Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co.

Decision Date02 July 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-0431.,99-0431.
Citation244 Wis.2d 720,2001 WI 82,628 N.W.2d 842
PartiesDavid R. and Eva MATTHIES, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. The POSITIVE SAFETY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, ARB INSURANCE COMPANY, Safety Supply and Design, Inc., f/k/a Wardco, GHI Insurance Company and The Travelers Insurance Company, Defendants.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by Erik J. Pless and Everson, Whitney, Everson & Brehm, S.C., Green Bay, and John J. Bullaro, Jr., James R. Branit and Bullaro & Carton, Chicago, Illinois, and oral argument by James R. Branit.

For the plaintiffs-respondents there was a brief by R. George Burnett and Liebmann, Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry, S.C., Green Bay, and oral argument by R. George Burnett.

An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. Gleisner, III, and Law Offices of William C. Gleisner, Milwaukee, and Rhonda L. Lanford and Habush, Habush, Davis & Rottier, S.C., Madison, on behalf of the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. An amicus curiae brief was filed by Richard L. Zaffiro, Brookfield, on behalf of the Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin.

¶ 1. N. PATRICK CROOKS, J

On August 22, 1992, David R. Matthies' hand was injured by a punch press. At the time of the accident, joint and several liability was a common-law rule in Wisconsin which permitted a plaintiff to recover his or her damages from any one of two or more persons whose joint or concurring negligent acts caused the plaintiff's injury. Wisconsin Natural Gas Co. v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp., 96 Wis. 2d 314, 330-31, 291 N.W.2d 825 (1980) (quoting Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 191 Wis. 610, 613, 211 N.W. 913 (1927)). After Matthies' accident, but before he filed this action, the legislature modified joint and several liability. The legislature modified the doctrine by amending the statute on contributory negligence, Wis. Stat. § 895.045, to limit joint and several liability to a person found 51% or more causally negligent.1 1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1. After Matthies filed this action, the Positive Safety Manufacturing Company (Positive Safety), the manufacturer of a safety device for the punch press, sought a declaratory order that, as amended and renumbered, Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) (1995-96),2 applied to Matthies' claims; and, as applied, § 895.045(1) would limit Positive Safety's liability to only that amount of causal negligence the jury would attribute to Positive Safety. Calumet County Circuit Judge Donald A. Poppy declined to enter the order Positive Safety sought, and, instead, declared § 895.045(1) unconstitutional in its retroactive application to this instant action. This order was taken up by the court of appeals, which, in turn, certified its appeal to this court.

¶ 2. The circuit court correctly determined that Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) is unconstitutional if retroactively applied in this case. According to the test this court adopted in Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), to determine the constitutionality of retroactively applying a statute, retroactive application of § 895.045 is unconstitutional. Retroactively applying § 895.045(1) to this action would adversely impact Matthies' right to recover all of the damages adjudged due to him and this adverse impact substantially outweighs any public benefit that would be gained from retroactively applying § 895.045(1). We thus affirm the circuit court.

I

¶ 3. The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Matthies was a machine operator at Mirro-Foley Company in Chilton, Wisconsin. On August 22, 1992, while operating a punch press, Matthies' left hand was severely injured. According to medical records submitted to the trial court, parts of four fingers were severed.

¶ 4. On July 19, 1995, David Matthies and his wife, Eva Matthies, filed their complaint, in which David Matthies brought claims of common-law negligence and strict liability.3 Matthies brought these claims against Positive Safety, as well as Allen-Bradley Company, Inc., the manufacturer of the foot pedal used to start the press, and E.W. Bliss Company, Inc., the manufacturer of the punch press.4

¶ 5. Matthies' complaint alleges that he was operating the punch press using a foot pedal and a pullback device. A pull-back device is a harness that, if operating correctly, pulls back the machine operator so that the operator's hand cannot be caught in the punch press at the point where the press pinches the metal. The complaint also alleges that Positive Safety, the manufacturer of the pull-back caused Matthies' injuries because, inter alia, the pull-back was ineffective, or defective and unreasonably dangerous.

