Matthews v. State
| Citation | 122 Idaho 801,839 P.2d 1215 |
| Decision Date | 21 October 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 18772,18772 |
| Parties | Sean Joel MATTHEWS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent. Boise, January 1992 Term |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Sean J. Matthews, petitioner-appellant, pro se.
Larry EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for respondent.
On March 21, 1983, Matthews was convicted of first degree murder by torture and sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence which he is currently serving in the Idaho Department of Corrections. Matthews appealed. In that appeal, Matthews' counsel, who was not the attorney who represented him at trial, attacked the validity and applicability of I.C. § 16-1806(1)(a), which excludes the offense of murder from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. It was argued that Matthews, who was a juvenile when the offense was committed, should have been tried in juvenile court. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed his conviction in 1985. State v. Matthews, 108 Idaho 453, 700 P.2d 75 (Ct.App.1985).
On March 20, 1990, Matthews filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with the district court. His petition alleges seventeen causes of action, which are readily summarized as follows:
1. That Idaho Code § 18-4001 violates the due process clause because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that the intentional application of torture to a human being constitutes malice aforethought and is deemed to be the equivalent of intent to kill, thus removing an essential element which the prosecution must establish in proving a murder charge and also creating an impermissible inference of intent to cause suffering, thereby relieving the state of its burden of proving every element of the crime.
2. That the information was constitutionally deficient because it failed to set forth the necessary allegation of "untoward purpose behind torturous conduct," which is an element of specific intent in the crime of torture murder.
3. That given jury instruction No. 23 amounts to a conclusive presumption and is therefore in violation of the due process clause.
4. That both given instructions No. 16 and No. 17 constitute an unconstitutional definition of torture murder, and given instruction No. 17 taken alone is an unconstitutional definition of torture murder in that torture murder in the second degree has not been statutorily created by the legislature, nor established as viable by any precedential case law decision.
5. The jury was not instructed that accomplice testimony must be corroborated as required by Idaho Code § 19-2117.
6. The jury was not instructed regarding the credibility of convicted felons.
7. That during cross examination of the petitioner the prosecuting attorney pursued an improper line of questioning.
8. That highly prejudicial autopsy photographs were shown to the jury.
9. That he was not afforded adequate and competent representation during trial.
10. That he was not given effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
On April 30, 1990, the district judge filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the Petition stating that 1) Matthews' claims had been forfeited by failure to raise them on direct appeal, and 2) Matthews' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on appeal could not be sustained. The district court considered those two claims on their merits but dismissed them. His petition was dismissed by court order on May 29, 1990, and Matthews appealed to this Court.
The main issues in this appeal are 1) whether the district court erred in relying upon language in the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 19-4901(b) in finding that Matthews had waived most of the issues he raised because he did not raise them on direct appeal and 2) whether the district court erred by finding that Matthews received effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Matthews argues that he has not waived any of the above issues and if those issues are held to have been waived, such is wholly attributable to ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.
We hold that; 1) Matthews' first, second, third and fourth allegations are without merit and 2) that Matthews is procedurally barred from raising his fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth issues, but is not barred from raising his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and, likewise ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. For reasons set out below, we further hold the court erred by dismissing those claims without having conducted an evidentiary hearing.
At the time the Court of Appeals issued its decision on reviewing Matthews' direct appeal in 1985, I.C. § 19-4901(b) provided:
This remedy is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence and conviction. Except as otherwise provided in this act, it comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them.
The next year, the statute was amended to include the following language:
Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilty and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier.
Notwithstanding that the direct appeal was fully conducted and final in 1985, the district court relied upon the 1986 amendment language in ruling that Matthews had waived most of the issues raised in his petition. This was error. Idaho Code § 73-101 clearly prohibits the retroactive application of newly passed legislation: "[N]o part of these complied laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." As is readily apparent from the text of I.C. § 19-4901, there is not even a hint of legislative intent that the statute could be retroactively applied, much less an express declaration to that effect.
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 19-4901 does not apply to this case. Our Court of Appeals has previously reached a conclusion similar to ours:
As amended, the statute now provides that an issue is "forfeited" if not raised on direct appeal, unless it creates a "substantial doubt" concerning the applicant's guilt and "could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." Time will tell whether these efforts to narrow the scope of issues raised under the post-conviction relief statute will prove effective, or, if effective, will increase pressure on state and federal courts to entertain allegations of fundamental error in habeas corpus proceedings. But for the purpose of this case, it suffices to say that the statute was amended after Matthews' direct appeal was decided.
Matthews (Michael) v. State, 113 Idaho 83, 85, 741 P.2d 370, 372 (Ct.App.1987).
We need not reach Matthews' argument that application of the statute was a violation of the constitutional (U.S. Const. art, I, § 10, Idaho Const. art, I, § 16) prohibitions against ex post facto laws, in light of our resolution of this issue on statutory grounds. See Swensen v. Buildings, Inc., 93 Idaho 466, 469, 463 P.2d 932, 935 (1970) ().
Although the district court's reliance on the 1986 amendment to I.C. § 19- 4901 was error, it was harmless. The same result was readily obtainable by applying the law as it existed in 1985 as evidenced by this Court's opinion in Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 474-75, 491 P.2d 733, 738-39 (1971):
Habeas corpus is available, however, to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could have been raised on appeal. Wilson v. State, [90 Idaho 498, 414 P.2d 465 (1966) ]. Likewise, under I.C. § 19-4901(a)(1), post-conviction relief is available to cure unwaived constitutional errors or other fundamental errors occurring at the trial.
In applying the rule that a post-conviction remedy is not a substitute for an appeal, other courts--in jurisdictions with provisions substantially identical to I.C. § 19-4901--have distinguished between 'mere trial errors' (which can be corrected only by direct appeal) and 'fundamental errors' (which may be raised even though they could have been raised on appeal).
The Smith opinion went on to state that the failure to raise known and existing grounds of unconstitutional action on direct appeal bars a subsequent challenge of the conviction predicated on those grounds which, though known, had not been utilized.
Applying this standard to Matthews' issues, we hold that the fifth and sixth issues (that the court erred in not instructing the jury regarding the credibility of accomplice witnesses or of convicted felons witnesses), as well as the seventh (that the prejudicial effect of the photographs of the victim shown to the jury outweighed their probative value) and eighth (that the prosecutor engaged in improper cross-examination) were not raised on direct appeal and further fall within the category of "mere trial errors." Accordingly, Matthews is procedurally barred from raising those issues now.
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