Matthews v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.
| Citation | 495 P.3d 333,251 Ariz. 561 |
| Decision Date | 09 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-IC 2020-0001,2 CA-IC 2020-0001 |
| Parties | Timothy MATTHEWS, Petitioner Employee, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona, Respondent, City of Tucson, Respondent Employer, Tristar Risk Management, Respondent Insurer. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
Bryan Clymer, Attorney at Law, Tucson, By Laura Clymer, Counsel for Petitioner Employee
The Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix, By Gaetano Testini, Counsel for Respondent
Moeller Law Office, Tucson, By M. Ted Moeller and Karolyn F. Keller, Counsel for Respondents Employer and Insurer
¶1 In this statutory special action, Timothy Matthews seeks review of the Industrial Commission's determination that he did not establish a compensable workers’ compensation claim based on a post-traumatic mental stress injury, arguing the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in finding that he failed to show "unexpected, unusual or extraordinary" stress, as required by the Arizona's Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA), A.R.S. § 23-1043.01(B), governing mental stress injuries. Matthews also challenges the constitutionality of that provision. Because we conclude the ALJ properly applied the statute to the evidence underlying Matthews's claim, and because Matthews has not met his burden to establish its unconstitutionality, we affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the ALJ's award. Munoz v. Indus. Comm'n , 234 Ariz. 145, ¶ 2, 318 P.3d 439 (App. 2014). Beginning in August 2000, Matthews received over four months of officer training with the City of Tucson Police Department after passing pre-employment physical and psychological examinations. There was evidence that he was provided a two-page acknowledgement that his duties might require him to respond to death scenes and handle body parts, as well as conduct child molestation interviews with victims and be subjected to various other stressful and emotionally charged situations.1 After serving as a patrol officer for ten years, Matthews was promoted to detective in 2011 and was assigned to the violent crimes unit for six years, then the street crimes unit, until finally joining the domestic violence unit in spring 2018.
¶3 In June 2018, Matthews was called to the scene of a barricaded man in the garage of a residence following a domestic violence report. Matthews watched a live video stream of the residence from a command post about a block away as negotiators spoke with the man. After gunshots were heard, officers stationed at the residence breached the garage door, and the man crawled out with a gunshot to the chest. Despite attempts to administer first aid, he died at the scene.
Matthews viewed this from the command post and then was assigned to inspect the body and process and photograph the crime scene.2
¶4 In September 2018, Matthews filed a workers’ claim of injury arising from the incident, based on medically diagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD).3 The City of Tucson's insurer, Tristar Risk Management, issued a notice of claim status later that month denying Matthews's claim. At a hearing before the ALJ, the parties presented expert testimony regarding Matthews's training and experience and the June event. Matthews's witness, Sergeant Daniel Spencer, a training supervisor for the Tucson Police Department, testified that the event in question was rare, and Matthews testified that the June incident was only the most recent among several other events that had contributed to his PTSD. The expert for the City of Tucson and Tristar (collectively, "the City"), Benny Click, a former Phoenix police officer and Dallas police chief, testified it was not an unusual event, stating, and even more stressful events such as the shooting of a fellow officer and mass shootings are part of an officer's training and not unanticipated. Both parties filed simultaneous post-hearing memoranda and responses. The ALJ issued a detailed decision in October 2019, finding the claim noncompensable because, based on the testimony of both experts, it "was not an unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress situation," and that because Matthews had not filed a gradual injury claim, the ALJ did not consider prior incidents that he had testified about. Matthews requested review, and in a decision upon review, the ALJ affirmed its decision. Matthews filed a statutory petition for special action to review the decision upon hearing and decision upon review. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(2) and 23-951(A).
¶5 Matthews raises two grounds for overturning the ALJ's determination. First, he argues the ALJ failed to consider the entire record and the evidence when it determined the stress from the June 2018 event was not unexpected, unusual, or extraordinary. Second, as he asserted in his request for review, the workers’ compensation mental injury statute, A.R.S. § 23-1043.01(B), violates our state constitution "by heightening the legal causation standard with the requirement stress must be ‘unexpected, unusual or extraordinary’ for a compensable mental injury claim." We will uphold an ALJ's factual findings if they are reasonably supported by the evidence. Micucci v. Indus. Comm'n , 108 Ariz. 194, 195, 494 P.2d 1324, 1325 (1972). Although we defer to the ALJ's findings, we review questions of law and constitutionality de novo. Hahn v. Indus. Comm'n , 227 Ariz. 72, ¶ 5, 252 P.3d 1036 (App. 2011) ; Grammatico v. Indus. Comm'n , 208 Ariz. 10, ¶ 6, 90 P.3d 211 (App. 2004).
