Swensen v. Buildings, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 January 1970
• Docket Number: No. 10573,10573
• Citation: 93 Idaho 466,463 P.2d 932
• Parties: Rulon SWENSEN, Jack M. Barney and John Bastida, Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, Idaho, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BUILDINGS, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 932

463 P.2d 932

93 Idaho 466

Rulon SWENSEN, Jack M. Barney and John Bastida, Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, Idaho, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BUILDINGS, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10573.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Jan. 20, 1970.

Eberle & Berlin, T. H. Eberle, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Ellison M. Matthews, Pros. Atty. of Ada County, Alan M. Schwartzman, Deputy Pros. Atty., and Robert W. Green, Special Pros. Atty., Boise, for plaintiffs-respondents; Richard H. Greener, Asst. Atty. Gen., Boise, Gerald W. Olson, Pocatello, and J. Ray Cox, Coeur d'Alene, for amici curiae.

SPEAR, Justice.

The facts in this case are undisputed, having been stipulated by counsel, and the pertinent ones are as follows:

Respondents, in their capacity as the Board of County Commissioners of Ada County, entered into a contract on March 7, 1969 with the appellant under which the latter would construct fairground buildings on land presently owned by Ada County, and lease them to the county. The particular buildings and facilities would include a grandstand, stables, barns, and associated facilities for race track purposes, which would be constructed and installed in accordance with plans and specifications approved by the respondent Board.

Upon approval of the specifications and plans, the parties were bound under the contract to enter into a lease agreement, the essential elements of which were to be: that the lease should extend 20 years; that the monthly rental amount should be a percentage (.0086230935) of the market value of the contracted facilities 'plus the cost of the land'; that the County was to pay all ad valorem taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums paid by the lessor; that the County lessee should keep the equipment, buildings and facilities insured to their full insurable value, and in addition, carry liability insurance for the same in the sum of $300,000 for injury or death to any one person, in the sum of $500,000 for any one accident, and in the sum of $50,000 for property damage; that title to the facilites should remain in the lessor, Buildings, Inc.; that each month's rent should accrue 'only in consideration of the right of lessee to possess' (emphasis added); that the lessee had an option to purchase the facilities during the term of the lease by paying an amount equal to all unpaid rent to the end of the term, together with a sum equal to one-tenth of one per cent of the original contract price; and that at the end of the lease term, if the option is not exercised, the lessee should return possession of the facilites to the lessor.

After entering into the contract, appellant, allegedly fearful of the unconstitutionality of the agreement, refused to perform. On March 10, 1969, three days after the signing of the contract, respondent brought suit to obtain a declaratory judgment on the question of the constitutionality of the contract. The court found that the contract was authorized under I.C. §§ 31-807, 31-822 and 31-1001. It further found that such rent constituted on 'ordinary and necessary expense authorized by the general laws of the state,' and as such, was exempted by Art. VIII, § 3 of the Idaho Constitution from the general provisions of the same section of the Constitution pertaining to indebtedness or liability.

From that decision, the appellant has perfected this appeal.

In his brief submitted as a 'friend of the Court,' amicus curiae contends that the lower court erred in concluding that the Agreement for Lease of Building, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, complies with I.C. § 31-1001 giving the respondent authority to lease fairground buildings and facilities.

An examination of the record establishes the merit of amicus curiae's contention, and such finding necessitates the reversal of the lower court's decision.

It is evident from a reading of I.C. § 31-1001 ¹ that any lease, contract, or agreement to lease fairground buildings or facilities must be let subject to the provisions of chapter 40 of Title 31. I.C. §§ 31-4002 ² and 31-4003 ³ specifically provide that a contract may be granted by the county to another for an amount exceeding $2,500 only after the county has solicited and received competitive bids for the contract, and that such contract shall then be granted to the lowest responsible bidder.

The language in the statutes cited above is neither ambiguous nor uncertain, and it is well established that where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction. Blue Note, Inc. v. Hopper, 85 Idaho 152, 377 P.2d 373 (1962); State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 362 P.2d 1075 (1961); Tway v. Williams, 81 Idaho 1, 336 P.2d 115 (1959); Moody v. State Highway Department, 56 Idaho 21, 48 P.2d 1108 (1935); State v. Jutila, 34 Idaho 595, 202 P. 566 (1921). There is no showing in the record that the agreement to lease involved herein, Exhibit 1, contemplates an expenditure of less than $2,500, which would render I.C. § 31-4003 inapplicable. Moreover, since the fairground facilities to be leased include a...