Mattingly v. Moss

Decision Date11 May 2020
Docket NumberNo. 19-0055,19-0055
PartiesRobert Lee Mattingly, Jr., Plaintiff Below, Petitioner, v. Robert Moss, Defendant Below, Respondent.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

(Ritchie County 18-C-2)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Robert Lee Mattingly, Jr., by counsel Joseph H. Kozlowski, James L. Lindsay and Jennifer N. Taylor, appeals the December 6, 2018 order of the Circuit Court of Ritchie County, West Virginia, granting summary judgment to Respondent. Respondent Robert Moss, by counsel John M. Butler, filed a response in support of the circuit court's order. Petitioner filed a reply. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in granting respondent's motion for summary judgment because it misapplied the doctrine of res judicata and failed to recognize that equity demands petitioner be given his day in court.

The Court has considered the parties' briefs, the appendix record, and the applicable law. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the parties' have agreed that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.1 Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court's order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Petitioner lives in Pleasants County and rents out a house that is also located on the same property where he resides. Respondent also lives in Pleasants County, and is a well-tender, who maintained the gas wells that were located on petitioner's property. Petitioner and respondent became acquainted and often visited when respondent passed through petitioner's property while working.

In July 2015, respondent was visiting with petitioner at his home when law enforcement authorities arrived and placed petitioner under arrest.2 Petitioner asked respondent, and respondent agreed, to take care of petitioner's property, his rental property and his dog until he was released from jail.

Petitioner was incarcerated from July, 2015, until January, 2017, even though he had initially thought his incarceration was going to be brief. When he realized it wasn't, respondent visited petitioner at the North Central Regional Jail and agreed to continue to take care of petitioner's dog and property. Petitioner said as part of that agreement, he signed eight blank checks from his two bank accounts and gave them to respondent. Thereafter, on October 21, 2015, petitioner executed a hand-written document ("Power of Attorney") appointing respondent his "power of attorney in all [petitioner's] personal and business" matters while petitioner was incarcerated. Petitioner signed the Power of Attorney and it was notarized. The Power of Attorney also specifically provided for respondent to address any issues that arose at petitioner's rental property, including collecting rent, and "speaking with the courts in preparation for an eviction notice to the tenanet [sic] on my notification."

According to respondent, while petitioner was incarcerated, respondent paid bills for petitioner; collected petitioner's mail and took it to him; cared for petitioner's dog, house, rental property, and vehicle; and managed any issues with a tenant on petitioner's property, which included filing a civil eviction and obtaining judgment for damages to the rental property in the amount of $5,000. Respondent stated that he handled all of the expenses associated with these activities by utilizing the checks signed by petitioner, and spent approximately $23,000 for the total care of petitioner's assets and debts for the eighteen months petitioner was jailed. Respondent stated that he turned over all remaining funds and supporting documents to petitioner upon petitioner's release from jail in January, 2017.

Conversely, petitioner claimed that upon his return home from jail he discovered that respondent had withdrawn over $23,000 from his two bank accounts. Petitioner claims respondent "swindle[d]" the money from him.

On March 1, 2017, petitioner, acting pro se, filed an action in the Magistrate Court of Pleasants County, case number 17-M37C-00032 (hereinafter "Case No. 1"). In the complaint, petitioner averred that respondent withdrew funds in the amount of $16,400, using the Power of Attorney that petitioner provided to him. Petitioner claimed that the funds were misused, and that respondent "did very[,]very little, and still let my home and a [sic] aparment3 [sic] go into ruins [sic][.] But yet he had plenty of time too [sic] withdraw $16,400.00 from my bank account. . . ." Petitioner further averred that respondent "even cash[ed] two checks 1368 & 1369 the same day for $9,000.00[,] surly [sic] not for my selfe [sic][,] dog, house or apparment [sic], in any way." Petitioner expressly "waive[d] . . . [his] rights to anything over 10,000.00."