¶6 Matthews contends the ALJ erred as a matter of law by "cherry-pick[ing] expert testimony and fail[ing] to consider the entire record."4 Under § 23-1043.01(B), a workers’ compensation mental injury claim is not compensable "unless some unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress related to the employment ... was a substantial contributing cause of the mental injury, illness or condition." The applicant must show both medical causation and legal causation for a compensable mental stress claim. See DeSchaaf v. Indus. Comm'n , 141 Ariz. 318, 320, 686 P.2d 1288, 1290 (App. 1984). Whether the stress is unexpected, unusual, or extraordinary is a legal conclusion, not a medical one. Barnes v. Indus. Comm'n , 156 Ariz. 179, 182, 750 P.2d 1382, 1385 (App. 1988). "As a preliminary matter, an officer must first establish that his work-related stress was a substantial contributing cause of his mental injury." France v. Indus. Comm'n , 250 Ariz. 487, ¶ 24, 481 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2021). "[A] work-related mental injury is compensable if the specific event causing the injury was objectively ‘unexpected, unusual or extraordinary.’ " Id. ¶ 1, 481 P.3d at 1163 (quoting § 23-1043.01(B) ). Under this standard, the event "must be examined from the standpoint of a reasonable employee with the same or similar job duties and training as the claimant, as opposed to the claimant's subjective reaction to the event." Id. And the ALJ must "focus[ ] on the stress imposed on the worker rather than how the worker experienced it." Id. ¶ 19, 481 P.3d at 1166. The ALJ determines the credibility of witnesses and resolves conflicts in the evidence. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n , 20 Ariz. App. 432, 434, 513 P.2d 970, 972 (1973). We presume the ALJ considers all relevant evidence, Perry v. Indus. Comm'n , 112 Ariz. 397, 398, 542 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1975), and we must affirm the administrative decision if it is reasonably supported by the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining the award, Lovitch v. Indus. Comm'n , 202 Ariz. 102, ¶ 16, 41 P.3d 640 (App. 2002).
¶7 In its detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ stated it had "carefully considered the evidence in this matter which includes the post hearing memoranda filed by the parties." The ALJ explained that the testimony of Matthews's expert witness, Spencer, persuaded him that the event and stressors were "standard issue," as Spencer had at one point referred to them, and that Matthews had failed to meet his burden. The ALJ concluded, "based on the evidence of record and the testimony ... this was not an unexpected, unusual or extraordinary stress situation." There is sufficient evidence in the record to inform and support the ALJ's conclusion. Id. (). And to the extent Matthews requests that we reweigh the evidence, it is beyond our purview to do so. See Kaibab Indus. v. Indus. Comm'n , 196 Ariz. 601, ¶ 25, 2 P.3d 691 (App. 2000) ; State v. Lee , 189 Ariz. 590, 603, 944 P.2d 1204, 1217 (1997) (); Janusz v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 157 Ariz. 504, 506, 759 P.2d 650, 652 (App. 1988) ().
¶8 Testimony from the experts for each side, as well as that of Matthews himself, supports the ALJ's determination that the event in question and the stressors Matthews experienced could reasonably be characterized as neither extraordinary nor unanticipated. Although Matthews's expert, Spencer, testified that a "high-danger incident[ ]" where an individual "was armed acting out violently toward others and barricaded in a structure" was rare, he also estimated such incidents occurred "two to four times a year," and indicated it was not "atypical[ ]" for a domestic violence situation to go bad and end in a self-inflicted death.
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Matthews v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.
...In a divided opinion, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of benefits. Matthews v. Indus. Comm'n , 251 Ariz. 561, 563 ¶ 1, 495 P.3d 333, 335 (App. 2021). The majority held that § 23-1043.01(B) did not unconstitutionally restrict compensation but instead expanded it because the framers ......
- Matthews v. The Indus. Comm'n of Ariz.