Mattice v. Dunden
| Decision Date | 07 February 1938 |
| Docket Number | 26836. |
| Citation | 75 P.2d 1014,193 Wash. 447 |
| Parties | MATTICE v. DUNDEN et al. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Roger J. Meakim, Judge.
Action by Clyde M. Mattice against Marjory Dunden, administratrix of the estate of Dorothy I. Wittwer, deceased, and another, to recover possession of an automobile, wherein the defendants filed a cross-complaint. Judgment for the named defendant adjudging her to be entitled to possession of the automobile and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank E. Hammond, of Seattle, for appellant.
Houghton Cluck & Coughlin, of Seattle, for respondents.
This action was instituted by plaintiff to recover possession of an automobile. In his complaint he alleges that he is the owner of and entitled to possession of a certain described automobile which was on the 12th day of August, 1936, taken by defendants without his knowledge or consent.
In their answer and cross-complaint, defendants, besides making a general denial, allege that defendant Marjory Dunden is administratrix of the estate of Dorothy I. Wittwer, deceased and is the owner of the automobile in her capacity as administratrix.
The action was tried to the court sitting without a jury. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered, and thereafter judgment rendered denying any relief to plaintiff, but adjudging defendant, as administratrix, to be the owner of and entitled to the possession of the automobile. Motion for a new trial was made by plaintiff and denied by the court. From the judgment in favor of defendant administratrix and the order denying his motion for a new trial, plaintiff has appealed.
No statement of facts has been brought to this court.
Appellant contends the judgment is against the findings as made by the trial court.
The findings of fact, in part, recite as follows: That during the lifetime of Dorothy I. Wittwer she employed plaintiff as a nurse at an agreed salary of $50 per month, the salary amounting to a total of $1,350; that on January 1, 1936, it was agreed that plaintiff had due him a balance of $662.35. Shortly thereafter plaintiff herein and Dorothy I. Wittwer, acting on behalf of the plaintiff, negotiated with the McFarland Motor Company for the purchase of the motorcar which is in litigation here; she becoming the nominal purchaser under a written conditional sales contract. In such contract Dorothy I. Wittwer was named as vendee and the McFarland Motor Company as vendor, and it was provided therein that the sum of $50 would be paid upon the execution of the contract and $35 each month for twenty-six consecutive months. A further finding was to the effect that the license was issued in Dorothy I. Wittwer's name, and she also applied for and received title certificate issued by the state of Washington, department of licenses, showing her as the registered owner and the McFarland Motor Company as the legal owner. At the time of the purchase of the automobile plaintiff was indebted to divers and sundry individuals, firms, and corporations, and certain judgments were outstanding against him of record in the superior court of King county; that such purchase was made in the name of Dorothy I. Wittwer to avoid the seizure of the automobile and the sale thereof by creditors of plaintiff; and that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal any interest or ownership, or right of possession plaintiff may have had in the automobile.
It is further related that plaintiff continued in the employ of Dorothy I. Wittwer until her death on July 21, 1936, at which time he had earned the sum of $350 in addition to the amount due him on January 1, 1936. Dorothy I. Wittwer was physically incapable of driving an automobile, due to an affliction in her feet, and never drove the car after its purchase, riding in it only when driven by the plaintiff. After her death the entire balance due on the contract, with the exception of $71.12, was paid by the administratrix from funds belonging to the estate. At all times after its purchase the automobile was in the physical possession of plaintiff up to the time it was taken by the defendants.
The conclusions of law made by the court recited that plaintiff was estopped from claiming either the title to or the possession of the automobile.
Appellant contends, first, that in order to prevail upon the ground of estoppel it was necessary for the respondents to plead it in...
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Lejeune v. Clallam County
...would be to sanction a second adjudication even though a first, presumptively correct one has already been made. Mattice v. Dunden, 193 Wash. 447, 450, 75 P.2d 1014 (1938) (decision presumed correct); Greene v. National Sur. Co., 140 Wash. 230, 232, 248 P. 803 (1926) In this case, we have n......
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State v. Manley, No. 53929-9-I (WA 7/18/2005)
...Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)). 25. Id. (citing Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 35, 666 P.2d 351 (1993); Mattice v. Dunden, 193 Wash. 447, 450, 75 P.2d 1014 (1938)). 26. State v. Ray, 116 Wn.2d 531, 547, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991) (citing State v. Camarillo, 115 Wn.2d 60, 70, 794 P.2d ......
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Smith v. Shannon
...of its reasoning is concededly somewhat vague. The judgment of a trial court is presumed to be correct, however. Mattice v. Dunden, 193 Wash. 447, 450, 75 P.2d 1014 (1938). In particular, "when the language of findings is equivocal and susceptible of ... another construction, the findings w......
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In re Levas' Estate
... ... have been testified to either by appellant's own ... witnesses or by respondents without objection. Mattice v ... Dunden, 193 Wash. 447, 75 P.2d 1014; Peoples Bank & ... Trust Co. v. Carlson, 195 Wash. 285, 80 P.2d 812; ... Terhune v ... ...