Matthews v. Holland

• Decision Date: 28 October 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:13-cv-00427 LJO MJS (HC)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: IVAN LEE MATTHEWS, Petitioner, v. KIM HOLLAND, Respondent.

IVAN LEE MATTHEWS, Petitioner, v. KIM HOLLAND, Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00427 LJO MJS (HC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

October 28, 2014

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent, warden of California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, is hereby substituted as the proper named respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent is represented by David Eldridge of the office of the California Attorney General. Respondent declined magistrate judge jurisdiction on May 15, 2013. (ECF No. 9.)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kings, following his conviction by jury trial on January 21, 2009, of assault by a life inmate causing great bodily injury with enhancements. (Lodged Doc. 7, Clerk's Tr. at 202.) On June 26, 2009,Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 26 years to life. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District on June 9, 2010. (Lodged Docs. 43-45.) The appeal was denied on May 6, 2011. (Answer, Ex. A.) On May 5, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 46.) The petition was summarily denied on August 10, 2011. (Id.)

Petitioner proceeded to file ten petitions for writ of habeas corpus with the California courts during the period between July 2011 and February 2013. (Lodged Docs. 47-56.) All of the petitions were denied. (Id.)

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on March 22, 2013. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) The petition raised three claims for relief, listed as follows:

1.) That trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by falling to communicate a plea offer to Petitioner;

2.) That the prosecution was vindictive in pursuing more serious charges after Petitioner exercised his right to appeal; and

3.) That the state violated Petitioner's federal constitutional right based on providing the jury improper jury instructions regarding the element of implied malice.

(Pet. at 5-8, ECF No. 1.)

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on June 14, 2013. (Answer, ECF No. 12.) Petitioner filed a traverse on July 10, 2013. (ECF No. 14.) The matter stands ready for adjudication.

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS¹

When correctional officers came to the cell shared by defendant and Fredrick Lewis to take them to the showers, Lewis backed up to the cell door, put his hands through the food port, and was handcuffed. Defendant then struck Lewis multiple times. The correctional officers used pepper spray to subdue defendant. Lewis sustained two injuries to his head that required sutures.

Defendant was charged by complaint with one count of assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury while confined in a state prison (Pen Code, § 4501).² Pursuant to a plea bargain, he entered a no contest plea and was sentenced to the lower term of 2 years in prison, consecutive to the term he was already serving. Defendant appealed, and the judgment was reversed on the ground the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights pursuant to Boykin/Tahl³ before accepting his plea. The case was remanded, "with the original allegations 'restored to the superior court calendar [citations] to be tried or disposed of in some other appropriate manner.'" At the subsequent preliminary hearing, the trial court held defendant to answer for the charge alleged in the original complaint (violation of § 4501) and for a violation of section 4500, assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury, with malice aforethought, by a prisoner undergoing a life sentence. The People filed an information charging defendant with both offenses, as well as enhancements not previously alleged.

Defendant unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the information for vindictive and retaliatory prosecution, asserting a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arose because the increased charges and potential punishment were apparently a response to defendant's exercise of his right to appeal the original judgment. At trial, defendant stipulated that, at the time of the alleged offense, he was serving a life sentence. The jury convicted defendant of the new charge (§ 4500) and acquitted him of the original charge (§ 4501). The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a minimum of 9 years, doubled to 18 years pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i), plus 8 consecutive years for enhancements.

People v. Matthews, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3406, 2-4 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. May 6, 2011).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kings County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Courthas jurisdiction over the action.

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that contradicts governing law set forth in ^{reme Court} cases" or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. "AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The "clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a 'principle' or 'general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a statedecision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle (or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the "look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court...