Mattingly v. COURT ON JUDICIARY, TRIAL DIV.

• Decision Date: 05 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. CJAD-2000-1.,CJAD-2000-1.
• Citation: 8 P.3d 943,2000 OK JUD 1
• Parties: William H. MATTINGLY, Associate District Judge, Osage County, Oklahoma, Petitioner, v. The COURT ON the JUDICIARY, TRIAL DIVISION, Respondent.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

8 P.3d 943

2000 OK JUD 1

William H. MATTINGLY, Associate District Judge, Osage County, Oklahoma, Petitioner, v. The COURT ON the JUDICIARY, TRIAL DIVISION, Respondent.

No. CJAD-2000-1.

Court on the Judiciary of Oklahoma, Appellate Division.

July 5, 2000.

W. Robert Wilson, Wilson & Payne, Pawhuska, Oklahoma, for Petitioner, William H. Mattingly, Associate District Judge, Osage County, Oklahoma.

W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and Cynthia L. Sparling, Short, Wiggins Margo & Adler, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent, Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division.

PER CURIAM.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 1 On February 10, 2000 the State of Oklahoma ex rel. W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma, filed a petition in the Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division, against Petitioner here, William H. Mattingly. Judge Mattingly is the Associate District Judge in Osage County, Oklahoma. The Attorney General filed his petition on the basis of allegations supplied to him by the Council on Judicial Complaints and alleged that Judge Mattingly had delayed filing an order disposing of a divorce case for 115 days following the time the case became at issue. The Attorney General alleged that the Court on the Judiciary's jurisdiction was based on Okla. Const. Art. 7-A § 4. Section 4 mandates that any petition invoking the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary "shall state . . . the grounds upon which his removal from office or compulsory retirement from office is sought." Nevertheless, the Attorney General did not allege that Judge Mattingly should either be removed from office or required to retire. Instead, the Attorney General alleged "that the above-enumerated acts by Respondent [Judge Mattingly] warrant discipline."

¶ 2 The Attorney General alleged that Judge Mattingly had violated Rule 27, Rules for District Courts, which provides, "In any matter taken under advisement, a decision shall be rendered within sixty (60) days of the date on which the matter was taken under advisement or, if briefs are to be submitted, within sixty (60) days of the date of the filing of the final brief. . . ." It is undisputed that Judge Mattingly had filed his order about which the Council on Judicial Complaints and the Attorney General complain before the investigation of his conduct was begun.

¶ 3 The Attorney General also alleged as misconduct against Judge Mattingly the filing of other delinquent orders. One of these delinquent orders had been the subject of a request by the Council on Judicial Complaints, in 1998, to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to approve a private reprimand of Judge Mattingly. The Council on Judicial Complaints, however, dismissed its complaint when the Supreme Court called for briefs on the constitutionality of 20 O.S. Supp.1997 § 1658.¹ The 1997 amendment to § 1658 purported to invest the Council on Judicial Complaints, subject to the approval of the Chief Justice, with jurisdiction to "issue reprimands and admonitions."² According to the Attorney General's petition in the current action, although the Council on Judicial Complaints dismissed the complaint it had filed with the Chief Justice, the Council advised Judge Mattingly that, despite its having been dismissed, the Council's complaint against him would "become a part of the permanent record of the Judge."

¶ 4 On March 3, 2000, Judge Mattingly filed an answer, a motion to dismiss, alternative motion to strike or for summary judgment, and a supporting brief before the Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division. In his motion to dismiss, Judge Mattingly contended that the Council on Judicial Complaints and the Court on the Judiciary were without jurisdiction in the matter. The presiding judge of the Trial Division notified Judge Mattingly's counsel that Judge Mattingly's motions would not be specially set for hearing but instead would be considered by the court as a preliminary matter on the morning the matter was set for trial on the merits, April 24, 2000.

¶ 5 Judge Mattingly then filed this original action, contending that the Trial Division's refusal to consider his motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Council on Judicial Complaints and the Court on the Judiciary before the morning the matter was set for trial on its merits deprived him of a remedy to seek relief from this Court. Judge Mattingly contended that if his motions were either denied or taken under advisement by the Trial Division he would be deprived of the right to seek an extraordinary writ from this Court. Judge Mattingly argued that a remedy by appeal after a trial on the merits would have been inadequate because the Trial Division would have proceeded to trial on the matter, although it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

¶ 6 On March 30, 2000, Judge Mattingly filed in this Court an application to assume original jurisdiction, a petition for writ of prohibition, and for an order staying proceedings in the Trial Division. On April 18, 2000, we entered an order assuming original jurisdiction and staying all proceedings in the Trial Division until further order of the Court.

