Mattingly v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 20 October 1931 |
| Citation | 240 Ky. 625 |
| Parties | Mattingly v. Commonwealth. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
5. Criminal Law. — Court of Appeals has power and duty to set aside conviction palpably against evidence.
6. Criminal Law. — Verdict is not palpably against evidence when there is proof from which inferences may be drawn to justify jury's finding.
7. Criminal Law. — Credibility of witnesses and deductions reasonably to be drawn from conflicting testimony are exclusively within jury's province.
8. Criminal Law. — Appellate court refused to consider claim that accused in homicide case was prejudiced by fatal shooting occurring near jury, where no objection was made until after verdict.
9. Criminal Law. — Accused may not experiment with jury by ignoring fact occurring during trial and then obtain new trial because of that fact.
10. Criminal Law. — Jury verdict, after fair trial fully supported by evidence, cannot be disturbed, in absence of prejudicial error.
Appeal from Bell Circuit Court.
LOGAN E. PATTERSON for appellant.
J.W. CAMMACK, Attorney General, and SAMUEL B. KIRBY, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Affirming.
Abram Mattingly was convicted of the crime of murder and condemned to serve a life sentence in the penitentiary. He has prosecuted an appeal, insisting that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of an immature witness, that the verdict of the jury was flagrantly against the evidence, and that he was prejudiced by a fatal shooting affair that occurred during and near the scene of the trial.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the contentions may be briefly recited: James Vaughn had attended a social gathering and was returning home with a young lady. Mattingly was following closely, and approached Vaughn, asking for a match. Vaughn gave him a match which he failed to ignite, and the request was repeated. Another match was given him by Vaughn, which also failed to ignite. A third request of Mattingly for a match was complied with by Vaughn, and, as he did so, asked in substance, "How many matches does it take to light your cigarette, Buddy?" Mattingly took offense at the question, and addressed a profane and insulting remark to Vaughn. A fight ensued, in which Mattingly stabbed Vaughn so severely that he died within a few hours. There was testimony tending to show, and the evidence as a whole warranted the conclusion, that Mattingly purposely provoked the difficulty with the intention of killing Vaughn. There was evidence, however, that the killing occurred in sudden heat and passion, and Mattingly claimed that he acted entirely in self-defense. The jury was properly instructed on all features of the case, and every hypothesis suggested by the evidence was covered.
Willis Gibson, a boy of eleven years of age, was permitted to testify against appellant over his objection, and he now insists that the boy was so immature and so ignorant of the nature of an oath that he was wholly incompetent as a witness. A preliminary examination of the witness was conducted by the trial court in which the boy stated he knew the meaning of the truth, and how to tell it, although he did not know that he could be put in jail for perjury. He stated that he would tell the truth, as near as he could. His testimony upon the trial, as reported in the transcript of the evidence, is coherent and clear and entirely consistent with testimony given by other witnesses. Indeed, the testimony of the boy was less damaging to the appellant than was that given by some of the other witnesses. The rule respecting the subject is that a child offered as a witness having sufficient natural intelligence, and having been so instructed as to comprehend the nature of the act of telling the truth, and the consequences of willful falsehood, must be admitted to testify. The question becomes then one of credibility and not one of competency. Bright v. Com., 120 Ky. 298, 86 S.W. 527, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 677, 117 Am. St. Rep. 590; Meade v. Com., 214 Ky. 88, 282 S.W. 781; Leahman v. Broughton, 196 Ky. 146 244 S.W. 403; Merchant v. Com., 140 Ky. 12, 130 S.W. 793; Orvin v. Com., 239 Ky. 767. The trial court, in this case, did not err in admitting the testimony of the Gibson boy. The jury had a right to hear his testimony and to give it such weight as it merited.
The argument that the verdict of the jury was palpably against the evidence proceeds mainly upon the contention that the severity of the sentence was not justified by any evidence in ...
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