county by William Pruett for' the land in suit (and other lands), 'which said tract has been purchased by the said William Pruett.' This is followed by a formal granting of the described lands There is no objection made to the form or sufficiency of the patent, except that which comes from the claim that Pruett died prior to August, 1867, It is admitted Pruett died prior to 1870. The evidence shows appellant has acquired whatever title William Pruett or his heirs had in the land. There was evidence pro and con upon the issue as to William Pruett's death prior to August 1867. Respondent claims under a patent issued to William S Sugg in 1870 and recorded in 1881. A register's receipt and a receiver's certificate issued to one Maulsby were offered by respondent. Numerous errors are assigned. These relate to the admission and exclusion of evidence, remarks of the court in the jury's presence, and the correctness of the decree on the evidence.
I. In the case of Russ v. Sims, 261 Mo. 27, 169 S.W. 69, is found a helpful discussion of the law relating to swamp lands as applicable to Dunklin and like counties. The Act of February 27, 1857 (Laws 1856-57, p. 271; Russ v. Sims, 261 Mo. loc. cit. 43, 169 S.W. 69) applies to this case. It provided that whenever the county court of Dunklin county (and other named counties) 'shall be satisfied that full payment has been made according to the terms of sale of any of the lands sold as swamp lands, under any of the acts of the General Assembly of this state, authorizing the same, they shall cause to be issued to the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, a patent for the same.' The statute declared that 'such patent shall be issued in the name of the state * * * and shall grant and convey to the grantee therein named, all the right, title and interest that the county has acquired to the lands therein named under' swamp land acts specified. Such patent was required to be recorded in the office of the county clerk before delivery, and the patent and record thereof and certified copies were made prima facie evidence of title to lands described therein. This case is unlike Bishop v. Blocker, 235 Mo. loc. cit. 617, 618, 139 S.W. 149; Whitman v. Giesing, 224 Mo. loc. cit. 616, 123 S.W. 1052, and cases cited. In those cases it was held that a mere certificate of entry without a showing of payment gave no title. In this case the act of 1857, already quoted, and amendatory acts (Russ v. Sims, supra), gave all authority to the county court and required it to determine the question of payment before issuing a patent thereunder. This the county court did and certified that payment had been made. This is not a contest between a later patentee and one relying solely upon a certificate of entry or register's receipt without evidence of payment, but is between a later claimant and one claiming under a prior patent issued by the county court under authority of the act of 1857.
Under the statute it was the duty of the county court to issue its patent when it found the price of the land had been fully paid. The statute points to the proper grantee: 'The purchaser, his heirs or assigns.' This means that the right to the patent, upon the finding stated, vested in the purchaser, if living, in the purchaser's heirs, if he had died and had not assigned his rights, and in his assignees if he had assigned his rights, whether he was living or dead. This construction of the statute is supported by authorities (cited below) construing like disjunctive language in deeds and by the reason of the thing when used in statutes authorizing official grants of rights or property. Hogan v Page, 2 Wall. 605, 17 L.Ed. 854; De La Vergne Machine Co v. Featherstone, 147 U. S. loc. cit. 221 et seq., 13 S.Ct. 283, 37 L.Ed. 138. If Pruett was alive when the patent was issued and recorded, it was valid. If dead, a deed to 'the heirs of William Pruett' would have been valid. Boone v. Moore, 14 Mo. 420, 426; Shaw v. Loud, 12 Mass. 447, 448. A deed to a named person 'or his heirs' conveys title to the named grantee, if living, or to his heirs if such named grantee is then dead. Ready v. Kearsley, 14 Mich. loc. cit. 225; Hogan v. Page, supra; Mortgan v. Hazelhurst Lodge, 53 Miss. 665, 675; Neal v. Nelson, 117 N.C. 393, 23 S.E. 428, 53 Am. St. Rep. 590. Under the authorities (Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. loc. cit. 376, 73 Am. Dec. 543; Neal v. Nelson, supra; Morgan v. Hazelhurst Lodge, supra), a deed from one person to another 'and his heirs' ordinarily conveys nothing to such heirs, though the grantee named is dead at the time. In such circumstances it is held that the word 'heirs' is not 'a word of purchase, carrying title to the heirs, but only qualifying the title to the grantee.' Hunter v. Watson, 12 Cal. loc. cit. 376; Neal v. Nelson, supra; Morgan v. Hazelhurst...
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