ISSUE

¶ 7 Do the Council on Judicial Complaints and the Court on the Judiciary have jurisdiction to consider matters concerning the conduct of judges that, even if proven to be true, would not be so serious as to warrant the judge's removal from office or compulsory retirement?

We answer the question no.

DISCUSSION

I.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear and act on Judge Mattingly's petition for extraordinary relief.

¶ 8 This Court has power to hear and consider original actions and issue extraordinary writs where the claim is made that the Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division, has exceeded its jurisdiction. Okla. Const. Article 7-A § 3(c) provides:

In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Court [on the Judiciary] is vested with full judicial power and authority, including the power to . . . issue all manner of judicial and remedial process and writs, legal or equitable. . . . The specific enumeration of powers herein shall not derogate from the existence of other judicial power and authority in the Court, or from the exercise thereof in aid of its jurisdiction.

¶ 9 In Haworth v. Court on the Judiciary, Trial Division, 1975 OK JUD 1, 684 P.2d 1217, we assumed original jurisdiction and issued a writ prohibiting the Trial Division from proceeding further in a matter filed against a judge. There, we held that 20 O.S.1981 § 1659 was unconstitutional to the extent that it purported to impose a mandatory duty upon the Attorney General to file an action against a judge at the direction of the Council on Judicial Complaints without the Attorney General's independent exercise of discretion.³ We said in Haworth,

We find that the Oklahoma Constitution, which created the Court on the Judiciary, by naming the officers and bodies who can invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary, has purposely limited this group and that it cannot be enlarged nor can the discretion of said group be limited by legislative action.

684 P.2d at 1218. The teaching of Haworth is that the Council on Judicial Complaints lacks jurisdiction "to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary" or to substitute its own discretion for that of the officers charged with that duty by the constitution.⁴

We held in Haworth, and reaffirm now, that this Court has authority to assume original jurisdiction in an appropriate case. We hold, therefore, that we have jurisdiction in this matter to issue any writ that may be necessary in aid of our jurisdiction.

¶ 10 We hold that the Trial Division should have set Judge Mattingly's motions, which if granted would have disposed of the matter, sufficiently in advance of the trial date to have allowed Judge Mattingly time to seek relief from this Court in the event of an adverse ruling. The jurisdictional questions raised by Judge Mattingly's motions raised serious questions as to the Trial Division's jurisdiction and were unmixed questions of law. The failure of the Trial Division to dispose of them sufficiently in advance of the trial date to afford Judge Mattingly an opportunity to seek relief from this Court before trial deprived Judge Mattingly of his due process right to test the Trial Division's jurisdiction and to avoid expending the time and money required by a trial.

II.

The Council on Judicial Complaints and the Court on the Judiciary are without jurisdiction to consider allegations of misconduct by a judge that, even if true, would not call for the judge's removal from office or compulsory retirement.

¶ 11 The Court on the Judiciary was created by a series of amendments to the constitution, Okla. Const. Art. 7-A §§ 1 et seq., passed by a vote of the people in 1966. Okla. Const. Art. 7-A § 1 provides that judges

. . . shall be subject to removal from office, or to compulsory retirement from office, for causes herein specified, by the Court on the Judiciary.

Okla. Const. Art. 7-A § 1(a). Those causes are:

. . . Gross neglect of duty; corruption in office; habitual drunkenness; commission while in office of any offense involving moral turpitude; gross partiality in office; oppression in office; or other grounds as may be specified hereafter by the legislature."

Okla. Const. Art. 7-A § 1(b).

¶ 12 Okla. Const. Art. 7-A § 4 provides:

The petition [invoking the jurisdiction of the Court on the Judiciary] shall state . . . the grounds upon which his removal from office or compulsory retirement from office is sought.

[Emphasis added.] Okla. Const. Art. 7-A § 4(a). Under §§ 1 and 4, then, proceedings properly brought under Art. 7-A must be for no other purpose than that of removing or retiring the judge who is the subject of the proceeding.

¶ 13 The quoted portions of §§ 1 and 4 expressly limit the Court on the Judiciary's jurisdiction to those matters where the respondent judge's "removal from office or...