People v. Matthews

• Citation: 497 N.E.2d 287,506 N.Y.S.2d 149,68 N.Y.2d 118
• Parties: , 497 N.E.2d 287 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael MATTHEWS, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 03 July 1986
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 149

506 N.Y.S.2d 149

68 N.Y.2d 118, 497 N.E.2d 287

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Michael MATTHEWS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 3, 1986.

Sean J. Denvir, Waterford, for appellant.

Richard A. Hennessy, Jr., Dist. Atty. (John A. Cirando and Maureen A. MacPherson, Syracuse, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Chief Judge.

The defendant has been convicted, after a jury trial, of robbery and related offenses in connection with a hold-up of a bar. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and the defendant appeals. The defendant's primary contention is that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecutor cross-examining him made a "surprise inquiry" concerning an unrelated robbery in another State. The defendant urges that we reexamine the rule announced in People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413, and shift the burden to the prosecutor of obtaining prior court approval before questioning a defendant about unrelated criminal acts.

On September 10, 1982, a few minutes after midnight, two men armed with handguns entered a bar in Syracuse. While one of the men, later identified as the defendant, took approximately $500 from the bartender, the other robbed the patrons. As the men fled in a green station wagon, one of them, also subsequently identified as the defendant, fired at police officers responding to the report of the robbery. The officers were not injured, but the robbers escaped. They were both arrested later that morning and were subsequently indicted. The defendant was charged with 18 counts, including robbery in the first degree and attempted murder.

While awaiting trial, the defendant was released and left the State. He was subsequently charged in Federal court with robbing a bank in Atlanta, Georgia, on December 13, 1982. The Federal charges, however, were dismissed pending the determination of the New York indictment. The prosecutor in New York was informed of this and passed the information on to the attorney representing the defendant on the Syracuse indictment. Defense counsel then called the Federal prosecutor who confirmed the fact that the charges had been dismissed but would be revived if the defendant was acquitted on the New York indictment.

At the defendant's jury trial on that indictment in the fall of 1983, the defendant chose to testify on his own behalf. Prior to doing so, he moved, pursuant to People v. Sandoval (supra), to preclude the prosecutor from questioning him with respect to certain criminal acts for which he had been convicted or adjudicated a youthful offender. He did not ask the court to also bar the prosecutor from cross-questioning him on the bank robbery in Georgia. The court granted the motion in part, excluding any reference to the youthful offender adjudication and the underlying acts, but permitting cross-examination on the later convictions.

After the defendant had testified on direct, the prosecutor asked him on cross-examination if he had gone to Atlanta, Georgia, while awaiting trial in December of 1982. When the defendant admitted being there, the prosecutor asked him if he had committed a bank robbery in that city on December 13, 1982. Defense counsel immediately objected and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial urging that no curative instructions could remove the prejudice. The District Attorney noted that defense counsel was aware of the Federal charges and had not made any motion with respect to them during the Sandoval hearing. The court denied the motion for a mistrial. Instead, the court offered the defendant an option: he could let the objection stand, and accept curative instructions; or he could withdraw the objection and answer the question, in which case the prosecutor would be bound by the answer. The defendant chose the latter course and in response to the prosecutor's question, denied committing the bank robbery in Georgia.

The jury found the defendant guilty of three counts of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15) and one count of attempted aggravated assault on a police officer (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.11). The Appellate Division affirmed (112 A.D.2d 781, 491 N.Y.S.2d 1019).

On this appeal, the defendant urges that the People should not be permitted to question a defendant about unrelated criminal acts unless the prosecutor has sought and obtained prior court approval to do so.

In People v. Sandoval (supra), we established a procedure which would permit a defendant who wishes to testify on his own behalf to move prior to trial to have the court prohibit the prosecutor from cross-examining him regarding unrelated criminal or immoral acts, when the probative value for impeachment purposes is outweighed by the potential prejudice to the defendant. We emphasized (34 N.Y.2d at p. 378, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413) that the defendant has the burden to "inform the court of the prior convictions and misconduct which might unfairly affect him as a witness in his own behalf" and "of demonstrating that the prejudicial effect of the admission of evidence thereof for impeachment purposes...