Also on March 3, 2017, petitioner, again acting pro se, filed a second complaint in the Magistrate Court of Pleasants County, case number 17-M37C-00033 (hereinafter "Case No. 2"). In this complaint, petitioner alleged: "[T]his civil matter is like case 1 in this case Mr. Moss with draw [sic] $7,200.00 under the same circumstances, I feel this is extorson [sic][.] I am asking for $7,200.00 in this suit plus cost[s] this is out of checking acct Community Bank."4

Respondent, by counsel, filed an answer in Case No. 1 and a Motion to Dismiss in Case No. 2. In his answer, respondent stated that "[a]ll records relating to the expenditure of funds w[ere] provided to the Plaintiff after he was released from incarceration so he has all of the accounting documents in his possession." Further, "[a]ny funds not specifically used to the payment of the Plaintiff's debts were used to pay the Defendant for performing a multitude of services." Respondent also stated that he "provided funds into the Plaintiff's commissary account to supply him with items during his incarceration." Respondent claimed that "[t]he Plaintiff owed according to him and [sic] excess of eighty thousand ($80,000.00) dollars in unpaid child support and he desired to keep all funds out of his checking account so that the Bureau of [C]hild Support Enforcement could not attach his checking account." Respondent also stated that during petitioner's incarceration: he paid for petitioner's post office box; he filed "the paperwork in Pleasants County Magistrate Court to evict Bill Shepard for nonpayment of rent and obtained a judgement for Mr. Mattingly in the amount of five thousand ($5,000.00) dollars"; he patched the roof on the garage attached to the house because it was leaking; he winterized the waterlines in the main house and the smaller house so they would not freeze during the winter; he cleaned the ventless heaters in the main house and smaller house to keep the heat running during the winter; he started petitioner's truck periodically to make sure it remained useable; he relocated the truck periodically on petitioner's property to make it look like someone was living on the property; he mowed petitioner's grass; he cared for petitioner's dog; he paid the rest of the bond money to petitioner's bail bondsman; he met with the interlock company to have the equipment removed from petitioner's vehicle as petitioner "was on the Interlock Program when he got caught driving and was sentenced to jail"; he unhooked petitioner's washer and moved it inside so it would not freeze as "it was sitting on the porch of the smaller house"; he picked petitioner up from the St. Mary's Correctional Center when petitioner was released from custody; and he continued to drive petitioner around after petitioner's release from incarceration as petitioner did not have a valid driver's license. Respondent further claimed in his answer that after petitioner's release from incarceration, petitioner spent some $8,000, had been drinking constantly, and "was mean, abusive and misusing medications."

In response to Case No. 2, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that petitioner had already filed Case No. 1, asking for $10,000 in damages, which is the jurisdictional limit for magistrate court. Respondent maintained that in Case No. 2, petitioner averred that "'this civil matter is like case 1.'" Respondent contended that both actions "are all financial matters between the parties relating to Mr. Mattingly being incarcerated and providing Bob Moss with a Power of Attorney to authorize him to take care of business matters while the Plaintiff is incarcerated." Respondent claimed that the two actions could not be separated and that petitioner was attempting to circumvent the jurisdictional limit of $10,000 in magistrate court.

According to respondent's affidavit filed in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment in the subsequent circuit court action, both magistrate court cases were set for hearing on May 17, 2017. On that day, petitioner appeared pro se, and respondent appeared with his attorney. Petitioner was allowed to testify and to present evidence in both cases. By order entered in Case No. 1, the magistrate court found in respondent's favor, stating that "Plaintiff failed to provide proof by the preponderance of the evidence." By order entered in Case No. 2, the magistrate court dismissed the action "without prejudice." Petitioner did not appeal either magistrate court order to the circuit court.

Eight months later, petitioner, who was then represented by counsel, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Ritchie County.5 Petitioner alleged the exact same financial circumstances between the parties from July 2015 through January 2017 as those he previously alleged in the two magistrate court actions. Based on those same facts, petitioner pleaded counts of financial exploitation, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, fraud in the inducement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract....

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