Matthews v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 June 2012
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10–0611–pr.
• Citation: 682 F.3d 180
• Parties: Michael MATTHEWS, Petitioner–Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

682 F.3d 180

Michael MATTHEWS, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES of America, Respondent–Appellee.

Docket No. 10–0611–pr.

United States Court of Appeals,Second Circuit.

Argued: Jan. 25, 2012.

Decided: June 14, 2012.

Jesse M. Siegel, New York, NY, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Michael Matthews, Petitioner–Appellant pro se, Pine Knot, KY, filed a supplemental brief.

Brenda K. Sannes, Assistant United States Attorney, Syracuse, N.Y. (Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Edward R. Broton, Rajit S. Dosanjh, Assistant United States Attorneys, Syracuse, NY, on the brief), for Respondent–Appellee.

Before: KEARSE, CABRANES, and STRAUB, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Michael Matthews, who received a sentence of life imprisonment as a career offender pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) following his conviction in 2007 of federal bank robbery and conspiracy offenses, appeals (1) from an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, David N. Hurd, Judge, denying his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction or correct his sentence on the principal grounds that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, and (2) from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Matthews contends that the district court erred in denying his § 2255 motion without conducting a hearing and without giving a meaningful explanation for its decision. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the matter must be remanded to the district court for further proceedings on at least one of Matthews's claims and for specification by the district court of the issue or issues as to which it granted Matthews, without explanation, a certificate of appealability (or “COA”) to seek review of its denial of his § 2255 motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Matthews has a history of convictions for robbery and burglary offenses dating back at least to 1971, when he was convicted of first-degree robbery in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15 and two counts of second-degree burglary in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 140.25, resulting in a state-court youthful offender adjudication. His § 2255 motion focuses principally on his most recent convictions and their relationship to his past troubles with the law.

A. Matthews's Most Recent Convictions

In 2006, in a superseding federal indictment, Matthews was charged with one count of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (“the 2006 charges”). The government filed an “Enhanced Penalty Information” alleging that Matthews had previously been convicted of several serious violent felonies; that his record included convictions in 1983 on two counts of first-degree robbery in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15, and convictions in 1996 of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (b), and conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and that, on the 2006 charges, the government would therefore seek enhanced punishment for Matthews under the three-strikes provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).

Section 3559(c) provides, in pertinent part, that if a person “convicted in a court of the United States of a serious violent felony” has previously “been convicted (and those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions in a court of the United States or of a State of ... 2 or more serious violent felonies,” that person, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, ... shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). For purposes of this section, “ ‘serious violent felony’ ” is defined to include “robbery (as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118)” and “conspiracy ... to commit any of the above offenses.” Id. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). See also United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 144 (2d Cir.2006) (“Snype”) (because the New York Penal Law “statutory elements” of robbery, including “§ 160.15,” “parallel those required to establish robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2113(a), and 2118(a), ... New York State convictions for first and second degree robbery by definition qualify as serious violent felonies under § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i)”).

At a jury trial in September 2006, at which Matthews was represented by James F. Greenwald of the Office of the Federal Public Defender, Matthews was found guilty of the 2006 charges. In 2007, the district court found, over defense objections, that Matthews had previously been convicted of at least two serious violent felony offenses, and it sentenced him to, inter alia, concurrent terms of life imprisonment. On direct appeal, for which Matthews was represented by new counsel, his conviction and sentence were affirmed. See United States v. Matthews, 545 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir.2008) (noting People v. Matthews, 68 N.Y.2d 118, 123, 506 N.Y.S.2d 149, 497 N.E.2d 287 (1986) (which had affirmed Matthews's first set of adult convictions), and United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 553–55 (2d Cir.1994) (which had affirmed his second set of adult convictions)).

B. Matthews's § 2255 Motion

In March 2009, Matthews, proceeding pro se, filed the § 2255 motion that is the subject of the present appeal, asserting four claims. He alleged principally that he was denied effective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) at trial because Greenwald had hired, as an investigator to assist in Matthews's defense, a former police officer with whom Greenwald knew Matthews “had a prior negative relationship” (Matthews § 2255 Motion at 5). The motion alleged that the investigator, Richard Haumann, had been a deputy police chief in Syracuse, New York, and that he had “arrested ... [and] viciously assaulted” Matthews and addressed Matthews “with racial disdain and insensitivity” at a time when Matthews was accused of the attempted murder of a police officer. ( Id.) The motion alleged that due to the conflict of interest stemming from this history, Haumann and Greenwald failed to conduct an adequate investigation into possible defensesfor Matthews against the 2006 charges.

The other claims asserted in Matthews's § 2255 motion were that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on his direct appeal because his new attorney had, inter alia, failed to communicate with him and to raise meritorious issues on appeal, including the IAC allegations against trial counsel, of which she was aware; that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enhance his sentence under § 3559(c) because the court did not ascertain that Matthews's predicate crimes were violent or that the predicate convictions were final; and that his life sentences violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

The § 2255 motion requested a hearing, a determination of the relief to which Matthews was entitled on these claims, and/or a reduction of his sentence. Matthews also made several requests that the court furnish him with trial and hearing transcripts and/or appoint counsel to represent him in connection with the motion. Those motions were denied. However, the district court instructed the government to file a response to Matthews's § 2255 motion and stated that the matter would be taken on submission.

The government, in its opposition to Matthews's § 2255 motion, submitted a memorandum arguing that his claims should be rejected for a variety of reasons. As to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the government argued (a) that Matthews failed to prove deficient performance as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in that his allegations were “general,” “cursory,” “vague,” and lacking in reference to specific incidents that might substantiate his claim of conflict between himself and the investigator hired by trial counsel, and (b) that Matthews failed to prove the prejudice element of the Strickland test because, given the district court's description of the trial evidence as to Matthews's guilt as overwhelming, Matthews could not show a reasonable probability that but for deficient performance on the part of his attorney the outcome of his trial would have been different. (Government Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Government Memorandum”) at 7–9.) As to the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the government argued (a) that counsel had simply made a “cho[ice] to advance stronger arguments on appeal and eliminate weaker ones” ( id. at 12) and that her choice thus did not amount to constitutionally deficient performance ( see id. at 10–12), and (b) that other arguments against application of the career offender statute would not have been proper issues for appeal because they had not been raised in the district court ( see id. at 10).

The government opposed Matthews's claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction to impose a life sentence under § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds (a) that that claim was procedurally barred because Matthews had not raised it on direct appeal from his conviction, and (b) that the claim lacked merit because the district court had properly determined, based on adequately supported findings, that § 3559(c) was applicable based on Matthews's prior commission of at least two serious violent felonies. ( See id. at 12–15.)

As to Matthews's Eighth Amendment claim, the government argued (a) that the claim was procedurally barred because Matthews failed to raise it on direct appeal, and (b) that it lacked merit in light of this Court's decision in Snype, 441 F.3d at 152 (holding that a life sentence pursuant to § 3559(c) does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment). ( See Government Memorandum at 15–16.)

After the government filed its memorandum, Matthews requested and received leave to amend his motion. However, the May 13, 2009 order granting that permission instructed that any amendment be filed...