¶ 6. On February 2, 1998, Positive Safety moved for a declaratory order that (1) Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) applies to Matthies' strict liability claim; and (2) that Positive Safety's liability, if any, would be limited to only that portion of total causal negligence that the jury would attribute to Positive Safety.5 Positive Safety argued that if Mirro-Foley is found most at fault, Positive Safety would not be liable for Matthies' entire damages under the former rule of joint and several liability; rather, Positive Safety's liability would be limited by § 895.045(1). Matthies sought a declaration that retroactive application of § 895.045(1) is unconstitutional.

¶ 7. On January 29, 1999, the circuit court concluded that retroactive application of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1) to this case is unconstitutional. Positive Safety sought interlocutory review of the circuit court's order, and Matthies joined in that request. The court of appeals granted leave for appeal of the court's order pursuant to § 808.03(2).6 Then, pursuant to Wis. Stat. Rule 809.61,7 the court of appeals certified the appeal to this court.

II

¶ 8. The legislature enacted 1995 Wisconsin Act 17 before Matthies filed his complaint, but after his accident. 1995 Wisconsin Act 17 amended Wis. Stat. § 895.045 as follows:

Section 1. 895.045 of the statutes is renumbered 895.045(1) and amended to read:
895.045(1) (title) COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. Contributory negligence shall does not bar recovery in an action by any person or the preson's person's legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such that negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable attributed to the person recovering. The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent. The liability of each person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is less than 51% is limited to the percentage of the total causal negligence attributed to that person. A person found to be causally negligent whose percentage of causal negligence is 51% or more shall be jointly and severally liable for the damages allowed.

[1]

¶ 9. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.045's predecessor, § 331.045, changed the common law rule of contributory negligence that had existed since the beginning of Wisconsin's jurisprudence. A plaintiff's contributory negligence, of any amount, was a complete defense and barred the plaintiff's recovery. Brewster v. Ludtke, 211 Wis. 344, 247 N.W. 449 (1933). In 1931, the legislature adopted Wis. Stat. § 331.045, which permitted recovery where a plaintiff's negligence is "not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." Ch. 242, Laws of 1931. Under § 331.045, "a plaintiff who is charged with 49 percent of the total negligence recovers 51 percent of his [or her] damage, while one who is charged with 50 percent recovers nothing." Lupie v. Hartzheim, 54 Wis. 2d 415, 416, 195 N.W.2d 461 (1972) (citing Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970)). In 1971, the legislature modified the comparative negligence standard to permit recovery where a plaintiff's negligence is not "greater than" the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Ch. 47, Laws of 1971. "Under this statutory modification, plaintiffs found 50 percent negligent will be able to recover 50 percent of their damages from a defendant who is found to be equally at fault." Lupie, 54 Wis. 2d at 417. This is the comparative negligence standard we have in Wisconsin today. Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1).

[2, 3]

¶ 10. Some cases only involve one tortfeasor, and so, the negligence is divided, if appropriate, between the two. Where cases involve multiple tortfeasors, "this court has repeatedly interpreted the comparative negligence statute as clearly providing that the comparison of negligence between the plaintiff and multiple tort-feasors involves a separate comparison between the plaintiff and each of the defendants." Soczka v. Rechner, 73 Wis. 2d 157, 164, 242 N.W.2d 910 (1976). The legislature appears to address this rule in the first sentence that it added to Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1): "The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent."8 1995 Wis. Act 17, § 1. Given that a plaintiff's negligence cannot be greater than the person against whom recovery is sought, a plaintiff's negligence cannot exceed the negligence of any one of the defendants, or the plaintiff cannot recover against that defendant. Wis. Stat. § 895.045(1). Where there are multiple defendants, the percentage of negligence that is allocated to each of the defendants found causally negligent cannot be combined to establish that the defendants' negligence is equal to or greater than the plaintiff's. Ford, Bacon & Davis,96 Wis. 2d at 326-27; Mariuzza v. Kenower, 68 Wis. 2d 321, 325, 228 N.W.2d 702 (1975). Even where multiple defendants may be jointly and severally liable, a plaintiff cannot recover from any one...

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